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ABSTRACT 
 
Reclaiming the Ungentlemanly Arts:  
The Global Origins of SOE and OSS. (May 2012) 
Aaron Ray Linderman, B.A., University of Dallas;  
M.A., Institute of World Politics 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. R. J. Q. Adams 
 
Sir Colin McV. Gubbins, former director of Britain‟s Special Operations 
Executive (SOE), explained in 1966 to a Danish audience that it is much easier to 
pronounce a new organization than to actually create it.  This dissertation examines the 
processes whereby SOE was created, including how its doctrine was formulated and 
subsequently disseminated, both to its own agents and to its American counterpart, the 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS).  Traditional narratives, which imply that SOE had no 
precedents, fail to appreciate that Gubbins and his colleagues consciously looked to past 
and contemporary examples for inspiration.  This dissertation follows Gubbins‟s career, 
examining his experience of unconventional warfare in the Allied Intervention in Russia, 
in Ireland during the Irish Revolution, and in India.  To personal experience was added 
the experience of colleagues and the knowledge he gained by study of several other 
historical and contemporary conflicts.  Pragmatically synthesizing this information, 
Gubbins authored two brief guides in 1939: the Art of Guerilla Warfare and the Partisan 
Leader‟s Handbook.  In 1940 Gubbins joined the new SOE and was given charge of 
  
iv 
both operations and training, allowing his ideas to shape SOE‟s agents and form their 
thinking.  Even before the entry of the United States into the Second World War, OSS 
turned to Britain for training in intelligence and sabotage.  SOE played a substantial role 
in this process, propagating Gubbins‟s ideas even further.  Although the Americans drew 
upon their own sources of inspiration as well, SOE and Gubbins‟s doctrines were 
significant, arguably central, to American thinking. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Speaking to a group of Danes after World War II, Sir Colin McV. Gubbins, 
former director of Britain‟s Special Operations Executive (SOE), commented that, “It is 
all very well to „decree‟ an organization, but then someone has to create it.”1  This work 
examines the processes whereby SOE was created, including how its doctrine was 
formulated and subsequently disseminated, both to its own agents and to its American 
counterpart, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). 
 The question of precedents has received some attention – if only in passing – in 
the scholarship of SOE.  A lecture detailing the history of SOE may be taken as 
representative of a common view: “When war broke out the art of underground warfare 
was unknown in England.  There was nothing to build on, no past experience and no 
precedents.”2  Such a narrative makes all the more glorious the subsequent successes of 
SOE and its colleagues in OSS and the various Resistance movements, and plays to 
certain stereotypes of the British amateur jack-of-all-trades gentleman.   
This essay argues that that narrative is wrong, however engaging it may be.  
There were precedents upon which SOE could, and did, draw.  It was not created ex 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of The Journal of British Studies. 
1
 Gubbins address to the Danish/English Society [elsewhere given as “Anglo/Danish Club”], Copenhagen, 
29 April 1966, 4, Gubbins papers 4/1/20, Imperial War Museum (IWM). 
2
 “Brief History of SOE,” 1, The National Archives (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO), HS 7/1.  This 
anonymous document is marked “1st Draft used on 1st Course” though its purpose remains obscure, since it 
appears to have been written in 1946, too late to be utilized in one of SOE‟s many wartime training 
schools. 
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nihilo.  Gubbins and his colleagues consciously looked to past and contemporary 
examples for their inspiration. 
This essay relies heavily on the pioneering research of M. R. D. Foot and the 
impressive work of Peter Wilkinson and Joan Bright Astley.  Journalists sometimes 
claim to write the first draft of history; in the case of SOE, however, there was no such 
journalistic account.  As a secret organization, it had very little meaningful history 
available to the public before Foot‟s SOE in France, published in 1966.  Thus, he, 
Wilkinson, Astley, and other members of the first generation of SOE historians have had 
to do the difficult but very necessary task of accurately establishing basic facts: who did 
what, when and where.  Their work has not only added to the historical record, but has 
done so with insightful comment, lively writing and patriotism of the truest sort, a 
patriotism which is not blinded by pride but which rejoices in its service of fellow man.
3
 
With the broad outlines of SOE‟s history already traced, the current writer has 
the luxury to step back and ask more analytic questions.  Who were the men and women 
of SOE?  Where did they come from?  What ideas underlay their strategy and tactics?  
How did they learn to do the things they did?  These questions, which may appear 
deceptively simple at first glance, point us toward more intellectually complex 
questions: What was SOE‟s doctrine, and where did it come from?   
SOE was created by the merger of two earlier organizations, Section D, a branch 
of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) and General Staff (Research) (GS[R]), a 
                                                 
3
 Regarding SOE in France, Gubbins wrote to Foot: “May I say at once that I was immensely impressed 
by the way you have marshaled the multiplicity of events and evidence into a continuous narrative which 
reads so convincingly and – if I may so presume – by the balanced judgment you have achieved and given 
from a welter of conflicting opinions.”  Gubbins to Foot, 1 January 1964, Gubbins papers 3/2/57, IWM. 
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branch of the War Office. As historian Simon Anglim observes, “The historians of SOE, 
William Mackenzie, M. R. D. Foot and Mark Seaman, all discuss [GS(R)] summarily 
and in terms of its input into SOE.”4  The story of these agencies and their leading light, 
Colin Gubbins, must be told.  This essay follows Gubbins‟s career from 1914 onward, 
examining his experience of unconventional warfare, first in the Allied Intervention in 
Russia (1919), most importantly in Ireland during the Irish Revolution (1919-1922), and 
then, to a much lesser extent, in British India (1923-1930).  To this personal experience 
was added the experience of colleagues who served in these same places and also in 
Iraq.  Gubbins‟s knowledge of unconventional warfare was further augmented by study 
of several other conflicts: the Second Anglo-Boer War, the Arab Revolt led by T. E. 
Lawrence, the German guerrilla war in East Africa, the Revolt in Palestine between the 
World Wars, the Spanish Civil War, and the Second Sino-Japanese War.   
With this knowledge at his disposal, in 1939 Gubbins authored two brief guides, 
the Art of Guerilla Warfare and the Partisan Leader‟s Handbook.5  The approach in both 
is pragmatic, only venturing into theory when necessary.  Gubbins wanted to create 
“how-to guides,” works “intended for the actual fighting partisans, tactical and not 
strategic.”6  One writer describes the Art as “the first synthesis of British unconventional 
warfare doctrine, or at any rate the first codification of irregular experience.  The work is 
                                                 
4
 Simon Anglim, Orde Wingate and the British Army, 1922-1944 (London, 2010), 105. 
5
 Note that Gubbins spells “guerilla” with only one “r”, whereas the accepted spelling today is “guerrilla.”  
However, his original spelling will be preserved in this title and in quotations. 
6
 Gubbins, quoted in Peter Wilkinson and Joan Bright Astley, Gubbins and SOE (London, 1997), 34. 
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bold, original and arguably unique; an incisive summary of lessons learned from Russia, 
Ireland, Arabia and elsewhere.”7   
The fruits of the various conflicts which Gubbins studied may be found 
throughout these two works: the centrality of the local population; the collection, 
protection and use of intelligence; the necessity of cooperating with conventional forces; 
and the use of speed, surprise and escape in carrying out ambush operations.  The 
historian Józef Garliński, who fought with the Polish Resistance, argues that “before the 
outbreak of war, before mobilization, when no one knew what turn events would take or 
how the Germans would overrun Europe, preparations were already in hand for 
underground warfare in territories that might fall under their control.  In this field, 
Britain was better prepared for war than any other country.”8  That preparation was the 
result of early planning by Gubbins and a handful of colleagues. 
Having formulated his ideas regarding guerrilla warfare, these ideas were given 
time to gestate while Gubbins liaised with the Poles in 1939, commanded troops in 
Norway in 1940, and made plans for the use of guerrillas in Britain itself, should it be 
invaded by the Germans.  Though of some significance, none of these actions would 
have earned the place that Gubbins deserves in history; that came in 1940, when he was 
invited by Minister Hugh Dalton to join the new Special Operations Executive, an 
organization within the Ministry of Economic Warfare tasked with supporting resistance 
and subversive activities in Nazi-occupied Europe.  Upon his arrival at SOE, Gubbins 
                                                 
7
 William Cassidy, introduction to Colin McV. Gubbins, The Art of Guerilla Warfare (San Francisco, 
1981), vi.  The 1981 reprints by Interservice Press of Gubbins‟s pamphlets should not be taken for books 
in the ordinary sense; they are pages stapled together between construction paper covers.  The author 
observed them in the Rare Books, Manuscripts & Archives section of the Georgetown University Library. 
8
 Józef Garliński, Poland, SOE and the Allies, Paul Stevenson, trans. (London, 1969), 25. 
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was not only given charge of operations, but also training.  Thus, it was his ideas that 
shaped SOE‟s agents and formed their thinking on irregular warfare.  When he was 
promoted to be Deputy Director and then Director of SOE, the significance of his 
thinking – and the many years of irregular conflict which informed it – only became 
more acute.  In 1942 Lord Selborne, then Minister of Economic Warfare, explained to 
Prime Minister Churchill:  “There is perhaps no officer, other than the Chief of S.O.E., 
who is more vital to the continuance of the work of this organisation than Brigadier 
Gubbins.  He has seen the growth of S.O.E. from its early beginnings, and… has 
acquired a technique, a knowledge and experience which are really irreplaceable.”9  If 
the story of SOE‟s doctrinal origins is to be told, Gubbins must be its central character.  
This essay is thus part biography, part intellectual history, and part organizational 
history; SOE cannot be understood apart from the ideas that animated it, nor can those 
ideas be understood apart from the life of Colin Gubbins, who did so much to shape 
them. 
 The United States turned to Britain for training in intelligence and sabotage, even 
before the formal entry of the US into the Second World War.  SOE played a significant 
role in this training process, which rapidly blossomed after the formal entry of the US 
into the war.  As the British lent instructors and their training syllabus to the Americans, 
Gubbins‟s ideas were propagated even further.  The Americans had their own sources of 
                                                 
9
 Selborne to Churchill, 13 May 1942, Gubbins papers 3/1/8.  Churchill eventually replied: “I am glad it 
has been possible to meet your wishes in this matter and that Brigadier Gubbins will be able to continue on 
the important work on which he is now engaged.”  Churchill to Selborne, May 1942, Gubbins papers 
3/1/9. 
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inspiration to draw upon when formulating ideas about irregular warfare, but SOE and 
Gubbins‟s doctrines played a key role. 
 
Writing about SOE 
 On 7 November 1949, Gubbins visited Roger Makins, of the Foreign Office, to 
discuss the possibility of writing a book about his experiences during World War II.  The 
following month he received a letter from another Foreign Office official, William 
Strange.  “The proposal has now been fully discussed by all the authorities concerned,” 
Strange explained.  “The publication even of such a sober and balanced review as you 
would write would be undesirable on security grounds….  The technique of organising 
resistance movements does not alter greatly with the passage of time and we could not 
be sure that your book might not give valuable assistance to a future enemy.”10  But 
following the publication of a series of unauthorized memoirs and Foot‟s authorized 
SOE in France in 1966, the climate began to shift.  By 1970, Robin Brook – who had 
served in SOE‟s Western Europe section and went on to become a director of the Bank 
of England – explained to the Foreign Secretary that “the techniques of subversion and 
sabotage have been so largely transformed since SOE‟s day that a mild office censorship 
on the final text [of a new book on SOE] could exclude anything in the least harmful.”11    
With the passage of time, many of SOE‟s secrets lost their deadly associations. 
 If security is no longer a major concern when writing about SOE, there remains 
the problem of sources.  It has been suggested that a fire in early 1946 destroyed a 
                                                 
10
 William Strange (Foreign Office) to Gubbins, 10 December 1949, Gubbins papers 3/2/48, IWM. 
11
 Robin Brook to Foreign Secretary, September 1970, Gubbins papers 3/2/57, IWM. 
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significant quantity of documents relating to SOE.
12
  Gubbins strenuously denied this, 
explaining,  
The suggestion of a fire in the small remaining office in Baker Street in January 
1946 destroying any important files is absolutely wide of the mark.  I returned 
from the Far East… about the end of December, 1945 to find nothing remained 
of S.O.E. except this little remnant.  Everything else… had been transferred to 
„C‟ [the director of the Secret Intelligence Service] including all operational 
files…. There have been suggestions ever since the War, rather nasty ones, that 
S.O.E. destroyed material that would have incriminated itself.  This is absolutely 
false, as the Historical Section was formed long before the end of the War, and 
worked independently under the War Cabinet Historical Section, which neither I 
nor any other Offices in S.O.E. had any control.
13
 
In spite of this insistence, a number of writers have commented on the famous fire of 
February 1946.  C. B. Townshend, the first professional archivist to attempt an 
organization of the SOE papers after the war, noted that the fire “destroyed an unknown 
quantity of records the subject of which it has been impossible to trace.”14  Duncan 
Stuart, former SOE Advisor at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, observes that 
several independent sources of evidence confirm the damage to the Belgian files, which 
still bear the burn marks.
15
 
 Apart from the state of the SOE archives generally, there is the problem of 
sources regarding its earliest days.  Section D, one of SOE‟s two predecessor agencies, 
belonged to the Secret Intelligence Service, which as a rule does not release documents.  
Likewise, Gubbins himself noted that “there are no records that I know of on the matter” 
                                                 
12
 M. R. D. Foot, SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in 
France, 1940-1944 (London, 1966), 450. 
13
 Gubbins to Foot, 31 January 1964, 2, Gubbins papers 3/2/57, IWM. 
14
 C. B. Townshend‟s report of 17 December 1974 held by SOE Advisor; quoted in Duncan Stuart, “„Of 
Historical Interest Only‟: The Origins and Vicissitudes of the SOE Archives,” in Special Operations 
Executive: A New Instrument of War, Mark Seaman, ed. (London, 2006), 222. 
15
 Stuart, “Of Historical Interest Only,” 222-23. 
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of GS(R), the other predecessor.
16
  In spite of the fact that GS(R) kept a war diary, it has 
not survived among the SOE papers held in Britain‟s National Archives.17  This paucity 
of sources is not entirely the product of secrecy.  Section D and GS(R) were both quite 
small when compared to SOE at its wartime height; thus, the number of documents 
produced by SOE dwarfs that of either of its predecessor agencies.  Moreover, as is the 
case with any wartime organization, records from the end of the war are simply more 
plentiful, due to the frequent practice of throwing out old papers in a bid to save space. 
 Finally, when discussing SOE, one is bound to run into the question posed by 
Foot: “Was SOE any good?”  There are certainly critics who insist it was not.  The 
military historian John Keegan concludes that SOE was costly, misguided, and 
pointless.
18
  In contrast, Foot argues that SOE did a great deal of good, providing 
considerable support to the Allied war effort at a relatively low cost.
19
  The overall value 
of SOE and irregular warfare will be considered briefly in the conclusion of the present 
work.  However, this ongoing debate about SOE‟s success or failure can sometimes 
obscure other questions about what SOE and OSS actually did and why they did it.  
Should sabotage officers work alone or in conjunction with local populations?  How 
closely should their activities be coordinated with military operations?  And how much 
                                                 
16
 “CG‟s Comments on Foot‟s Book,” nd, 1, Gubbins papers, 3/2/57, IWM. 
17
 On the existence of this war diary, see Joan Bright Astley, The Inner Circle: A View of War at the Top 
(Durham, 2007), 42.  GS(R) was followed by MI(R), whose war diary is extant, though it begins only with 
the outbreak of war in September 1939.  It may be found in the TNA: PRO, HS 8/263. 
18
 John Keegan, The Second World War (London, 1989), 483-85.  It should be noted, however, that 
Keegan‟s criticism of SOE is part of his larger argument – found across numerous works – that “victory 
is… bought with blood rather than brains.”  Thus, in addition to criticizing SOE, he also qualifies the 
utility of intelligence, calling it “the handmaiden, not the mistress, of the warrior.”  Keegan, Intelligence in 
War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to al-Qaeda (New York, 2003), 6. 
19
 M. R. D. Foot, “Was SOE Any Good?” Journal of Contemporary History XVI, no. 1 (January 1981): 
167-81. 
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should be expected from them?  Gubbins engaged with these questions as he sifted the 
experience of four decades of unconventional warfare. 
 
Introducing Colin Gubbins 
Who was this Colin Gubbins?  William Stevenson, author of the New York Times 
bestseller, A Man Called Intrepid, describes him as 
an unusual man-at-arms….  Gubbins dressed immaculately, wore a red carnation 
in his buttonhole, and carried kidskin gloves.  One acquaintance remembered him 
as “an amiable, rather vague sort of chap with no particular talents and some sort 
of desk job in the War Office.”  His middle name was McVeagh, and deep in his 
ancestry had been planted the instincts of a buccaneer.  Years of practice had 
taught him to conceal this, along with fluency in Slavic languages and a most 
curious record of travel that one did not associate with officers of the regular 
army….  His instructions for blowing up tanks by filling bottles with gasoline 
and rags became known later, when the Russians adopted them, as “Molotov 
cocktails.”20 
Unfortunately, only bits and pieces of Stevenson‟s account are true; it is – at best – a dim 
reflection of historical events.  Of A Man Called Intrepid, Hugh Trevor-Roper wrote in 
the New York Review of Books, “This book… is, from start to finish, utterly worthless.”21  
Likewise, Foot has said A Man Called Intrepid is “historically worthless.”22  Who, then, 
was the real historical Colin Gubbins?  His life was every bit as exciting as Stevenson‟s 
pulp fiction account, perhaps more so for having actually happened. 
 Certain details of Stevenson‟s description quoted above are copied without 
attribution from an account written five years earlier by Gubbins‟s one-time secretary, 
                                                 
20
 William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War (New York, 1976), 46.  Stevenson 
misspells  “McVean.”  Throughout this essay, all spellings within quotations are reproduced from the 
original.  
21
 Quoted in David Stafford, “„Intrepid‟: Myth and Reality,” Journal of Contemporary History XXII, no. 2 
(April 1987): 303. 
22
 Quoted in Stafford, “Intrepid,” 305.  
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Joan Bright Astley: the carnation in the buttonhole, the smooth suède gloves, and the use 
of the terms “man-at-arms” and “buccaneer.”23  But Astley does not misspell his middle 
name, nor attribute the Molotov cocktail – likely invented in Spain in the autumn of 
1936, and given its present moniker in Finland – to him.24  She does, however, describe 
Gubbins as “quiet-mannered, quiet-spoken, energetic, efficient and charming.  A „still 
waters running deep‟ sort of man, he had just enough of the buccaneer in him to make 
lesser men underrate his gifts of leadership, courage and integrity.…  He was dark and 
short, his fingers square.”25   
 In studying Gubbins, one is struck by his incredible balance.  He was a man of 
creativity and intellectual power; after the war he occupied much of his time visiting art 
galleries, reading novels, and watching ballet.
26
  However, he never attended university, 
and his writing always remained accessible to the common man, even if it contained a 
few romantic flourishes.  Gubbins possessed considerable belief in the importance of 
ungentlemanly warfare; his zeal for his work made him “the driving force behind 
SOE.”27  But Gubbins was no wild-eyed fanatic.  When in the mid-1950s the future 
historian M. R. D. Foot and a group of his fellow Oxford students decided to attack a 
railway bridge in Hungary, in support of that country‟s anti-Soviet aspirations, he looked 
                                                 
23
 Astley, Inner Circle, 21-22. 
24
 Anthony Beevor, The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (New York, 2006), 78; Eloise 
Engle and Lauri Paananen, The Winter War: The Soviet Attack on Finland, 1939-1940 (Mechanicsburg, 
PA, 1973), 39; William Trotter, A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940 (Chapel Hill, 
1991), 72. 
25
 Astley, Inner Circle, 21-22. 
26
 Wilkinson and Astley, Gubbins and SOE, 242. 
27
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up Gubbins‟s address in Who‟s Who and wrote to him for advice.  Gubbbins prudently 
advised them to abandon the idea.
28
 
 Gubbins was certainly hard working, and proud in his way.  Leo Marks, an SOE 
cryptographer, describes Gubbins as an intense and sometimes inscrutable man of great 
intelligence and exacting standards.
29
  Lord Selborne acknowledged after the war that 
“Gubbins is not universally popular in all other Departments, and I believe he has his 
critics in some parts also of the War Office.”  However, he insisted “that no Minister 
was served more loyally by a subordinate than I was by him, and that when a strong man 
is fighting to create a new Organisation, which is to be carved out of the three Services 
and other Departments, it is not unnatural that he sometimes trod rather badly on 
people‟s toes.”30  Sir Frank Nelson, Gubbins‟s first boss at SOE, echoed these 
sentiments, describing him as a man who provided “ever genial, calm and brilliant help, 
loyalty and support.”31 
 How Gubbins came to be SOE‟s intellectual wellspring is a tale that is both 
fascinating and illuminating for a full understanding of the Second World War and the 
role clandestine service. 
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CHAPTER II 
BAPTISM BY FIRE 
 
World War I 
 The account of Gubbins‟s service in the First World War provided by Wilkinson 
and Astley is fairly complete, leaving little to conjecture.  In any event, given that all of 
Gubbins‟s comrades in that conflict are dead, there are limits to how much might be 
added to their account.  For the purposes of this study, Gubbins‟s service in the Great 
War is less significant, his single large conventional experience in an otherwise 
unconventional career.  A brief overview of this time should suffice to demonstrate that 
he saw combat fairly typical of the war (Second Ypers, the Somme, and Cambrai) and 
that he served with distinction, receiving a Military Cross, numerous promotions, and 
additional training.  Moreover, he was also wounded in combat. 
In the summer of 1914, Colin Gubbins, the son of a British consular official and 
a cadet at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, was innocently trying to study in 
Heidelberg.  Having shown “a certain inherited predilection for foreign language, it 
occurred to my father that it might give me a leg-up if I learnt German.”32  Instead, his 
plans were cut short by the advent of the Great War.  He quickly made his way back to 
Britain, arriving in Dover on 3 August, the day before the British declaration of war.  
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 Gubbins, quoted in Wilkinson and Astley, Gubbins and SOE, 14.   
  
13 
Three other Woolwich cadets had been in Germany at the time; all three were arrested 
and interned for the duration of the conflict.
33
 
Although only halfway through his course of studies at Woolwich, Gubbins was 
commissioned a second lieutenant on 15 September 1914 and posted to 126
th
 Battery, 
XXIX Brigade, 4
th
 Division, III Corps, arriving in France in early November 1914.
34
  
Gubbins and his brigade participated in the Second Battle of Ypres in April and May, 
1915, and in June he was promoted to lieutenant.  His brigade saw action in the Battle of 
the Somme, in which Gubbins was awarded a Military Cross “for conspicuous gallantry.  
When one of his guns and its detachment were blown up by a heavy shell, he organised a 
rescue party and personally helped to dig out the wounded while shells were falling all 
round.”35  In August (about a month after his 20th birthday) he was made an acting 
captain and served for a short time on the staff of the General Officer Commanding, 
Fourth Army; this would be the first of several stints of staff work.
36
  “Refus[ing] to stay 
at GHQ when the battery came into action” again at the Somme, Gubbins rejoined his 
unit and was wounded on 7 October 1916.
37
  Discharged from the hospital after eleven 
days, Gubbins commanded the battery while his major was on leave in January 1917, 
was sent to a Battery Commander‟s Course at Larkhill in February, and attended a 
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Cooperation with Aircraft Course at Arras, France, in March.
38
  The future looked bright 
for young Gubbins. 
At the Battle of Arras, which lasted for most of April and into May, 1917, 
Gubbins first met Adrian Carton de Wiart, whose infantry brigade Gubbins‟s battery was 
supporting.  Gubbins was sent as liaison to Carton de Wiart, who was already something 
of a living legend.  Wounded a seven times in the course of the war – having already lost 
an eye in Somaliland – Carton de Wiart won a Victoria Cross in the summer of 1916.  
“After three other battalion Commanders had become casualties, he controlled their 
commands, and ensured that the ground won was maintained at all costs. He frequently 
exposed himself in the organisation of positions and of supplies, passing unflinchingly 
through fire barrage of the most intense nature. His gallantry was inspiring to all.”39  
Reflecting on his experience afterward, Carton de Wiart commented, “Frankly I had 
enjoyed the war.”40  Gubbins recalled,  
He was already a legendary figure with his Victoria Cross, his black eye patch, 
his stump of an arm and his formidable bearing.  When the divisional orders for 
next days‟ attack reached him – long and voluminous – he read these through 
twice, questioned me on one or two gunner matters, then deliberately tore up the 
orders and sent for his battalion commanders; a ten-minute conference; a few 
clear verbal orders from him; and it was all over.
41
   
In the summer of 1939 their paths would cross again. 
On 1 November 1917 Gubbins was made an acting major, with temporary 
command of 125
th
 Battery and then two other batteries within the brigade.
42
  That same 
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autumn he was gassed, “but fortunately not badly.”43  XXIX Brigade participated in the 
Battle of Cambrai, where tanks made their first significant appearance, with limited 
success.  On 12 February 1918 Gubbins was promoted to substantive captain and given 
command of 126
th
 Battery.
44
  When the Germans launched Operation Michael, the 
opening phase of the Spring Offensive in March 1918, XXIX Brigade was in the thick of 
it.
45
  After “handling his battery with skill and authority,” Gubbins contracted trench 
fever and was evacuated to England in May.
46
  After recuperating he served as an 
instructor at No. 3 Royal Artillery Officer Cadet School in Weedon, and attended 
courses at the School of Education at Oxford and the School of Instructors at 
Bockhampstead.
47
 
 
Russia 
Background 
In April 1918 a small body of British Marines was landed at Murmansk, 
followed on 23 June 1918 by a mixed force of Royal Marines, Canadian, Australian and 
American soldiers.  This force intended to secure the stores at the port of Archangel and 
defend the rail line to Murmansk, then being threatened by a Finnish-German offensive.  
However, the Bolshevik Revolution and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk caused many 
Russians to abandon the fight against the Germans; moreover, Czech troops who had 
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once fought alongside the Russians now had nowhere to go.  Thus the Allied force at 
Archangel hoped to meet up with, train, and equip those Czechs, while also recruiting 
and training local Russians to continue the fight against the Germans.
48
  In this way, the 
project was originally conceived of as a part of the broader Great War campaign against 
Imperial Germany.  But when Germany agreed to an armistice on 11 November 1918, 
the Allied forces did not leave Russia.    
In July 1918, Allied forces made an initial landing at the port of Archangel.  The 
politics of the place were difficult, to say the least.  When Captain Georgi Chaplin, 
whose coup had preceded the Allied landing in Archangel and put the Chaikovsky 
government in power, decided the new government was not to his liking, he staged a 
second coup, backed by Tsarist officers.
49
  General Frederick Poole, the British 
commander at Archangel, was sacked for his passive participation in the coup, and was 
replaced with Major General Edmund Ironside.
50
  Matters were further complicated by 
the fact that, on his arrival, “Ironside… found a disturbing number of his British officers 
openly sympathetic with the most reactionary monarchists among their Russian 
counterparts.”51   
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Gubbins’s Experience of Russia 
On 22 February 1919, Gubbins was appointed aide-de-camp (ADC) to General 
Ironside.
52
  Ironside commanded a mixed force of British, French, American, Italian, 
Polish, and Russian troops, now actively aiding the White Russians against the 
Bolsheviks.
53
  Ironside spoke a number of European languages, including Russian, and 
had previous operated with Canadian forces, an advantage when commanding a 
multinational force.  He possessed considerable energy and was keen on details and 
meeting his men.  But his most notable quality was his overwhelming size: he was six 
foot four and weighed nearly 280 pounds.  “One sergeant in the force recalled… that he 
required two ordinary sleeping bags sewn up to make one which would accommodate 
him.”54  His nickname was “Tiny.”55 
Gubbins landed in Murmansk, since the frozen port of Archangel did not open 
until June 1919.
56
  He spent only six months in Russia before the British withdrew, but it 
was a formative experience.  There was no continuous front, as there had been in France; 
instead, the Allies occupied only certain strongpoints, while vast stretches of terrain 
were left unoccupied.
57
  The conflict was one characterized by espionage and 
propaganda, where events behind the lines occupied leaders as much as the enemy 
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before them.
58
  Ironside complained, “It is extremely hard to know whom to employ as 
Head Russian Agent because, as soon as I have chosen someone, the secret service come 
and tell me that he is a German spy….  Everyone distrusts everyone else and 
denouncements are taking place every day.”59  And this view may have been merited; an 
Anglo-Polish-Russian attack on the village of Kuliga, for example, was spoiled when a 
Bolshevik spy apparently warned the defenders of the impending attack.
60
  (Ironside also 
made use of the conflict‟s extensive espionage, ordering his intelligence personnel to 
send false information to the enemy, and thereby deceive them about impending 
operations.
61
) 
Moreover, historian Clifford Kinvig notes that the Bolsheviks “showed 
themselves to be masters of propaganda.”62  Ironside later reflected that “propaganda… 
is a very difficult [weapon] to employ, especially against troops on active service.  It is a 
long-term weapon and like advertising it must be repeated over and over again to 
produce any effect.  No soldier picks up a pamphlet and at once becomes infected by 
it.”63  However, his wartime correspondence was less confident, recording that “the most 
active propaganda was carried out amongst the rank and file of all the Allied 
Contingents by the enemy, and [as a result] discontent showed itself in many places.”64  
In particular he worried about the impact of Bolshevik propaganda on Russian-speaking 
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American troops, many of them recruited from Detroit.
65
  Enemy propaganda 
distribution was virtually impossible to control, since “there was no continuous line of 
defence between the enemy and ourselves which could prevent the passage of 
individuals, and we had not sufficient police or troops to patrol the crowded town in a 
proper manner.”66 
We do not know precisely what Gubbins did in his six months as ADC to 
General Ironside.  We do know, however, that he later reflected that “to anyone who had 
studied the Russian revolution… the crippling effect of subversive and para-military 
warfare on regular forces was obvious.”67  (Gubbins complained, however, that the 
Russian Revolution was “not studied at any of the higher colleges of War – [it was] 
„Irregular‟ and not deemed worthy of serious attention.”68)  In one episode he is 
remembered as safeguarding the kitchen on Ironside‟s private river steamer, fairly 
mundane work.
69
  More interestingly, he likely saw many of the reports coming to and 
going from Ironside‟s office.  We know that the ADC‟s of Lord Rawlinson, who 
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assumed overarching command of both Archangel and Murmansk in August 1919, 
“were always busy collecting the necessary material for his reports.”70  Gubbins may 
have done the same for Ironside.  He may even have authored some of the documents 
that bear Ironside‟s signature, since generals rarely write their own reports.  But this is 
slipping from evidence into speculation.  All we can say with certainty is what Ironside 
did while Gubbins was in Russia, and assume that, in its general outlines, Gubbins‟s 
experience was similar. 
Ironside faced a variety of challenges as he negotiated with the White 
government in Archangel, tried to shift troops between Finland, Russia and Estonia, and 
navigated the complexities of ethnic troop compositions.
71
  The intricacies of operations 
were only increased by the use of ground, air, and river forces.
72
  But it was the social 
and cultural issues, the intangibles, which may have been most difficult for the British to 
master.  At one point Ironside records that Russian and American troops at Shenkursk – 
an Allied outpost nearly 200 miles south of Archangel – “were, from a military point of 
view, too far advanced, but it was decided for political reasons to maintain them there 
during the winter.”73  Elders in one village outside Archangel did not even know of the 
White Russian Provisional Government there and could not understand why the British 
wanted them to join the conflict against the Bolsheviks.
74
  In spite of his efforts at 
accommodating the local politics – and Ironside had no inconsiderable political ability – 
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an American observed: “There was a sad failure to realize that an expedition of this sort 
is bound to run into social and political problems that are quite as important, perhaps 
more so, than mere military practice.”75  Such problems were not unique to the British 
forces, however; Ironside noted that “the Archangel officials were… completely out of 
touch with the people they were controlling.”  As a corrective, Ironside records, “I urged 
them to get civilian officers out into the country at once, to get into touch with the 
people.”76 
Recruiting for the Russian forces of Chaikovsky‟s Provisional Government was 
highly problematic.  Regarding leaders, Ironside complained, “I searched everywhere for 
news of a local leader who might be able to lead a guerrilla movement against the 
Bolsheviks, but without success.  It was curious how no Russian I met had any desire to 
lead any movement against the enemy.”77  Recruiting the rank and file was no easier:  
The Archangel bourgeoisie were unlikely to furnish recruits, while the Tsarist 
refugees were unwilling to serve in the Socialist government‟s army.  The 
Solombola dock workers were not willing to join what they regarded as the 
forces of reaction.  Among the peasants of the occupied villages and hamlets 
further south… there was no desire to serve in the new army.78   
Even when sufficient numbers could be found, their commitment to the cause was weak, 
as Ironside himself admitted: “The efforts of the British training staff had organised and 
trained a Russian force of between 20,000 and 30,000 men of all ranks, sufficient in 
themselves to continue the defence but in my opinion it was doubtful whether they had 
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sufficient moral to stand by themselves.”79  Even during peak recruiting times, 
“discipline in the barracks was still doubtful.”80  Russian officers were not seen joking 
with their men, as British officers did; in fact, the Russian officers feared their own men 
would shoot them.
81
 
Mutiny was a constant problem.  In December 1918, a Russian unit mutinied, 
only being brought to heal by a mortar team.  In February 1919, a British unit refused to 
fight and the ringleaders were sentenced to death (though their sentences were 
commuted to life imprisonment); a short time later a French unit mutinied.  In April 
1919, there was another Russian mutiny, with seven Russian officers murdered and 300 
men joining the Bolsheviks; in July 1919 a group of Russians mutinied and turned their 
positions over to the Bolsheviks.
82
  But the episode which most upset the British psyche 
was the mutiny of C Company, 1
st
 Battalion (Dyer‟s Btn.), Slavo-British Legion.  
Around 2:30 a.m. on 6 July 1919, the mutineers „murdered three of their own British 
officers and four Russian officers in cold blood in their billets and then intimidated a 
certain number of the rank and file to desert and join the Bolsheviks.”83  An unknown 
writer described three of the ringleaders as “guilty of the blackest treachery 
conceivable.”84  Although “all ranks from the Colonel downwards had great faith in the 
Battalion and in its loyalty,” the British may have had cause to suspect these men, since 
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all eight of the alleged leaders of the mutiny were Bolshevik deserters.
85
  In any case, 
“the Regiment was disbanded and turned into a labour unit forthwith in which capacity 
it… rendered useful service.”86  But as late as 1921, the British government was trying to 
hunt down the mutineers, who had become international fugitives.
87
  Mutinies are not 
unknown in conventional conflicts and had occurred on the Western Front.  However, 
the mutiny of Dyer‟s Battalion was different, involving no mere discontent with 
conditions, but desertion to the enemy.  The men‟s motive may well have been political, 
and their presence among the Allied forces may well have been a counterintelligence 
failure.  Ironside complained that the episode highlighted how “one propagandist can 
make [the Russians] do anything.”88  From his vantage point as Ironside‟s aide-de-camp, 
Gubbins witnessed much of this, a rude introduction to the labyrinthine character of 
irregular warfare. 
In Russia Gubbins also experienced the difficulties of working with allies who 
were not only foreign, but often unprofessional.  In the aftermath of the mutiny of Dyer‟s 
Battalion, Ironside complained that  
the Russian officers did practically nothing to quell the mutiny.  They did not use 
their revolvers, or give orders to the men who were running about not know that 
to do.  Many simply ran away and deserted their posts.  The mutiny was quelled 
by the British officers.  I interviewed the Russian officers a few hours after the 
event, and found them in a state of panic, and quite useless for any military 
purpose.
89
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Frustration with the Russian indecision is easily heard in a report from the same period.   
July.  Concentration of Russian troops at MORJEGORSKAYA, and subsequent 
abandonment of plan by the Russians as soon as concentration was carried out.  
August.  Lack of decision by the Russians as to whether they would stand or not 
after our withdrawal, causing a great many administrative difficulties: it was 
assumed they would not….  August 18th.  Complete reversal of administrative 
policy owing to Russians deciding to stand.
90
 
Lionel Sadleir-Jackson, one of Ironside‟s subordinates, “wanted to have done [with the 
Russian troops] and to trust to his own men.”91  Whether or not British criticism of the 
Russian forces may not be relevant; what is important here is that relations between the 
allies were far from easy, a situation Gubbins no doubt observed.  But if he learned that 
foreign allies are not always reliable or agreeable, he also may have also come to 
appreciate their real potential.  One British report noted,  
Force Commanders have been unaminous in their appreciation of the energy, 
loyalty and adaptability of the Russian Engineer units, which have not only 
gained credit by the speed and thoroughness with which the men, many of them 
old soldiers, have performed their work, but also by the high stamp and powers 
of leadership displayed by many of the officers.
92
 
 
That irregular fighters often lack training and discipline is a reality with which Gubbins 
would have to come to grips by the time of his World War II service. 
 
Ironside and Small Wars 
 On his arrival Ironside found that neither he nor the Russian officers with whom 
he worked knew much about North Russia or river or forest fighting.  However, Ironside 
was happily able to turn to “the old and well-tried textbook, „Small Wars,‟ which was 
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found an infallible guide.”93  Col. Charles E. Callwell‟s Small Wars: Their Principles 
and Practice, was first published in 1896 and revised and republished in 1899 and again 
in 1906.  Callwell‟s experience was typical of officers serving in the Empire: having 
been educated at Haileybury, he fought in the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1880), the 
First Boer War (1881), the Greco-Turkish War (1897) and the Second Boer War (1899-
1902) and also served in the intelligence branch of the War Office (1886-91).
94
 
Ironside would have found much in Small Wars that paralleled his experience in 
Russia.  Battling the Russian winter as often as the Bolsheviks, Ironside would have 
appreciated Callwell‟s comment that “it is perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic 
of small wars… that they are in the main campaigns against nature.”95  More 
specifically, Callwell noted that poor climate affects the health of troops, difficult 
communications slows their movements, and uncultivated land requires more complex 
supply systems.
96
  Two of the most elaborate arrangements with which Ironside had to 
deal were the annual freeze and thaw.  In summer time the Dvina River or the regional 
rail lines were the primary lines of communication.  But in winter sleighs became the 
major mode of transit, often allowing very different routes from those determined by the 
river or railway.  Further complicating matters were incomplete knowledge of the 
Russian weather.  Callwell cautions that “the resources of the theatre of war in supplies, 
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in water, and in transport may not be properly estimated.”97  This is precisely what 
happened to Ironside in late 1918, when the British flotilla on the River Dvina, fearing 
the river would soon freeze over and trap the vessels, returned to Archangel, leaving the 
Allies‟ forward positions without support.  The move was at least a month premature, 
and the Bolsheviks took the opportunity to send their own flotilla down the still ice-free 
river, attacking and capturing the isolated outpost of Seltso.
98
  The Bolshevik, Ironside 
concluded, “was better in his information… and caused us considerable annoyance and 
losses.”99 
In words that could describe the Archangel Expedition, Callwell observes that in 
campaigns against insurrections, “the regular army has to cope not with determinate but 
with indeterminate forces….  Such campaigns are most difficult to bring to a satisfactory 
conclusion, and are always most trying to the troops.”100  One of the greatest burdens the 
Allied forces faced was settling on a clear objective.  What were they trying to capture?  
Who were they supposed to fight?  Callwell notes,  
When there is no king to conquer, no capital to seize, no organized army to 
overthrow, and when there are no celebrated strongholds to capture, and no great 
centres of population to occupy, the objective is not so easy to select.  It is then 
that the regular troops are forced to resort to cattle lifting and village burning and 
that the war assumes an aspect which may shock the humanitarian.
101
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Though he does not write of cattle lifting or village burning in his memoirs, Ironside 
does observe that “a blow in the air would yield us nothing.”102  Advancing into empty 
space was virtually useless; Ironside had to wait for the enemy to coalesce before he 
could strike a meaningful blow.  But victory on the battlefield was not the only matter at 
hand.  Though Allied defeats were few, the withdrawal from Archangel on 27 September 
1919 was followed by the collapse of the Provisional Government in February 1920.
103
  
Politics, in the British cabinet and across Russia, were as important as military might.  
Or, as Callwell put it, “The beating of the hostile armies is not necessarily the main 
object even if such armies exist….  Moral effect is often far more important than 
material success.”104  It was, perhaps, the bitterest lesson. 
There are parallels between Callwell‟s Small Wars and Gubbins‟s thinking which 
deserve consideration; Gubbins may have read Callwell while in Ironside‟s service, or 
may have encountered it at another time in his career.  Nevertheless, no evidence has yet 
been found that Gubbins read Callwell in Russia or elsewhere. 
Judging Callwell‟s opinion of guerrillas is often difficult.  On the one hand, his 
writing regularly displays the racism and condescension common in 19
th
 century 
imperialism; on the other hand, that irregular forces merited a handbook of over 500 
pages suggests the power Callwell believed they could wield.  Indeed, he warned that 
guerrillas are “very troublesome” to regular troops, since they avoid direct conflict and 
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favour “protracted, toilsome war.”105  Elsewhere Callwell made clear that guerrilla 
warfare is the least favourable kind of campaign regular troops can face.
106
  Gubbins, 
later considering the possibilities of fielding or supporting guerrillas, would have found 
this assessment affirming.  
Callwell and Gubbins agree that guerrillas can possess an advantage by fighting 
on terrain they know well.  In the Partisan Leader‟s Handbook, Gubbins demands that a 
partisan leader must be intimately familiar with the area in which he operates.
107
  When 
trying to break through an enemy sweep, Gubbins confidently asserts in the Art of 
Guerilla Warfare that “to men who know the country and can move freely in the dark 
there is little risk of failure.”108  Callwell sums up this state of affairs quite succinctly: 
“The enemy [i.e., the guerrilla force] is generally operating in a theatre of war with 
which he is familiar.”109  Moreover, this condition yields the guerrilla intelligence 
benefits, allowing him almost immediate knowledge of his enemy‟s movements.110  This 
is particularly important because it deprives the counter-guerrilla force of the possibility 
of surprise.
111
  Recognizing this, Gubbins writes that “the advantage of superior 
information is the guerillas‟ greatest asset.”112  He explains in another passage that local 
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support allows guerrillas knowledge of enemy movements, while helping mask the 
guerrillas‟ own intentions.113 
Callwell observed that collecting intelligence on guerrillas could be very 
difficult.  “It may… be accepted as a general rule – and the reason why this is so need no 
demonstration – that the less organized the forces of the enemy are, the more difficult is 
it to form any estimate of their strength or their quality.”114  But what to Callwell was a 
vice was a virtue to Gubbins: “The organization of guerillas must not be of a higher 
degree than circumstances will, with reasonable safety, and a view to efficiency, permit.  
The factor of „safety‟ concerns possible enemy counteraction; the closer and higher the 
organization, the more easily can it be broken up and become ineffective.”115 
Callwell, discussing how guerrillas may be defeated, contends that “it is not a 
question of merely maintaining the initiative, but of compelling the enemy to see at 
every turn that he has lost it and to recognize that the forces of civilization are dominant 
and not to be denied.”116  Elsewhere he writes that counter-guerrilla forces must appear 
in total control of the war‟s direction, never showing weakness, but instead causing the 
guerrillas to lose heart.
117
  It is precisely this kind of strategy that Gubbins knows his 
guerrillas must defeat, and therefore he emphasises moral and the human spirit.  He 
notes in the Art of Guerilla Warfare that,  
the immunity of partisans from enemy action is a most valuable moral factor; to 
inflict damage and death on the enemy and to escape scot-free has an irritant and 
depressing effect on the enemy‟s spirit, and a correspondingly encouraging effect 
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on the morale, not only of the guerillas but of the local inhabitants, a matter of 
considerable moment; in this sphere of action nothing succeeds like success.
118
 
Thus, guerrilla actions must have not only a military dimension, but also a moral one; 
remaining in the field proves that anti-guerrilla forces, however successful elsewhere, 
have not yet defeated the people of the occupied nation.
119
 
Callwell admits that complex organization, extensive armament, and excessive 
equipment hinder regular troops.
120
  In contrast, Gubbins encourages his guerrillas, 
observing that they should enjoy superior mobility due to local knowledge and lighter 
equipment.
121
  Callwell further admits that anti-guerrilla forces are limited by their 
supply lines.  In contrast, “the adversaries with whom the regular troops… have to cope 
depend on no base and have no fixed system of supply.  They are operating in their own 
country….  [The enemy] does not need communications as a channel for replenishing 
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food or warlike stores.”122  Gubbins insists that guerrillas recognize and protect this 
strength.  He encourages them to avoid  
wild [areas], with little cultivation or pasture land for carrying stock or feeding 
the guerillas‟ animals, [where] supplies would have to be brought in specially.  
At once the guerillas would begin to be dependent on communications, a 
situation cramping their mobility and exactly opposed to the characteristic which 
constitutes their chief military value.
123
 
Freedom from a supply tail is one of the defining characteristics of a guerrilla.  The 
absence of such freedom is one of the weaknesses of regular forces which guerrillas can 
exploit.  Callwell observes that long lines of communication are exposed to guerrilla 
attacks, while “their protection absorbs a large proportion of the forces in the theatre of 
war.”124  Gubbins too recognized that extended communications create opportunities to 
“strike at many points… in order to harass the enemy and keep him always on the 
alert.”125  Indeed, Gubbins admonished guerrillas to strike “where [the enemy] least 
expects it… where he is most vulnerable.”126  Like Callwell, Gubbins perceived such 
attacks compelled the enemy to spread thin his forces to guard a variety of potential 
targets.
127
  Even if such a tactic, alone, cannot win a war, it can change the number of 
regular troops available for offensive operations. 
The battlefield superiority of regular troops makes avoiding pitched battles 
crucial for guerrillas.  “On the battlefield the advantage passes over to the regular army,” 
notes Callwell.  “Superior armament, the force of discipline, a definite and 
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acknowledged chain of responsibility, esprit de corps, the moral force of civilization, all 
these work together to give the trained and organized army an incontestable advantage 
from the point of view of tactics.”128  Thus, regulars actively seek battle against 
guerrillas.
129
  Gubbins, recognizing this reality, insisted that partisans avoid prolonged 
battles.
130
  Lest they be crushed in the kind of battle Callwell hoped for, Gubbins advised 
partisans to “break off the action when it becomes too risky to continue.”131 
Callwell devotes a number of pages to the discussion of flying columns, which 
he sees as a key part of a counter-guerrilla strategy.
132
  If Gubbins read Callwell, he may 
have taken this to heart, assuming as he does in the Art of Guerilla Warfare that flying 
columns will be part of any anti-guerrilla action.
133
  But like most of the matters 
discussed in Small War, flying columns were a regular feature of the Irish Revolution, in 
which Gubbins fought shortly after Russia.  He may have been influenced by both 
Callwell and his own experiences, but if one had to choose between them, it seems likely 
that his lived experience had a greater effect than any reading of Small Wars, whose 
popularity was beginning to wane by 1919. 
Nevertheless, it is somewhat curious that this is the only occasion on which 
Callwell‟s Small Wars intersects with Gubbins‟s story.  As historian Simon Anglim 
explains, “this work seems to have influenced not only at least two generations of 
colonial soldiers… but also approved Army „doctrine‟: it formed part of the curriculum 
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of the Army Staff Colleges and the RAF Staff College at Andover, and the chapter on 
„Warfare in Undeveloped and Semi-Civilised Countries‟ in the 1929 edition of FSR 
[Field Service Regulations], appears to be an unattributed summary of Chapters VI-VIII 
of the 1906 edition of Callwell.”134  Put simply, Small Wars was almost omnipresent.  If 
Gubbins did not encounter it while in Ironside‟s service, one would expect him to have 
seen it in his time in Ireland, at Staff College, with GS(R), or elsewhere.  But Gubbins 
never mentions Small War, nor do any of the leading historians of SOE.  The most likely 
explanation for this lacuna is three-fold.  In the first place, as Callwell himself admits, 
“the subject [is] discussed merely from the point of view of the regular troops,” not from 
that of the partisans.
135
  This alone, however, could be overcome with a small dose of 
imagination.  Indeed, some passages, such as those on ambushes, would seem to be 
directly useful to guerrillas.
136
  On closer examination, however, these turn out to be 
inappropriate for use by Gubbins‟s prospective partisans.  The ambushing forces are 
sometimes fairly large in size and usually include both cavalry and infantry.  While the 
Boers on the veldt (see Chapter 3) could field horsemen, most 20
th
 century guerrillas – 
particularly those Gubbins imagined in Europe – would not include cavalry forces. 
But the third and deepest problem with Small Wars is that it fails to engage with 
the inner workings of guerrilla movements.  It treats the symptoms but not the disease 
itself.  As Douglas Porch explains, “a primary weakness of Small Wars… is its over-
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reliance on operational solutions to political problems.”137  Rightly or wrongly, the star 
of Small Wars began to wane as T. E. Lawrence‟s began to rise; whereas Callwell had 
argued that guerrillas and rebels could be put down, Lawrence seemed to have proved 
their success.
138
 
 Gubbins relinquished his position with General Ironside on 6 October 1919 and 
left Russia having obtained a passing knowledge of Russian, the Order of St. Stanislaus 
(3
rd
 class), “a deep hatred of Communism and all it stood for,” and an introduction to 
less-than-conventional warfare fought by international allies.
139
   
 
Ireland 
Gubbins’s Experience 
After leaving Russia, Gubbins reported for duty in Ireland in late 1919.  It was, in 
historian David Fitzpatrick‟s words, a war involving “flying columns, raids, ambushes, 
slaughter of „informers,‟ cutting of communications, destruction of property, looting 
(„requisitioning‟), and bullying of opponents.”140  These elements may be “familiar” in 
retrospect, but at the time they were quite disorienting to the British Army.  Gubbins 
complained that he was “shot at from behind hedges by men in trilbys and mackintoshes 
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and not allowed to shoot back!”141  But rather than despairing at the disarray into which 
this well-organized guerrilla resistance threw the British, he set about learning about 
irregular warfare and its handmaiden, intelligence.
142
 
Peter Wilkinson and Joan Bright Astley‟s Gubbins and SOE is regarded as the 
most complete and authoritative account of Gubbins‟s life, though even they 
acknowledge that “this book has no academic pretensions” and relies heavily on 
“personal knowledge.”143  In it they comment that “there is no open page relating to 
Gubbins‟ sojourn in Ireland.”144  While there is less readily available information about 
this period of his life than other periods, a good deal more can be said than the two pages 
Wilkinson and Astley devote to Gubbins‟s service in Ireland.  Indeed, it is essential to 
say more if we are to properly understand the context in which Gubbins‟s doctrine of 
irregular warfare germinated. 
 Gubbins was initially posted to 47
th
 Battery, 41
st
 Brigade at Kildare, one of the 
artillery elements of the 5
th
 Division, the unit responsible for much of central and 
western Ireland.
145
  He was in Kildare for two years before assuming temporary duties as 
Brigade Major at Division Headquarters at the Curragh in November 1921.  He briefly 
rejoined 47
th
 Battery from January until March 1922, but returned to Division 
Headquarters as temporary Brigade Major, remaining in this position even as 
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Headquarters moved to Dublin at the end of April 1922.
146
  On 30 September 1922 
Headquarters Royal Artillery, Dublin District, was dissolved and its last remaining 
personnel withdrawn to Britain.
147
   
At first glance one might wonder how much of the messy guerrilla war an 
artilleryman actually saw.  Though artillery hardly played the role in Ireland that it had 
on the Western Front, it would be misleading to think of Gubbins‟s service as strictly 
artillery, for it was much more diverse than that.  Gubbins sent artillerymen to act as 
guards of both military supplies and soldiers‟ families at such locations as the 
Newbridge Train Station, the Dublin shell factory and the magazine fort in Phoenix 
Park.
148
  Prior to January 1922, 30
th
 and 36
th
 Brigades – the bulk of 5th Division‟s 
artillery – were organized as Royal Artillery Mounted Rifles or Composite Batteries 
combining infantry and artillery, a status to which they reverted in April 1922.
149
  In a 
similar manner, the 1
st
 Brigade Royal Horse Artillery was reorganized into Royal 
Artillery Mounted Rifles.
150
  Plans were drawn up to convert all of 5
th
 Division‟s 
dismounted artillery units to infantry, “should urgent evacuation be ordered” in the 
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spring of 1922.
151
  By June 1922 one artillery unit, 33
rd
 Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, 
was operating armed cars and foot patrols, but no artillery.
152
 
William Cassidy claims Gubbins also served as an intelligence officer, and 
Wilkinson and Astley confirm that he “had all the instincts of a good „I‟ officer” who 
“set out to learn all he could about… intelligence,” though they do not explicitly state 
that he served as such, nor has Cassidy‟s claim been confirmed elsewhere.153  Indeed, 
Peter Hart observes that many regiments, unwilling to part with good officers, assigned 
the expendable to intelligence duties.
154
  Thus, the quality of Gubbins‟s “instincts” may 
not have been terribly relevant.  Nevertheless, even if Gubbins was never an intelligence 
officer per se, in his role as Brigade Major he certainly saw plenty of intelligence.   
The guerrilla war in Ireland was a complex one.  In early 1920 the army had the 
rebels on the run, utilizing police information, captured documents and Irish informers.  
However, a hunger strike by captured Irish Republican Army (IRA) leaders caused the 
British administration at Dublin Castle to capitulate and release them.  Such releases of 
the enemy for political reasons were a recurring feature of the conflict, happening almost 
annually from 1916 to 1920.
155
  Gubbins notes in the 5
th
 Division artillery‟s war diary 
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that “all internees in Ireland were released” on 8 December 1921, just two days after the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed.
156
  Gubbins‟s reaction to this move is not recorded, but 
whatever it may have been, this event marked an intersection of political and military 
policy, the likes of which had not occurred on the Western Front, but Gubbins would 
come to know well by the time of the Second World War. 
Although much of Gubbins‟s time as Brigade Major came after the signing of the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty in December 1921, and all of it after the suspension of hostilities 
between Crown forces and the Irish rebels on 11 July 1921, this state of truce should not 
be confused with peace.  In January 1921 intelligence was received that “the IRB [Irish 
Republican Brotherhood] intended to attack troops while evacuation was proceeding,” 
and in February Gubbins received orders “warning all officers to be prepared to defend 
themselves against sudden attacks.”157  The very next day one Lt. J. H. Wogan Browne, 
Royal Field Artillery, was killed at 11:20am, while returning to his barracks in Kildare, 
Gubbins‟s old post.  In a separate incident three more soldiers were wounded in Kildare 
that evening.  Two days later the evacuation of British troops from 5
th
 Division was 
temporarily suspended, not to be resumed until 15 days later.
158
  In May Gubbins wrote 
about “uncertainty as to the nature and duration of operations,” and June saw another 
attack on his artillerymen, as well as reports of further threats.
159
  That same month he 
issued contingency plans for the defence of Phoenix Park, Dublin in the event of major 
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trouble: “All ranks must be prepared against a sudden outbreak of hostilities without 
warning.”  That these plans included measures for aerial re-supply by the RAF indicates 
how dangerous Gubbins thought the situation.
160
  Into August the War Office was still 
holding units in Britain in readiness, should the situation in Ireland deteriorate.
161
  The 
operations Gubbins experienced remained dangerous and complicated all the way to the 
end.  The Record of the Rebellion in Ireland describes the conflict as “a curious mixture 
of peace and war.”162 
In early 1922 Gubbins began dealing with the security implications of the fall-out 
between the pro-Treaty and anti-Treaty factions of the IRA.  In March he was warned 
that “attempts would probably be made by mutineers [i.e. anti-Treaty forces] to steal or 
buy arms”; before the end of the month the “mutinous IRA” were disrupting traffic on 
the Naas-Dublin road, had stolen the private car of the General Officer Commanding, 5
th
 
Division, and opened fire on a group of artillery officers.
163
  By April Gubbins had 
reports that “the mutinous IRA intended to attack British soldiers” in the near future.164  
On 22 June Field Marshall Sir Henry Wilson was assassinated and troops in Ireland 
confined to their barracks as a result.
165
   
Meanwhile, the anti-Treatyite Rory O‟Connor‟s occupation of the Four Courts in 
Dublin was undermining the Free State government, and Gubbins found himself drawn 
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into the matter.  On 27 June Gubbins noted that at 11:59am “two 18-pdrs of 17th Battery 
RFA and 20 rounds of ammunition [were] handed over to the Provisional Government.”   
The following day at 4:00am “P.G. Troops commenced the attack on the Four Courts.  
Two more 18 pdrs of 17
th
 Bty RFA & 20 rounds of ammunition handed over to the 
Provisional Government.”166  Gubbins watched from just across the River Liffey.167  On 
29 June the withdrawal of artillery to Britain was halted, in response to the situation, 
though on the following day O‟Connor gave himself up unconditionally.168  On 1 July 
1922 Collinstown Camp was attacked by “irregulars,” likely anti-Treaty forces trying to 
draw Britain back into the conflict as a means of uniting republican factions.
169
  On 22 
August, less than two months after his victory at the Four Courts, Michael Collins was 
killed in an ambush by anti-Treaty forces.  On 25 August “6 Horses of 17th Bty RFA 
were lent to PG for funeral of Michael Collins,” and returned on 4 September.170  “I did 
not like… having to provide a gun carriage and six black horses for the funeral,” noted 
Gubbins.
171
 
As Peter Wilkinson, his SOE colleague and biographer, later explained, Gubbins 
“experienced at first hand the disadvantage felt by regular troops when attacked by well 
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organised terrorists and guerrillas.”172  His service was certainly not peaceful, nor was it 
limited strictly to irrelevant artillery duties; he made use of intelligence reports, 
navigated political issues such as prisoner releases and the split in the IRA, and 
coordinated with law enforcement, such as the Royal Irish Constabulary.  Finally, it is 
worth noting that the removal of British forces from Ireland, in which Gubbins played a 
major role, was an operation of considerable logistical difficulty.  His ability to carry out 
both unconventional and conventional functions appeared throughout his life, and may 
account for his general success in the field as well as in the meeting room.
173
 
 
The Doctrinal Significance of Ireland 
Of all the conflicts which inspired Gubbins‟s thinking on unconventional 
warfare, Ireland surely comes first, for several reasons.  Firstly, the parallels between the 
Irish conflict generally and Gubbins‟s writings are many.  A few examples illustrate the 
point.  In Ireland, British intelligence officers relied on informers and captured 
documents.
174
  Gubbins later warned that letters and other documents seized from 
guerrillas pose one of the gravest threats to an insurgent cause.
175
  The significance of 
informers is clear as well: “The most stringent and ruthless measures must at all times be 
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used against informers; immediately on proof of guilt they must be killed, and, if 
possible, a note pinned on the body stating that the man was an informer.”176   
When the IRA was hit hard by the British counter-offensive that followed 
Bloody Sunday, historian Peter Hart explains, “activists still at large went on the run…, 
arms were moved and better hidden, [and] larger and more vulnerable flying columns 
were broken up.”177  Gubbins‟s comments to partisans in 1939 could have been 
descriptions of Ireland: “Searches, raids… curfew, passport and other regulations” will 
eventually force guerrillas to abandon their homes and “go on the run,” that is “live as a 
band in some suitable areas where the nature of the country enables them to be relatively 
secure.”178  Likewise, he recommended that guerrilla parties be kept small, to improve 
mobility and secrecy, and that supply of weapons be given very careful consideration.
 179
  
These and other parallels between Gubbins‟s GS(R) writings and the Irish war may be 
coincidence, reflections of universal guerrilla principles discerned elsewhere, though 
such an explanation strains Occam‟s Razor. 
Secondly, the existence of the 5
th
 Division Guerrilla Warfare Class provides a 
concrete instance of the collection and dissemination of irregular warfare knowledge.  
Conceived in October 1920, the three-day course was designed “to enable [officers and 
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NCOs] to deal with the peculiar type of guerrilla warfare in which they were becoming 
more and more engaged.”180  Though designed to teach counter-guerrilla tactics, the 
course included “practical tactical exercises carried out by the class itself in ambushes on 
lorry parties and cyclist patrols.”181  This is an important psychological shift, moving 
from the mind-set of a status-quo imperial power to that of a revisionist insurgent.  If 
Gubbins attended the course, this may have been his first introduction to the idea of 
playing the role of the guerrilla, rather than the occupier.  Even if he did not personally 
attend, the lessons from these classes were printed and distributed to every unit of the 5
th
 
Division, as well as to the Royal Irish Constabulary, the Auxiliaries, and to other 
divisions as well.
182
  In the initial ten iterations of the course, 280 officers and NCOs 
were trained, and when reinforcements began arriving in Ireland in January 1921, all 
officers and NCOs of arriving battalions underwent the course.  Thus, the question of his 
attendance is moot: if Gubbins himself never attended the 5
th
 Division Guerrilla Warfare 
Class, he most probably would have read its lessons and frequently interacted – 
particularly when serving as brigade major at the Curragh – with men who had attended. 
The parallels between Gubbins‟s experiences in Ireland and his later writings can 
be discerned.  An IRA memorandum from September 1920, captured and quoted in the 
Record of the Rebellion in Ireland, argues that “our troops must not be drawn into an 
operation or into a general engagement with large bodies of military.”  The Record goes 
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on to quote a similar piece of advice from the Commandant Mid-Clare Brigade, IRA, 
from February 1921: “A little action wisely and well done must be our motto at 
present.”183  Likewise, the Notes on Guerrilla Warfare in Ireland, the printed lessons 
learned from the Guerrilla Warfare Class, dismissively explain that “the rebels [have] 
small stomach for fighting at close quarters or suffering heavy casualties.”184  Gubbins 
writings echo the tactics advocated by the IRA.  In the Art of Guerilla Warfare Gubbins 
admonished partisans to “avoid prolonged engagements” or “being pinned down,” 
instead “break[ing] off the action when it becomes too risky to continue.”185  The 
Partisan Leader‟s Handbook expresses the same sentiments, arguing that partisans 
should not fight pitched battles but disengage when risks become too great.
186
 
The Notes on Guerrilla Warfare in Ireland insist that no party should ever leave 
barracks without a precise plan, and that officers and NCOs should practice giving 
orders before conducting an operation.
187
  This emphasis on sound preparation, always 
important in the chaos of war, but particularly so in the confusions of irregular warfare, 
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is also found in Gubbins‟s writings, such as the Partisan Leader‟s Handbook‟s comment 
that “every operation must be planned with the greatest care.”188 
The Notes also observe that “the leakage of information in Ireland is very great, 
and it may be generally accepted that no inhabitant or civilian employee is to be 
trusted.”189  Nearly three decades later, Gubbins the guerrilla organizer advocated 
utilizing the local population as the best source of information, since occupying troops 
are must necessarily brush elbows with the inhabitants, to some extent.
190
  Locals, 
Gubbins says, may passively obtain information by keeping an open ear, or more 
actively by questioning soldiers and “purloining letters.”191  He lists people who might 
make suitable agents: waitresses, domestic servants, priests, doctors, barbers, telephone 
and telegraph operators, postmen, “camp followers,” etc.192  Such people, he insists, 
must be trained to know what sort of information will be valuable and to keep an eye out 
for traitors in their own midst.
193
 
These same Notes observe that  
the tactics employed by the rebels are those of ambush.  These ambushes are 
dependent on secrecy, which is easily obtainable owing to the fact that they are 
dressed as civilians and move amongst a population of sympathizers similarly 
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attired.  These ambushes are dependent for their success on surprise….  
Individuals cutting peat in a bog may not be as harmless as they appear.
194
   
Here we see three items, all of which can be found in Gubbins‟s writings: the centrality 
of the ambush, the importance of secrecy and surprise, and the role of the local 
population.  Ambushing appears in both the AGW and PLH, the latter of which includes 
an appendix each on road and rail ambushes.
195
  With regard to secrecy and surprise, 
Gubbins explains that surprise has two components, “finding out the enemy‟s plans and 
concealing your own intentions and movements,”196 while elsewhere he insists: 
“Surprise is the most important thing in everything you undertake.”197  The local 
population helps ensure such secrecy.  Thus, partisans should work hard not to aggravate 
the people, but instead foster their hatred of the enemy and their sense of resistance.
198
  
The population‟s cooperation may be active – “providing information for the guerrillas” 
– or passive – “withholding it from the enemy.”199   
The countermeasures Gubbins expects guerrillas to encounter are generally found 
in the Notes as well: raids, lorry patrols, armoured cars, etc.
200
  Whether Gubbins 
personally attended the Guerrilla Warfare Class or simply read about it, many of his 
recommendations to guerrillas correspond to its prescriptions.  The Notes detail nine 
different places to check a man for concealed documents.
201
  Gubbins observes that “it 
has been proved over and over again in guerilla warfare that it is the capture of guerilla 
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documents that has helped the enemy the most in his counter-measures,” while also 
noting that “lack of communications” should be seen by guerrillas as an “inherent 
advantage.”202   He advised that messages should be verbal whenever possible, and that 
the level of documentation should not exceed guerrillas‟ ability to ensure its security.203  
Nevertheless, if written messages must be used, Gubbins observes that “it is often better 
to use women and children who are less suspect and probably could enjoy greater 
immunity from search.”204 
The Notes insist that counter-guerrilla forces fighting off an ambush should 
always attack the enemy‟s flank and rear.205  Gubbins counters by insisting that sentries 
be posted to prevent guerrillas waiting in ambush from becoming the ambushed.
206
  
(“Women and children, who are less likely to be suspected,” may be utilized in this 
role.
207
)  The Notes observe that most rebels, being poorly trained, are likely to break if 
their line of retreat is threatened; Gubbins answers that a “secure line of retreat,” which 
“will give all the men a safe and sure way of escape,” is essential for any ambush 
position.
208
  The Notes point out that successful searches, raids and drives all require 
surprise; in response, Gubbins advises guerrillas that fostering the local population as 
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intelligence gatherers “will ensure that the guerillas are kept au fait with the enemy‟s 
movements and intentions, whereas their own are hidden from him.”209 
Finally, we can say with confidence that Ireland influenced Gubbins‟s thinking 
because he and so many of his colleagues said just that.  In a memo describing the 
requirements for the Art and Handbook, Gubbins‟s supervisor at GS(R) explains that 
“there is little doubt that the Irish made guerrilla warfare into a science, which has been 
followed since….  It is proposed to base this present study on such information as can 
be obtained of Irish principles and their application by other revolutionaries 
subsequently.”210  Likewise, when describing his writings decades later, Gubbins 
commented that “we had only our own experience to go upon,… in Ireland 1919-1922 
and… in North Russia at the end of the First World War.”211  These were not 
romanticized accounts of SOE‟s origins, but honest assessments which are borne out by 
a careful consideration of the strategy and tactics in question.   
Eunan O‟Halpin, one of the few authors to comment on the IRA-SOE connection 
at any length, contends that the influence was minimal.  He acknowledges that Gubbins 
and his colleagues studied the IRA, but highlights the fact that other conflicts – including 
the Boer War, the Russian Revolution, and the Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936-1939) – 
were also studied.  Moreover, he contends that “the Chinese and Spanish wars provided 
                                                 
209
 AGW, 4 § 12.  Cf. Notes § 12.  As the Troubles in Ireland were winding to a close, the War Office had 
instructed its various unit commanders to compile detailed reports of their time in Ireland, reports which 
would then become the raw material for a brief work on partisan warfare.  Thomas Mockaitis writes that 
„such a worthwhile manual seems never to have been written.‟  It is possible, however, that GS(R) had 
access to these reports and that the manual was indeed written by Gubbins, though no evidence of this has 
yet been found.  Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60 (New York, 1990), 180. 
210
 J. C. F. Holland, “Duties of the New Branch,” 3 April 1939, 2, TNA: PRO, HS 8/256.  Emphasis 
added. 
211
 Gubbins, “The Underground Forces in Britain 1940-1944,” lecture given to the Cerne Abbas 
Discussion Club, Dorchester, April (?) 1973, Gubbins papers 4/1/42, IWM. 
  
49 
more recent and larger scale examples of the use of irregular warfare.”212  O‟Halpin is 
right to insist that Ireland be placed alongside other sources of inspiration (see Chapters 
III and IV), but this does not ipso facto mean that Ireland was insignificant.  While 
China and Spain provided recent examples, neither Gubbins nor his superior, J. C. F. 
Holland, participated in or directly observed either conflict.  Both men, however, fought 
in Ireland, where Gubbins served far longer than he had served in Russia.  O‟Halpin 
further observes that one knowledgeable figure, Guy Liddell, claimed that Gubbins‟s 
organization was modelled not on the IRA but on the Arab Bureau that supported the 
Arab Revolt of 1916-1918.
213
  Although Liddell may have known a great deal about both 
Ireland and intelligence, his position was with the Security Service (MI5), not with SOE 
or any of its predecessors.  Moreover, the parallelism is complicated: Gubbins saw 
himself supporting foreign guerrillas, rather than becoming a guerrilla himself.  Thus the 
Arab Bureau may have been a major inspiration with regard to advising, while the IRA 
or other partisans were the preeminent model of guerrilla tactics.  Finally, O‟Halpin 
contends that there is no evidence Section D, SOE‟s other progenitor, looked to 
Ireland.
214
  True though this may be, it does not affect Gubbins‟s own work.  His time 
spent in Ireland, coupled with the strong parallels between the Irish experience and his 
later writings, argues strongly in favour of the contention that Ireland played a crucial 
role in the formation of Gubbins‟s thinking. 
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India 
In early 1923, while in London, Gubbins took a Russian course at King‟s College 
London, earning himself a second Interpretership, having already earned one in French 
in 1921.  That spring Gubbins was posted to India.  It was an interesting time to be there; 
Mohandas Gandhi led a growing resistance movement to British rule, Japanese agents 
were active in India and Southeast Asia, the Bolsheviks had designs on India and the 
Afghans had invaded as recently as 1919.
215
  Although the invasion had been quickly 
defeated, it caught the British by surprise, was an embarrassment to local intelligence, 
and was followed by tribal revolts which were not so easily put down.
216
 
On March 1923, Gubbins was appointed to Lucknow, northern India, with 15
th
 
Battery, Royal Field Artillery.  He was at Lucknow for nearly a year until appointed 
officiating General Staff Officer, Grade III (GSO3) for intelligence in the Central 
Provinces District, working out of the major military instillation at Mhow, south of 
Indore in modern-day Madhya Pradesh.
 217
  “Here he was able to indulge his passion for 
mounted sport.”218  After eight months as GSO3 (Intelligence), he returned to 15th 
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Battery, which was now at Jubbulpore (modern-day Jabalpur, also in Madhya 
Pradesh).
219
   
In January of 1925 he was appointed Adjutant to XXIII Field Brigade, Royal 
Artillery, in Nowshera, just outside Peshawar near the eastern end of the Khyber Pass.
220
  
Not long after he arrived in Nowshera the Royal Air Force began a series of operations a 
couple hundred miles southwest in South Waziristan.  These strafing runs against 
Wahsud tribesmen became known as Pink‟s War, after their architect, Wing Commander 
R. C. M. Pink.  This conflict may have shaped Gubbins‟s thoughts on air power (see 
below), but it certainly did not destroy his confidence in the abilities of guerrillas.  He 
later commented that “it is undeniable that in certain campaigns in the past the activities 
of guerillas have had a marked influence on the operations of regular armies.”  Among 
the examples he cites are “the continual small wars on the North West Frontier of 
India.”221  He was not alone in his observation of irregular warfare on the North West 
Frontier; historian Chaz Bowyer calls the locals “the finest guerilla fighters in the 
world.”222 
Gubbins did not stay in Nowshera long, attending the Northern Command‟s 
annual Intelligence Course in Murree, east of Peshawar, from May to June, 1925.
223
  
Col. Reginald Hillyard recommended Gubbins in the strongest terms, noting that he 
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“worked with the greatest keenness throughout the class and is suited in every way for 
Intelligence work especially in the Far East.”224  That year Gubbins, ever the linguist, 
also passed a preliminary Urdu exam.
225
  From October 1925 to February 1928 he served 
as GSO3 (Intelligence) at Army Headquarters at Simla, the summer capital of the Raj.  
There he spent much of his time reading and translating secret Soviet communications, 
making use of his facility in Russian.
226
   
Soviet premier V. I. Lenin made no secret of his hatred for the British Empire, 
annulling the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which had ended the Great Game, the 
19
th
 century struggle for mastery of Central Asia.
227
  In 1920, Lenin declared that 
“England is our greatest enemy.  It is in India that we must strike them hardest.”228  This 
open hostility must have lent a certain edge to the intelligence work of Gubbins, a man 
who already loathed Communism from his first-hand experience in Russia.  Historian 
Peter Hopkirk notes that “from remote listening-posts far beyond India‟s frontiers, 
British Indian intelligence officers monitored every Bolshevik move against India and 
reported these back to their chiefs in Delhi and London.”229  Within India itself, the 
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British carried out “the discreet reading of suspects‟ mail, the interception and decoding 
of Bolshevik wireless messages, and the penetration of Indian nationalist groups 
suspected of having links to Moscow.”  Likewise, Richard Popplewell notes that “from 
1920 to 1927 [the British] were able regularly and extensively to read Soviet codes, 
including those of the Comintern,… [gaining] detailed insights into Soviet policy at the 
highest levels.”230  When Gubbins wrote in 1939 that “ALL [guerrilla] MESSAGES IN 
WIRELESS MUST BE IN CODE OR CIPHER,” he wrote from a personal experience of just how 
damning intercepted signals could be.
231
  He also learned, however, the potential 
usefulness of wireless in a “whispering” campaign aimed at galvanizing the discontent 
of a war-weary enemy population.
232
  Although the future SOE would be a sabotage and 
subversion agency, not an intelligence one, it made considerable use of intelligence in its 
operations, many of which, in turn, generated intelligence.  Thus, Gubbins‟s time with 
intelligence in India, both studying it at Murree and practicing it at Simla, offered useful 
experiences for the future SOE leader. 
Gubbins left Simla when sent to the Staff College at Quetta, whose course of 
study he completed in December 1929.  There he studied a variety of topics including 
military history, air power, combined operations with the Royal Navy, signals 
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intelligence, and the political and military challenges of frontier warfare.
233
  Among 
Gubbins‟s colleagues at Quetta was Frederick William “Nick” Nicholls, who had 
managed to establish wireless communications with the British Embassy in Kabul during 
the Third Anglo-Afghan War.  During World War II, Nicholls would serve under 
Gubbins as Director of Signals at SOE.   
Gubbins was often awake until 2:30 or 3:00am, laboring over his studies.
234
  
“The one ambition of all the students now,” he wrote to his cousin Helen, “is not to get a 
1
st
 class report but just to get thro‟ safely and get it over.”235  Gubbins finished fourth in 
the class, with his commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Sir Ian Birdwood, commending 
him for “an excellent performance.”236  Having completed his studies, Gubbins was back 
in Britain by the end of January 1930.
237
 
 
Air Power 
 Gubbins first saw combat in the first conflict to feature any significant use of air 
power, the Great War, and attended the Cooperation with Aircraft Course in 1917.  The 
Archangel Expeditionary Force made the first air-supported landing in world history, 
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covered by Fairey Campania biplanes from HMS Nairana.
238
  The RAF contingent of 
the Archangel Force also brought eight DH-4 biplanes, two Sopwith Baby floatplanes 
and a Sopwith Camel, and on arrival discovered RE-8s, Nieuport 17s, Sopwith 1 ½ 
Strutters among the supplies which had been sent to Russia.  Just as important, the RAF 
discovered 27 veterans of the Russian Flying Corps, to add to the thirty pilots and 
observers they had brought.
239
  Gubbins‟s presence alongside General Ironside meant he 
would have brushed elbows with some of the RAF personnel, among whom Ironside 
praised Lt. Col. Robin Grey “for his direction of the Royal Air Force and for his courage 
and determination.”240  In Ireland the RAF dropped propaganda leaflets, conducted 
reconnaissance, escorted convoys to deter and detect ambushes, and carried out both 
bomb and strafing attacks against IRA guerrillas.
241
  In India, Air Force Headquarters 
were located in Simla, alongside Army Headquarters, where Gubbins was stationed, and 
among the topics he studied at the Staff College in Quetta was the role of air power.
242
  
Thus, although Gubbins records in his SOE Record of Service that he flew an aeroplane 
“only once!” he had considerable familiarity with aircraft and had numerous occasions 
on which to consider their role in guerrilla warfare.
243
  Thus, it comes as little surprise 
that air power figures in a few significant passages of Gubbins‟s 1939 writings. 
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 One can speculate as to why Gubbins‟ writings display a considerable fear of air 
power.  Although air power played small roles in Russia and Ireland, in neither theater 
could it be called decisive.  Gubbins was certainly aware of the role of air power in the 
Chinese Civil War and the Spanish Civil War, both raging as he wrote the Art of 
Guerilla Warfare and the Partisan Leader‟s Handbook (see Chapter III).  However, the 
most unambiguous uses of air power in the interwar period involved Britain‟s own Royal 
Air Force.  In 1919, the RAF deployed to British Somaliland to put an end to the 
rebellion of Mohammed bin Abdullah Hassan, known to his British opponents as the 
“Mad Mullah.”  The RAF contingent, “Z Force,” was used to bomb rebel strongholds – 
very nearly killing the rebel leader in the process – as well as performing reconnaissance 
and communications functions.
244
  Contemporary assessments of the RAF‟s operations 
in Somaliland were quite positive, concluding, in the words of the Governor, that 
“threats from the air offer the surest guarantee of peace and order.”245  In 1919 a series 
of rebellions broke out in Mesopotamia, and the RAF once again conducting ground 
attack and communications operations, as well as dropping propaganda leaflets, 
attacking Turkish incursions into Mesopotamia, and engaging in air mapping.
246
  As the 
regional situation worsened in the coming years, overall command in the recently-
renamed Iraq was invested in an RAF officer, while “air control” of certain territories 
was substituted for army control.
247
  Conflict, much of it centred around Sheikh 
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Mahmud‟s rebellion, continued until 1932, the same year Iraq officially received 
independence.  In spite of more than a decade of irregular warfare, many viewed the 
RAF‟s experiment in air control as a success; upon his surrender in 1931, Sheikh 
Mahmud himself described the RAF as “the people who have broken my spirit.”248  As 
the Palestinian Revolt broke out in 1936 (see Chapter IV), the RAF coordinated with 
police and army forces, conducting reconnaissance, distributing propaganda and carrying 
out strafing and light bombing against Arab mobs, criminal gangs and Arab and Jewish 
terrorist groups.
249
  It was in Palestine that the RAF began the tactic of “air cordons,” in 
which entire villages or cities – such as Jerusalem on 18 October – were surrounded by 
aircraft flying around the perimeter to prevent anyone from entering or leaving, while 
the army then searched the location for rebels or arms caches.
250
 
Gubbins would have only learned about the above conflicts at a remove, but 
India was also a significant scene of air operations against irregular forces.  In the tribal 
rebellion in Waziristan which followed the Afghan invasion, the RAF engaged in both 
close air support and independent bombing, often at great peril.
251
  Its work was praised 
by the official historian of the conflict, who argued that “officers of the land forces 
would find their labour well repaid if they undertook the study of this important 
auxiliary to the art of tactics.”252  But the most striking use of air power came during 
Pink‟s War, operations against a few tribes on the North West Frontier which chose not 
to accept the British‟ terms, as their neighbours had, but launched a fresh rebellion in 
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1925.  These actions – by both day and night – were not simply led by the RAF, as was 
the case in Iraq or the earlier conflict in Waziristan, but were exclusively conducted from 
the air.
253
  When the rebels were foolish enough to move through open country, 
considerable casualties were inflicted from the air.  Perhaps more importantly, 
neighbouring tribes began refusing the rebels sanctuary, having been warned by the RAF 
that their villages and flocks would be bombed if they did.  That the rebels came to terms 
after only 54 days of RAF operations suggested the stunning possibilities of air power 
against unconventional forces.
254
 
Gubbins advises in The Art of Guerilla Warfare that “partisan leaders must 
impress on all their men that the surest way of attaining success in their operations is by 
remaining undetected, and that detection will always be followed by enemy action 
against them.”  Such detection can come with very little warning from the air.  Thus, 
“concealment from aircraft is of the greatest importance, and men must be trained to take 
cover quickly, to lie face downwards, and to remain absolutely still until the aeroplane 
has passed.”255  Elsewhere in the Art he observes that of “the various weapons that the 
enemy may employ… the most dangerous to the partisans is the aeroplane.”256  Drives 
and other actions of enemy mobile detachments are made more dangerous by the fact 
that “aeroplanes are certain to co-operate.”257  In addition to simply posing a direct 
danger, aircraft also impose limits on partisans, forcing them to organize bands of twenty 
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five men or fewer; anything larger cannot be concealed.
258
  Because of the danger of 
being spotted from the air, partisans are advised to “move as much as you can by 
night.”259  When preparing an ambush site, arrangements should never be of the sort that 
can be spotted from the air.
260
 
These are cautions the Irish would have understood.  In May 1921 the 
Republican newspaper an t-Ólgach explained that “enemy aircraft were a factor which 
our troops had to give serious attention”; retreating guerrillas had to worry about 
“keeping in cover from the aircraft” since “the most dangerous thing was being observed 
by [British] aircraft.”261  Gubbins‟s partisans would be heirs to this important point. 
 
Conclusion 
 By the dawn of the 1930s Gubbins had seen conventional warfare on the Western 
Front, where he served with distinction.  He had participated in irregular conflict, first in 
Russia and then in Ireland, and had spent several years in India, where problems of 
intelligence, subversion and the irregular warfare of the North West Frontier occupied 
much of his time.  Moreover, he had had occasion to reflect on guerrilla warfare, its 
methods and qualities, and how it intersects with intelligence, air power and larger 
strategy.  He had certainly considered some of these matters at the Intelligence Course 
and at Staff College in India; he likely considered them in the light of the Notes on 
Guerrilla Warfare in Ireland while in Ireland and may have also examined them with 
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reference to Small Wars while in Russia.  Nevertheless, readers should be cautioned not 
to take too much of a teleological view; although Gubbins had considerable experience 
with irregular warfare, he did not yet see it as his particular vocation, nor did he single-
minded seek it out, as if somehow consciously preparing himself for his future 
leadership of SOE. 
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CHAPTER III 
FORMULATING A DOCTRINE: 
LEARNING FROM THE PAST 
 
The 1930s 
Beginning of the Decade 
 Gubbins returned to Britain and spent nearly a year with 5 Light Brigade at 
Ewshot, Hampshire.
262
  On 19 January 1931 he reported for duty at MI3(c), the Soviet 
section of the Military Intelligence Directorate.
263
  He had spent a great deal of time in 
India reading intercepted Soviet communications, but the new cipher pads adopted by 
the Soviets in 1927 proved much harder to crack.  Thus, most of Gubbins‟s work 
involved reading open source material from the Russian press.  This was his first 
experience at the War Office, and he enjoyed the cosmopolitan atmosphere he found in 
his new assignment, a welcome break the sometimes drab world of regular soldiering.
264
   
In April 1933, he left MI3(c) when was appointed Brigade Major, Royal Artillery 
to 4 Division in Colchester.
265
  Here he was responsible for training artilleryman from 
the Territorial Army (TA), Britain‟s reserve force.  Like his experience with Military 
Intelligence, Gubbins appreciated the wide variety of enthusiastic men the TA provided, 
as well as the constructive criticism they frequently brought to military practices.  While 
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many soldiers, skeptical of civilians, might have discouraged such comments, Gubbins 
encouraged them.
266
   
His work in training continued when, in October 1935, he was appointed to the 
policy-making branch of the Military Training Directorate, MT1, where he served as a 
GSO2 and head of the artillery section.  While working with MT1, he also doubled as 
personal staff officer to Major-General Alan Brooke, Inspector of Artillery and soon-to-
be Director of Military Training.
267
  Brooke would later become General Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief Home Army and Chief of the Imperial General Staff, when his 
friendship proved valuable to Gubbins. 
In October 1938 Gubbins was among the British military observers who watched 
the withdrawal of Czech forces from the Sudetenland.  He considered Czechoslovakia “a 
thoroughly decent democratic little nation” and disapproved of the Munich Agreement, 
which he saw was a prelude to the war Hitler desired.
268
  Ever after, Gubbins was 
shamed that the Czechs had fallen victim to the Nazis by virtue of what he judged to be 
British and French weakness.
269
 
 
Electra House 
As the British government faced the possibility of that which they most dreaded, 
a European war, the Committee of Imperial Defence set up a small organization called 
the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries – known as EH (after its 
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headquarters, the Electra House on the Thames) or CS (after its head, Sir Campbell 
Stuart) – with the purpose of influencing German opinion.  Stuart, a Canadian, had been 
deputy head of the Crewe House organisation, Britain‟s propaganda machine in the First 
World War, and was now chairman of the Imperial Communications Committee, whose 
offices were at Electra House.
270
 
Authors disagree about when EH was established; M. R. D. Foot argues for late 
March 1938.
271
  Charles Cruickshank contends that Stuart “was invited by the Prime 
Minister to set up a new propaganda department” in September 1938, though the Munich 
crisis delayed its actual operations until the following September.
272
  William 
Mackenzie‟s account is similar to Cruickshank‟s, though he assigns the initiative to 
Admiral Hugh Sinclair, chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and places the 
beginning of operations in January 1939.
273
  The differences between these accounts 
may be the result not of fact but of definition.  What qualifies as establishment or 
constitutes an agency changes the “official” date of creation for EH. 
EH was placed under the authority of the Ministry of Information, then the 
Foreign Office, and back again several times during 1939 and 1940.  It would eventually 
become the Political Warfare Executive, an independent war-time propaganda agency.  
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Before such independence it would pass through the hands of SOE.
274
 
 
Section D 
In April 1938, a month after the Austro-German Anschluss was effected and 
around the time EH was proposed, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) created a new 
section within its organization.  This was the product of a joint assessment by Section III 
(Naval) and Section VI (Industrial) that SIS needed to consider the potential of sabotage 
operations.  Thus Section D (originally known as Section IX) was established to study 
unconventional means of waging warfare or – in the words of the SIS chief – “to 
cogitate upon the possibilities of sabotage.”275   
The first objects of study were the transportation of two key raw materials to 
Germany: iron ore from Sweden and oil from Romania.
276
  Section D also considered 
groups which might be induced to carry out sabotage, including Jews, Catholics and 
Communists.
277
  Like SOE, into which it developed, Section D aimed at utilizing anti-
Nazi organizations already in Europe.
278
  It recommended deploying agents to the 
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countries on Germany‟s frontiers, both to intercept goods destined for Germany and to 
supply resisters within Germany.
279
  However, Section D recognized that such a 
deployment of agents would be too provocative in peacetime.
280
  Until the outbreak of 
war, it limited itself to research and preliminary organization, with a one-time 
appropriation of £20,000.
281
 
The new organization was led by Major Laurence Douglas Grand, Royal 
Engineers, who began work on 1 April 1938.  He was tall and lean, described by one 
who knew him as having “all the paraphernalia of the „spy master‟ of popular fiction”: 
civilian clothes (always with a red carnation in the buttonhole), a black homburg hat, 
dark glasses, and a tapered cigarette holder in his mouth.
282
  Further matching the 
stereotypes of fiction, Section D had an “obsession with security.”283  Grand commanded 
great loyalty, but was said to be short on tact.
284
 
Grand got off to a quick start, moving Section D from its original location in the 
SIS basement to a new location a couple hundred yards away on the 6
th
 floor of No. 2 
Caxton Street.  Here its offices connected by various passageways to the neighboring St. 
Ermin‟s Hotel.285  In May 1938 Grand submitted a list of likely targets and methods of 
sabotage.  According to an internal SOE history, other sections of SIS commented that 
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the ideas were ambitious to the point of impracticality.
286
  Grand nevertheless pressed 
ahead.  In the autumn of 1938 he traveled to Czechoslovakia, where he met with the 
Czech General Staff and considered the possibilities of sabotaging the Skoda Armaments 
works, should it fall into German hands; Grand even went so far as to organize a 
pyramidal network through the main Skoda factories themselves, to carry out such 
sabotage, although it never happened.
287
 
Since Section D‟s original field of operations included “moral sabotage,” it 
overlapped with EH‟s propaganda operations.288  Open broadcasts from Britain were 
unequivocally the BBC‟s responsibility, but Grand planned for extensive propaganda 
against Germany via neutral countries and was also interested in “black” radio, 
broadcasts claiming to come from within Germany, while really originating in Britain.  
Out of Section D‟s secret allocation he funded the Joint Broadcasting Committee, which 
carried out both black and white (avowed) broadcasts.
289
     
With the outbreak of war, Section D no longer limited itself to planning; in 1939 
and 1940 it ran operations in the Balkans.  The Ploeşti oilfield in Romania supplied 
Germany with 20% of its oil; Section D attempted attacks on the oilfield itself and the 
means of transport, but all efforts failed.
290
  Unsurprisingly, the British diplomats of the 
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Balkans were squeamish about these clandestine operations, about which they knew 
little and over which they had no control.
291
  Nevertheless, the failures themselves may 
have proved something to the diplomats: denying Britain‟s (unacknowledged) saboteurs 
the support of the (official) diplomatic staff only increased the likelihood of 
embarrassing failures.  Cooperation, it appeared, might be mutually beneficial.
292
 
At the same time Section D established contact with a host of Jewish, Catholic, 
labor, émigré and other anti-Nazi organizations.  Its relationships extended to 
international groups with a presence in Britain, but also to organizations in Germany, 
Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Italy, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Palestine and 
Egypt.  Although Section D was not an intelligence organization per se, it was an 
extension of SIS, and so the various intelligence data which came from these sources – 
including a secret index of the Nazi hierarchy provided by a German émigré – was 
passed along in course.  A few cases of explosives were distributed to would-be 
saboteurs in Germany, but the results were minimal: the reported – though unconfirmed 
– destruction of a single munitions dump.293 
In the four weeks leading up to the outbreak of war, Section D delivered more 
than two tons of propaganda to Germany, Austria and the (former) Czechoslovakia, by 
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way of four courier lines running through Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands.  
These lines went dormant at the outbreak of war – both due to the arrest of key personnel 
and also because of the difficulty in securing transport from Britain to neutral countries 
in those busy days – but by October all original lines were operating again, and seven 
new lines had been added.  As 1939 drew to a close, some lines were shut down, but 
even more new lines were opened.
294
  By the beginning of 1940 radio broadcasts could 
be heard in  fourteen countries, with negotiations underway for broadcasts in several 
others.  Hundreds of recordings and thousands of pressings – including special records 
that could be hidden inside rolled newspapers – were produced each month.295  Little, 
however, came of these efforts, in part because commercial radio stations in neutral 
countries would only broadcast material too mild to be effective.
296
 
In addition to examining external possibilities for employing sabotage and 
subversion against Britain‟s enemies, Section D also worried about the possible uses of 
sabotage and subversion against Britain.  It produced directions for anti-sabotage 
precautions which were approved by MI5, the Security Service, and circulated not only 
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throughout Britain but also to the Empire.  Moreover, Section D also documented the 
allegedly pro-Nazi activities of the “Oxford Group,” and studied the potential value of 
secret censorship (i.e., reading mail, not censoring the press).
297
 
  
General Staff (Research) 
In 1936, the Imperial General Staff set up a small section in the War Office 
called General Staff (Research), or GS(R), reporting directly to the Deputy Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff (DCIGS).  This office was really more of a fellowship, extended 
to a single officer for one year, in which he would “research into problems of tactics and 
organisation under the direction of the DCIGS.”  He would “liaison with other branches 
of the War Office and with Commands in order to collect new ideas on these 
subjects.”298  Put simply, the fellowship holder could study any topic of interest to him, 
so long as it was acceptable to the DCIGS.  The first holder of the office considered 
army education; the second examined military medicine.
299
  Nevertheless, GS(R)‟s 
clandestine potential was suggested by the DCIGS in a minute: “This section must be 
small, almost anonymous, go where they like, talk to whom they like, but be kept from 
files, correspondence and telephone calls.”300 
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In 1938 the position passed to Lt. Col. J. C. F. Holland, a Royal Engineer who 
had attended Woolwich in the class behind Gubbins.  In 1916, Holland had been 
attached to the Royal Flying Corps, serving in the Balkans and with T. E. Lawrence‟s 
irregulars in Arabia; for his service he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.
301
  
Holland had also served on the Northwest Frontier and during the post-war “Troubles” 
in Ireland, where – according to Foot – he befriended Gubbins.302  Gubbins described 
Holland as intelligent, imaginative and practical.
303
  He was “completely unselfish… 
[and] had no intention of building an empire for himself,” Gubbins explained.304  
Holland‟s secretary described him as a hardworking chain smoker with a fiery temper (“I 
can feel now the quick downward movement by which I ducked the impact of a book 
flung at my head one day on opening the door of his office”), a man both feared and 
loved.
305
  Finally, in contrast to Grand, Holland loathed pretense.
306
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In the autumn of 1938 the General Staff was prohibited from even considering 
the possibility of deploying a British expeditionary force to the Continent in a future 
war.  However, as Gubbins explained, Holland had been impressed by the hit-and-run 
tactics of guerrillas in China and Spain.
307
  Thus, Holland took guerrilla warfare as his 
topic of study, officially seeking lessons for British colonial operations.  In secret, 
however, Holland was ordered by the DCIGS to examine ways in which Britain might 
support guerrillas in Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe.
308
   
In January 1939, on the strength of a preliminary report, Holland received 
authorization to expand GS(R) by adding two general staff officers, second grade 
(GSO2), one a demolitions expert, the other to be in charge of organization, recruitment 
and training.  For the demolitions post he selected the ruddy-faced Millis Jefferis, 
another Engineer, who was described by Joan Bright Astley as “an inventive genius.”309  
For the position overseeing organization, recruitment and training, Holland chose Colin 
Gubbins, at least in part because of his service in Russia and Ireland.
310
  On 4 April 1939 
Gubbins joined Holland as his assistant, and that spring they authored papers on the 
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theory and practice of guerrilla warfare.
311
  Their source material came from the 
conflicts in which they had fought – the Arab Revolt, the Russian Civil War and the Irish 
Revolution – as well as from the earlier Anglo-Boer Wars, the guerrilla campaign of 
Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck in East Africa and such recent affairs as the Spanish Civil 
War, the Sino-Japanese Wars and the Palestinian Revolt.
312
 
In addition to the officers, Holland also had a secretary typist, Joan Bright.  She 
was a sort of genuine Miss Moneypenny, holding together the office with diligent work 
and keen wit.
313
  She was born in Argentina and served as a typist with the British 
delegation in Mexico.
314
  After the war Gubbins described her as professional and a 
“great personal friend.”315  Two other early members of the organisation were Norman 
Crockatt and Eddie Combe; of these, together with Holland, Gubbins and Bright, Dennis 
Wheatley wrote, “It would have been difficult to find five people better qualified to run 
such a „free-lance‟ department with vigour and imagination.”316 
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GS(R), Section D, and Electra House are proof that British foreign policy in the 
1930s was not simply inactive; the War Office, the Secret Intelligence Service, and the 
Committee on Imperial Defence were thinking about the conflict to come and were 
taking creative – albeit limited – steps to prepare for that conflict. 
 
Section D and GS(R) 
In March 1939 a series of important meetings took place.  On 20 March Grand 
submitted a joint paper to W. E. van Cutsem, Deputy Director of Military Intelligence 
(DDMI).
317
  Mackenzie comments that “the basic ideas of this paper are recognizably 
those of Colonel Holland; its style and its unquenchable optimism are certainly Colonel 
Grand‟s.”318  The report emphasized lessons from “experiences which we have had in 
India, Irak, Ireland and Russia.”319  With regard to present applications of guerrilla 
warfare it advocated 
(a) Creating the maximum of insecurity to occupying troops and occupying 
Gestapo: 
(b) Creating the maximum of insecurity on the lines of communication: 
(c) Encouragement of local desire for independence; 
(d) Making any fresh adventure, and the most recent in Czecho-Slovakia and 
Austria, as expensive as possible.
320
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Among other things, the report proposed the elimination of Gestapo agents in occupied 
countries, the fostering of Romanian, Danish, Dutch and Polish guerrillas, and the 
fomenting of insurrection in Italian Libya and Italian-occupied Abyssinia.
321
  The 
Czechs were to be armed and encouraged “to commence operations on the lines of the 
Irish Terror in 1920-21.”322  To do all this, Grand requested Holland, along with 25 other 
officers and a budget of half a million pounds.
323
   
On 22 March, Good Friday of that year, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
(CIGS), Viscount Gort, was briefed on the proposals, along with R. H. Dewing, the 
Director of Military Operations (DMO); DDMI Cutsem
 
was again present.
324
  On 23 
March the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax; the Permanent Under-Secretary of the 
Foreign Office, Sir Alexander Cadogan; the acting SIS Chief, Sir Stewart Menzies; Gort; 
and Grand met to discuss the paper of 20 March.  Halifax was concerned about funding a 
sabotage organisation which might be traced back to His Majesty‟s Government; Grand 
convinced him that plausible deniability could be maintained.  Someone also asked why 
the paper proposed only to tell the prime minister and foreign secretary about subversive 
operations; why was the chancellor left off?  Grand explained that fewer people reduced 
the chance of leaks.  Halifax said he understood, but pointed out that it would be hard to 
obtain funding while the chancellor was partly in the dark.  Finally, the matter of 
Romania came up; Grand explained that the Romanian oil fields were certainly 
important, but only one piece of the larger plan.  Halifax suggested that he be given a 
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letter which could then be passed to King Carol II of Romania “to raise the matter” of 
the oilfields.
325
  Thus, the assembled leaders agreed that, with Prime Minister 
Chamberlain‟s approval, some preparatory work could be done by Section D, with an 
emphasis on counteracting the Nazis in the small countries Germany was threatening.
326
  
Holland, in turn, followed up this meeting by securing Gort‟s approval for the expansion 
of his work.
327
  Since the approval came from Gort, in the War Office, and not from 
someone in the Foreign Office, this suggests that Holland and GS(R) were still distinct 
from Section D; however, the funds for the expansion came from the SIS budget.
328
 
As part of the change, GS(R) was redesignated “D/M Section” and authorized to 
expand.
329
  To limit costs and attention, however, D/M Section received only a small 
number of regular officers; most of its staff came from the ranks of Reserve or 
Territorial Army officers.
330
  Given the secrecy surrounding the task Holland and his 
small staff were performing, it was decided that they should work along side Section D, 
since it was making similar plans and could more easily divert the Treasury‟s prying 
eyes.
331
  As part of this cooperation, Holland and his personnel moved from the War 
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Office to Section D‟s offices at No. 2 Caxton Street in April 1939.332  In June 1939 D/M 
Section was moved from the DCIG‟s jurisdiction and placed under the Director of 
Military intelligence (DMI), General Frederick George Beaumont-Nesbitt, and again 
renamed, this time MI.1(R), though MI(R) is the name that stuck.
333
 
Thus in the spring of 1939 MI(R) and Section D began a relationship which 
would eventually result in their merger into SOE.  In retrospect, the precise parameters 
of that relationship in 1939 are confusing and at times unclear; the same was true for the 
participants then.  Peter Fleming, having been recruited by MI(R), recorded his 
confusion with a biblical turn: “I seem to be under but not of the War Office.”334  
Likewise, Joan Bright Astley records that in April 1939 she joined “Section „D/MI(R),‟” 
though all the superiors she lists were from the MI(R) side of things.
335
  This confusion 
regarding the relationship between the two organizations is only heightened by later 
attempts to establish the primacy of one or the other in the historiography.  An internal 
SOE history, for example, written from the perspective of Section D, was likely authored 
by a veteran of that organization or by someone utilizing documents from it.  This 
history claims that “M.I.R., an organisation… initiated by Colonel Grand, was 
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established as a branch of the War Department.”336  While Grand may have shepherded 
its development into a guerrilla agency, its existence as a kind of research fellowship 
undeniably antedates the creation of Section D or Grand‟s arrival on the scene.   
Attempts by historians to identify a division of labour between the two 
organizations have been inconclusive.  Seaman contends that Section D provided 
wartime contingency plans while the more “visionary” MI(R) contributed “thoughtful 
development of the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare.”337  However, Foot appears 
to contradict this directly, noting that Holland “seems to have believed [Section D‟s] 
head to be too visionary and impractical to suit the exigencies of the war that both he 
himself and Gubbins regarded as imminent.”338  On 11 February 1940, DMI Beaumont-
Nesbitt attempted to delineate the boundary between the two organizations: activities 
which could be acknowledged would be handled by MI(R); those that could not, by 
Section D.
339
 
Perhaps the best distinction comes from a memorandum of 4 September 1940, in 
which MI(R) clarified that Section D would focus on “action [which] must be sub-
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terranean, i.e., in countries which are in effective occupation,” while MI(R) would focus 
on “action [which] is a matter of military missions, whether regular or irregular.”340 
The parallels between MI(R) and Section D are considerable: Holland, like 
Grand, was an engineer; both, like Gubbins, studied at the Royal Military Academy, 
Woolwich.  Grand and Gubbins both had served in France, Russia, and India, though 
Grand had also served in Iraq.  Just as his counterparts at MI(R) looked to the Irish 
Republican Army, the experience in Russia, and the experience of imperial policing for 
lessons, so too did Grand.
341
  That Grand, Holland and Gubbins all had similar 
experiences and ended up in subversive warfare in the late 1930s attests to the fact that 
there existed a circle of men who had cut their teeth on the same irregular conflicts in the 
years before the Second World War.   
In spite of the similarities, there was a basic difference in temperament between 
the two organizations, a difference which explained Gubbins‟s mixed feelings toward 
Section D.  As seen during his experiences with Military Intelligence and Military 
Training, Gubbins opposed bureaucratic thinking and appreciated alternative views, 
particularly from civilians.  In Section D he encountered risk-taking businessmen and 
generous budgets to finance innovative ideas.  However, he was aghast at some of 
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Section D‟s more grandiose projects and the amateurish way they were executed.342  
MI(R) was creative, but it also remained realistic.
343
  A single example of MI(R)‟s hard-
headedness may suffice: Holland explained in April 1939 that MI(R) would focus on 
defending countries which remained unoccupied.  Those which had already fallen to the 
Germans were beyond its modest abilities.
344
  Holland‟s decision was simple, clear, 
practical, and quite unlike the empire-building so often found within government 
bureaucracies. 
From June 1939 onward, the tone at MI(R) changed, as Holland explained in a 
memo to his subordinates: “from now until the middle of August we must aim primarily 
at getting anything ready that we can in the time.”345  Under orders from the DCIGS, 
MI(R) operated “on the assumption that war might occur in August/September.”346  For 
the time being, however, MI(R) remained in the same building as Section D, in spite of 
the concerns of Holland and Gubbins that Section D might be too impractical for the 
coming conflict.
347
 
As part of the new growth GS(R) experienced when it evolved into MI(R), the 
agency was permitted to earmark and train British personnel for special work in sabotage 
and guerrilla warfare.  When necessary, they could be commissioned in the Officers‟ 
                                                 
342
 Wilkinson and Astley, Gubbins and SOE, 35.  Among Section D‟s more creative projects was the 
development of balloons – several kinds, including hydrogen, hot air and a combination of hydrogen and 
ammonia, were tried – to carry incendiary devices to Germany.  See “SOE Early History to September 
1940,” Chapter 1: Early History, 18, HS 7/3.  It should be noted that the Japanese tried something similar, 
achieving very limited success.  See Bert Webber, Retaliation: Japanese Attacks and Allied 
Countermeasures on the Pacific Coast in World War II (Corvallis, OR, 1975). 
343
 Mackenzie, Secret History of SOE, 38. 
344
 Holland, “General Instructions,” 13 April 1939, 3, TNA: PRO, HS 8/256. 
345
 Holland, “Memorandum,” No. M/I.6, June 1939, TNA: PRO, HS 8/256. 
346
 “Record of Meeting Held in the War Office on June 27th, 1939, To Settle the future of G.S.(R) and 
Certain Connected Questions,” No. M/I.7, 2, TNA: PRO, HS 8/256. 
347
 Foot, SOE in France, 4. 
  
80 
Emergency Reserve.
348
  If, up to this point, there had continued to be a pretext of broad 
research at GS(R), it was dropped.  Holland focused on producing reports for the DDMI 
on irregular warfare and Gubbins prepared a syllabus for three MI(R) training courses in 
the theory of elementary guerrilla warfare, held in late June at Caxton Hall – next to the 
St. Ermin‟s Hotel, on the other side from MI(R) headquarters at No. 2 Caxton St.349  For 
these courses he recruited explorers, linguists, international businessmen and regular 
officers with special skills.
350
  Classes were kept small for security reasons; everyone, 
civilians and officers alike, wore civilian dress.
351
  Holland hoped these men could 
accompany future military missions sent abroad, making “contact with any elements that 
might be able to operate behind the Germans.”352   
Meanwhile, Gubbins traveled to connect Britain‟s potential agents with potential 
guerrillas abroad.  In May he traveled to Poland, the three Baltic republics and Romania, 
meeting with the British military attachés in each country.  He concluded that the Poles 
possessed a “natural aptitude… for guerilla activities… fostered by the national spirit 
during a century of oppression by Russia and Germany.”353  The British ambassador in 
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Warsaw informed him that the Polish General Staff had been very frank; the ambassador 
insisted that the Poles “could be trusted to the hilt” and hoped that MI(R) would match 
their candor.
354
  On two later trips to Poland, the Baltic and the Balkans, he contacted the 
Polish General Staff and its intelligence service and again met with the British military 
attachés.
355
  In his meetings with the Poles, Gubbins discussed guerrilla warfare only 
generally, without making any joint plans, though he and Colonel Stanislav Gano of 
Polish military intelligence, met at this time and become friends.
356
  However, very little 
is known of these travels, since, as Gubbins himself admitted years later, they “were so 
secret that even the D.M.I. was not informed and was very angry when he 
discovered.”357 
 In addition to the information and relationships Gubbins acquired in Poland, he 
also brought home a device called a “time-pencil,” a time-delay fuse capable of 
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detonating plastic explosives up to 30 hours after activation.  It had been invented by the 
Germans during World War I and was improved by the Poles; SOE would subsequently 
improve the device further and manufacture them in the millions.
358
 
 
The Art of Guerilla Warfare and The Partisan Leader’s Handbook 
In April 1939 Holland sent a memo to his subordinates, explaining that the 
organization had permission to act on three items: 
(a) To study guerilla methods and produce a guerilla “F.S.R” [Field Service 
Regulations], incorporating detailed tactical and technical instructions, 
applying to each of several countries. 
(b) To evolve destructive devices for delaying and suitable for use by 
guerillas, and capable of production and distribution on a wide enough 
scale to be effective. 
(c) To evolve procedure and machinery for operating guerilla activities, if it 
should be decided to do so subsequently.
359
   
Holland envisioned an easily-translated pamphlet to explain the general principles of 
guerrilla operations, “followed by chapters or sections dealing with the detailed 
application to each country.”360  Gubbins answered this call, completing in May two 
brief but significant pamphlets: The Partisan Leader‟s Handbook and The Art of 
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Guerilla Warfare.
361
  Gubbins also co-authored with Jefferis a third work, How to Use 
High Explosives.
362
 
For unknown reasons, Gubbins‟s works are general guides and not country 
specific.  In passing, we have already seen many of these principles: the potential 
strength of guerrillas, particularly when possessed with quality intelligence; the need for 
guerrillas to maintain mobility; the psychological or moral effect of guerrillas simply 
remaining in the field; the danger guerrillas can pose to extended lines of 
communication; and the threat posed to guerrillas by extended engagements.  It may be 
useful, however, to pause and briefly consider these works in their own right, rather than 
in relation to other ideas.   
The Art of Guerilla Warfare, though completed second, is logically the senior of 
the two works, since it covers “the organisation of guerilla warfare generally,” while The 
Partisan Leader‟s Handbook, as the name implies, is “of the „Section Leading‟ type, for 
the leaders of partisan parties.”363  The Art is broken into seventeen sections, covering: 
(1) The object of guerrilla warfare (“to harass the enemy in every way possible”364); (2) 
Its “objectives” or targets, such as supply depots, communications, etc.; (3) Its methods 
and asymmetric tactics utilizing mobility, initiative, information and morale, including 
the so-called “nine points of the guerilla‟s creed”365; (4) Its leadership and organization; 
(5) The Guerilla Bureau; (6) Arms and equipment; (7) Information and intelligence; (8) 
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Communications; (9) Training; (10) Enemy counter action; (11 & 12) Planning; (13) 
Friendly populations; (14) Hostile populations; (15) Neutral countries; (16) Geography; 
and (17) The organization of individual partisan bands.  The Handbook, divided into 
seven sections, covers similar topics: principles of guerrilla warfare and sabotage, types 
of operations, organization, information, informers and enemy countermeasures.  These 
sections are then augmented by eight appendices deal with practical matters: road 
ambushes, rail ambushes, the destruction of an enemy post, concealment and care of 
arms and explosives, countering the enemy‟s information system, countering enemy 
action, the guerrilla information service, and miscellaneous sabotage methods. 
 
Learning from the Past 
Although Gubbins and Holland had both experienced irregular warfare 
themselves, particularly in Ireland, they were also inspired by historical examples.  
Indeed, as Foot observes, their “subject‟s importance should have been obvious to the 
British, for in 1899-1902 it had taken a quarter of a million men to put down an informal 
Boer army less than a tenth as large.”366  There is no doubt about GS(R)‟s interest in 
history; its Report No. 2 considered “The Employment of Historians by the War Office 
in a consultative capacity.”367  Even before Gubbins joined GS(R), Holland had argued 
in his first joint proposals with Grand that irregular warfare “must be based on the 
experience which was have had in India, Irak, Ireland and Russia, i.e. the development 
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of a combination of guerilla and IRA tactics.”368  An examination of these and other 
conflicts known to have been studied by Holland and Gubbins reveal several things.  At 
the most general level, such an examination shows that these men were very much 
products of their time.  This is not to say that all military men in 1939 were interested in 
irregular warfare or believed in the usefulness of partisans.  Nevertheless, we discover 
the decades preceding the authorship of the Art and the Handbook were filled with 
irregular conflicts about which a great deal of information was available – in public 
books and articles and also in government memoranda – to those who were willing to 
look.  And that was the crux of the matter.  For although virtually every element of 
Gubbins‟s writings had precedent somewhere else, his claim that “there was not a single 
book to be found in any library in any language which dealt with this subject” should not 
be dismissed as mere hyperbole.
369
  Works on guerilla warfare certainly existed, but they 
were few.  Moreover, most were historical, even anecdotal; a few were theoretical.  
Systematic tactical considerations were unusual.  In addition, most works that seriously 
considered guerrilla warfare as a military phenomenon did so from the counter-
guerrilla‟s perspective, not from the guerrilla‟s own.  Thus, we see that Gubbins‟s genius 
lay in synthesizing existing ideas into a brief and usable form. 
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At a more specific level, a careful consideration of the conflicts examined by 
GS(R) reveals parallels between specific tactics seen on the battlefield and also in 
Gubbins‟s thought.  The extant documentation is rarely sufficient to definitively prove 
that on a particular point Gubbins was inspired by a single particular example.  
Nevertheless, by constructing a picture of irregular conflict in the decades before GS(R) 
came into existence – a picture informed by contemporary accounts, the later writings of 
participants, and the known interests of GS(R)  – one can better understand the context 
of Gubbins‟s work and draw probable, if not always certain, conclusions. 
 
The Second Anglo-Boer War 
 Holland and Gubbins were certainly inspired by the example of the Boers in the 
Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1903.  In a report to the DCIGS on 1 June 1939, GS(R) argued 
that  
guerilla warfare, when carefully planned and conducted with skill, can have a 
marked influence on a campaign, out of all proportion to the numbers of guerillas 
actually engaged.  Examples from our own history give adequate proof.  In the 
Boer War, the number of Boers in the field probably never exceeded 25,000, 
while our own army was fully ten times as large before success was ultimately 
achieved.
370
 
The precise details of their study of the Boers we do not know; however, a careful 
consideration of the Boers‟ conflict with the British, alongside Gubbins‟s later writings, 
reveals likely areas of inspiration. 
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 The Second Anglo-Boer War was Britain‟s largest conflict between the defeat of 
Napoleon and the Great War.  Gubbins‟s interest in the Boers may have been further 
piqued at an early age by his aunt Susie‟s service as a nurse in the conflict.371  He 
continued to concern himself with the Boers after World War II, as well.  In a lecture in 
1973, for example, he observed that Britain‟s many irregular campaigns of the late 19th 
and early 20
th
 centuries had seen a “marked influence on the operations of regular 
armies.”372  Likewise, an article in Chamber‟s Encyclopedia explains the advantages of 
mobility that the Boer commandos had over the British forces.
373
  The original draft adds 
that British regulars were “cumbersome and… unsuited” to unconventional war, having 
to change their methods to achieve victory.
374
  It is unsurprising, then, that Gubbins was 
inspired by the Boers and their irregular tactics. 
 Dutch refugees from British Cape Colony – known as Voortrekkers – established 
the Orange Free State and the South African Republic (colloquially known as the 
Transvaal) in the 1850s.  The Boers‟ first experience of guerrilla warfare likely came in 
the Voortrekker wars of expansion, when both the agrarian Boers and the neighboring 
peoples utilized nocturnal raids to capture and recapture cattle; it comes as little surprise 
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that both sides also utilized the raid in open warfare.
375
  In 1881 the Transvaal fought an 
inconclusive war against Britain.  Gold was discovered in the Transvaal in 1886 and war 
returned thirteen years later.  Boer troops rapidly struck into Cape Colony and Natal, but 
these gains were reversed by Field Marshall Lord Roberts, who captured the Boer 
capitals of Bloemfontein in March 1900 and Pretoria in June.  Many in London and 
elsewhere assumed the war was over.  Instead, Lord Kitchener, successor to Roberts as 
commander of the British forces, faced a guerrilla war against Boer commandos for 
another two years until the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging in May 1902, ending the 
conflict.   
 The parallels between Gubbins‟s writings and the Boer experience are many.  In 
the first instance, the counter-guerrilla environment was similar.  Writing four decades 
after the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War, Gubbins was keenly aware of the 
enemy countermeasures guerrillas would face.  He expected the enemy to be much better 
armed and equipped with all the technological advances of recent decades.
376
  The 
enemy would likely employ raids, traps, regulations such as the use of identity cards, 
agents recruited from the local population, imported agents, captured prisoners, and 
press and mail censorship.
377
  Such measures not only echo the British actions Gubbins 
had seen in Ireland, but also parallel conditions in South Africa at the turn of the century.  
Byron Farwell, the eminent historian of the Second Anglo-Boer War, explains that when 
martial law was imposed across Cape Colony in 1901,   
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Passes were required…; a curfew was imposed; ...bicycles were registered; 
neutrality became unacceptable and farmers were ordered to give information 
and actively aid British columns; …the licences of travelling pedlars were 
suspended; hotels had to file daily reports on their guests; and there were harsh 
restrictions on a long list of “prohibited goods.”378   
Gubbins was fully aware that if a guerrilla movement could not contend with 
countermeasures such as these, it would fail. 
A second parallel is the importance of survival, something the Boer guerrillas 
understood well.  So long as they remained in the field, the British could not claim 
victory; thus, a skillful retreat was often more useful than bold actions.  The Boer 
General Christiaan de Wet commented that “it was impossible to think of fighting – the 
enemy‟s numbers were far too great.  Our only safety lay in flight.”379  Recognizing the 
importance of survival, Boer commandos often fled when British reinforcements arrived 
at an engagement, much to the British‟ chagrin.  Roberts complained to war minister 
Lord Lansdowne, “They slip away in the most extraordinary manner.”380   
Moreover, the Boers also excelled at ambushing their pursuers, further allowing 
escape.  At the Battle of Belmont (23 November 1899), the Boers not only inflicted 
significant losses and made a successful retreat, but then ambushed the lancers and 
mounted infantry who followed them.
381
  After engagements Boers frequently 
disappeared into the veldt, knowing “the principle that best ensures survival: 
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invisibility.”382  General Koos de la Rey usually “vanished in the darkness with 
exhausted cavalry in weary pursuit,” wrote one Kitchener biographer in 1920.383   
Gubbins followed the pattern of his Boer predecessors by arguing that survival is 
key for guerrillas.  As we have seen in the case of the Irish context, he admonishes 
partisans to “avoid prolonged engagements”384 and “never get involved in a pitched 
battle.”385  Direct action should be utilized only by guerrillas “in such overwhelming 
strength that success can be assured.”386  A “secure line of retreat” is essential for any 
ambush position; “speed and aggression in the attack” are needed, Gubbins writes, 
“followed by [a] quick get-away.”387 
In a third parallel, both Gubbins and the Boers emphasized stretching the enemy 
thin.  The Boers were vastly outnumbered, and could not hope to equal the resources of 
the British Empire.  However, by striking unexpectedly, first at one place and then 
another, they could force the British to guard vast tracks of territory, tying down enemy 
forces.  In this they were highly effective.  On 19 June 1901, Kitchener had 
approximately “164,000 men, of whom, however, nearly 100,000 were scattered along 
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the lines of rail, and were almost wholly upon the defensive.”388  The Boer General 
Louis Botha told an American observer, “Should we gather all our fighting men together 
into one force we could undoubtedly make some very pretty fights; but there would be 
only a few of them… and there would be an end to our cause.”  The Boers could not 
allow the British such a concentration of forces.  “As it is, we will split up into four or 
five commands, [and] continue operations independently of each other.”389  Busy trying 
to defend everything, the British had trouble collecting forces for offensive operations.  
The same elements appear in Gubbins‟s writings, which advocate harassing the enemy 
and forcing him to disperse his forces until he could not effectively wage war.
390
 
A fourth parallel concerns mobility and initiative.  In peacetime the Boers were a 
nation of horsemen; in war, consequently, one of their chief advantages was mobility.
391
  
The use of small groups maximized this advantage.
392
  A number of means were 
employed to further improve the Boer horsemen‟s mobility.  Several of de Wet‟s patrols 
“were forbidden to use waggons; thus, if the enemy should appear in overwhelming 
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numbers, it would always be possible for them to escape across the mountains.”393  Late 
in the war de la Rey began adopting very swift surprise attacks, in which he ordered his 
men to fire from the saddle; they would strike where the enemy was weak, but would not 
stay long enough even to dismount and fire.
394
 
Like the Boers, Gubbins prized mobility as one of a guerrilla‟s key 
advantages.
395
  He argued that they should strike the enemy and then quickly withdraw, 
only to attack again at a different location.
396
  Further paralleling the Boers of South 
Africa, Gubbins noted that a guerrilla‟s mobility could be enhanced by the use of lighter 
equipment.
397
 
 The Boers found that small groups could best employ their mobility, while also 
minimizing the constant problems of ill-discipline.  In a similar way, Gubbins advocates 
autonomy for partisan bands: “self-contained, acting under their own leader‟s 
initiative… obtaining their own information by the most direct and simplest means 
(usually word of mouth) and maintaining the loosest organization compatible with 
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effective action.”398  A central authority should provide only general oversight indicating 
ends, for which the individual bands supply the means.
399
 
 Mobility, however, was only one means by which the Boers retained initiative in 
combat.  Even before the dawn of the 19
th
 century, the Boers, in their wars with 
neighboring peoples, began the practice of seizing a defensive position near to the 
enemy, provoking an attack that favored the Boer defenders; in this way they could 
enjoy the benefits of defense while still retaining the initiative.  When war broke out 
with the British in 1899, the tactic was employed yet again.
400
  Surprise and deception 
were frequently utilized as well.  When President Martinus Steyn of the Orange Free 
State decided to risk crossing the Pietersburg Railway in order to visit the Transvaal 
government, de Wet intentionally made his presence known elsewhere, distracting 
British forces from the presidential party.
401
  At the Battle of Modder River (28 
November 1899) the Boers hid themselves behind the forward bank of the river, 
surprising Lord Methuen‟s men, who expected to meet the enemy on the far side.402  On 
another occasion two squadrons of the 19
th
 Hussars were surrounded when Boers “laid a 
bait for them with some cattle.”403  At the Battle of Blood River Poort (17 September 
1901), Colonel Hubert Gough attacked a body of dismounted Boers, caught – he 
believed – unprepared.  In fact it was a trap, with Botha‟s main force flanking Gough 
and  
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roll[ing] over the British line from right to left in ten minutes.  Six officers and 
38 men of the Mounted Infantry were killed or wounded, and 6 officers and 235 
men taken prisoners.  After searching inquiry, the Commander-in-Chief 
[Kitchener] exonerated Gough: “Gough‟s affair might have happened to any one.  
He fell into a carefully-prepared trap in very difficult ground.  The bait was 200 
men of the enemy off-saddled, and the whole force of the enemy carefully 
concealed.”404   
Likewise, during his raid into Cape Colony, General Jan Smuts divided his forces, for 
easier provisioning, but also to keep the British in a state of confusion.
405
   
Gubbins argues that among the principles of guerrilla warfare, “Surprise [is] first 
and foremost.”406  The later SOE syllabus – on which Gubbins had considerable 
influence (see Chapter 5) – clearly echoes this idea: “SURPRISE IS ESSENTIAL.”407  In 
order to achieve surprise, Gubbins advised “finding out the enemy‟s plans and 
concealing your own intentions and movements.”408  Although Gubbins writes little 
about actual deception as such – as opposed to mere concealment – Britain‟s efforts at 
strategic deception during the Second World War are well documented.
409
  It is worth 
mentioning, however, that the Inter-Service Security Board (ISSB), which coordinated 
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many of the nation‟s deception activities, began as an MI(R) project, though one Holland 
was happy to spin off when it grew beyond MI(R)‟s scope.410 
Information was a key part of the Boer approach to warfare, a fifth parallel with 
Gubbins‟s writings; intelligence on the enemy allowed the Boers to retain the initiative 
and strike the enemy where he was weakest.  Even before the conflict with the British, 
the Boers possessed fine scouting skills.
411
  Men were selected for certain operations 
precisely because “they belonged to the district, and thus were well acquainted with 
every foot of the rough and difficult country.”412  Moreover, “every [Boer] farm was 
both an intelligence agency and a stores department.”413  The Boers collected additional 
information on British military movements by simply tapping the British telegraph 
lines.
414
  The Boers seem, however, to have been uninterested in gleaning information 
from the enemy‟s mail.415 
The SOE training syllabus explains that “the secret of every successful operation 
is detailed and accurate information.”416  “The advantage of superior information is the 
guerillas‟ greatest asset,” writes Gubbins; “it must be used to the fullest extent 
possible…. in order to counteract the enemy‟s superior armament and equipment.”417  
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As noted in the Irish context, information may pertain to “the offensive aspect” – useful 
for planning guerrilla operations – or “the defensive aspect” – ensuring that the enemy 
cannot undertake raids of suspected houses or other operations without the guerrillas‟ 
prior knowledge.
418
 
The local population, frequently rubbing elbows with occupying troops, is the 
best source of information; locals may passively obtain information by keeping an open 
ear, or more actively by questioning soldiers and intercepting mail.
419
  Gubbins explains: 
“The proper encouragement of [the local population‟s support] and the development of 
the system of obtaining information will ensure that the guerillas are kept au fait with the 
enemy‟s movements and intentions, whereas their own are hidden from him.”420  The 
partisan has the added advantage of blending in with the local population, while the 
enemy‟s activities, in uniform, are more conspicuous.421 
 Information collection and utilization is only one half of the intelligence battle; 
information must also be denied to the enemy.  Those who collaborate with the enemy 
are a frequent source of information, either in the form of particular operational plans or 
more general insights into culture and tactics.  During the guerrilla phase of the Boer 
War, the British employed the National Scouts, a group of Boers, many of whom had 
previous served the republics before surrendering to the British.  De Wet complained 
that these deserters – “hands-uppers” – were the Boers‟ “undoing,” as they provided the 
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British with native scouts.
422
  Boers who surrendered and subsequently tried to convince 
their comrades to do likewise found no welcome; those who collaborated with the 
British were court-martialed and sentenced as traitors.  When he became Assistant 
Commandant-General, Smuts not only appointed new leaders, but also expelled those 
suspected of disloyalty and executed those found guilty of treason.
423
  The families of 
those who surrendered were also driven from their homes by Botha, Smuts and de la 
Rey, and had to be protected by Kitchener.
424
 
 In addition to those who openly went over to the British, the Boers had spies and 
informers in their own midst.  In the Western Cape Smuts faced a grave problem when 
betrayed by a bogus “Colonel Lambert Colyn,” who deserted the Boers to lead a British 
column on a dawn raid against them.  When Colyn was captured, Smuts had him shot 
(the man‟s desperate pleas for mercy notwithstanding).425  Thus, scouting or spying for 
the British “was dangerous work for the boys, as the Boers killed any they caught and 
we found their bodies left as warning on the veldt.”426  Farwell records that one Boer 
commander “freely admitted that he had flogged „kaffir spies‟ and… executed Boer 
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„traitors.‟”427  Similarly, de la Rey ruthlessly cleared the eastern region of Transvaal of 
native African families, in a bid to protect himself against British spies.
428
 
As we have already seen in the context of his Irish experience, Gubbins 
recommends the severest measures for those who collaborate: 
In every community will be found certain individuals so debased that for greed of 
gain they will sell even their own countrymen.  Against this contingency close 
watch must be set, and wherever proof is obtained of such perfidy, the traitor 
must be killed without hesitation or delay.  By such justifiably ruthless action 
others who might be tempted to follow suit will be finally deterred.
429
   
In addition, Gubbins argued that partisans must convince the people that the enemy will 
soon be expelled, and when he is, those who have aided the resistance will be rewarded, 
but those who have collaborated “will be ruthlessly punished.”430 
The practice of raiding for supplies is yet another parallel between the Boer 
experience and Gubbins‟s writings.  The Boers received only minimal material support 
from abroad.  Limited domestic production was further curtailed after the British 
occupation of the Boer capitals in 1900.  Thus the commandos relied heavily on captured 
equipment and supplies.  By 1901 many of the Mauser rifles with which the Boers began 
the war had worn out and been replaced with captured British Lee-Metfords.  Guerrillas 
made use of clothes captured from the British, and also took the clothes off British 
prisoners‟ backs before releasing them.  Clothing was in such short supply that de la 
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Rey‟s daughters wore dresses made of captured Union Jacks.  Captured wagons, boots 
and other supplies were also utilized.
431
   
When the British made a regular habit of burning farms in the occupied Boer 
republics, Smuts invaded Cape Colony in September of 1901, hoping to find supplies 
there.
432
  Sometimes the supply situation became quite desperate.  In one engagement 
Smuts had to attack, knowing that without fresh supplies captured from the enemy he 
could not carry on; his men literally fired their last rounds and then took up the weapons 
of the fallen British.
433
 
 Surviving off enemy goods had its advantages: wearing the enemy‟s captured 
uniforms proved invaluable at the Battle of Elands River (17 September 1901), when 
British forces were confused by the guerrillas‟ khaki uniforms.434  Likewise, Deneys 
Reitz avoided capture or death at least twice by pretending to be a British soldier.
435
  
This was, of course, a violation of the accepted norms of warfare.
436
  The Boer 
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guerrillas‟ dependence on captured goods also made them prone to looting, particularly 
problematic when they should have been fighting.
437
   
Similarly, Gubbins insists that logistics are of the utmost importance for 
guerrillas.
438
  
When operating behind the enemy‟s lines, the maintenance of supplies from 
outside will be a matter of the very greatest difficulty…; it is most important 
therefore that every opportunity to seize arms and ammunition from the enemy 
should be grasped….  It will sometimes be necessary to organize raids whose 
primary object is the seizure of arms; every partisan must always have this matter 
uppermost in his mind, and be prepared to grasp any opportunity that offers.
439
   
The SOE syllabus also discusses the details of looting supplies from an ambushed 
convoy, including the need to hide the stores and “the likelihood of the party leaving 
tracks in soft ground,” on account of the supplies‟ weight.440  Nevertheless, SOE was far 
less dependent on raiding than the Boers had been, since arms and equipment could – 
with difficulty – be supplied to occupied areas from Britain; as Gubbins explained after 
the Second World War, the Resistance movements had “a secure and accessible base 
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from which [they could] be nourished.”441  Moreover, Gubbins nowhere recommended 
posing as enemy soldiers; instead, he seems committed to upholding international norms 
and conventions.
442
 
A final parallel between the Boers and Gubbins concerns the role of civilians.  
The Boers made not infrequent use of civilians, particularly women.  On one occasion, 
Percival Marling, a British officer, recalled, “When we started to search the house the 
old woman stood in front of a door and said we couldn‟t enter, as her daughter was in 
bed going to have a baby, so we sent in Hardy, our doctor.  The girl was in bed all right, 
and a Mauser [rifle] under the mattress, and her Boer lover under the bed.”443  The entire 
guerrilla effort depended upon support from the Boer civilian population; when Smuts 
pushed for the invasion of Cape Colony, he did so in part because he hoped the ethnic 
Boers, who represented the largest white minority there, would rise against the British 
and support the invaders.
444
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 This inclusion of Boer civilians in the war effort was not without cost.  Women 
and children were rounded up and placed in concentration camps where they died in 
appalling numbers.  Burning farms was a routine British practice.  In the brief period 
from 15 April to 17 May 1901, Colonel Marling reports burning 22 farms on six 
different occasions.  Afterward the pace quickened: “For the next two weeks we were 
engaged in burning farms and rounding up Boers, but a daily account of our movements 
would become monotonous.”445  Before the end of the war in 1902 he reports another 41 
farms destroyed on seven occasions, along with an entire town and a region where “we 
have removed all the Kaffirs, destroyed all the Boer farms, and the occupants have been 
taken to Concentration Camps; [we] knocked down all buildings, and bagged all the 
sheep and cattle and nearly every living animal.”446  Another British officer saw all this 
as necessary, explaining that the Boers used “their women and children as cover and 
their farms as arsenals.”447 
Botha had read a fair amount of military history, Smuts even more; both had 
good reason to understand the price civilians pay in a guerrilla war.  Sherman‟s march 
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through Georgia and the Prussia capture of French franc-tireurs were not so distant.  “In 
short, here was a daunting moral problem.  Was it fair to the folk (women and children, 
as well as the menfolk) to involve them in such a savage kind of war? … Women and 
children [were] pressed into service,… their homes looted and burnt, then forced to 
choose between going as refugees to the cities, or following the laagers into battle.”448  
Smuts took consolation in the stern morale of the Boer civilians who endured 
tremendous suffering.
449
  It was, however, a high price that they paid. 
 Like the Boers before him, Gubbins concluded that the inclusion of women and 
other civilians in a guerrilla war effort was worth the costs.  He advocates the use of 
women and children, “who are less suspect” for conveying messages and sentry 
duties.
450
  Indeed, every man, woman and child, should be trained as an intelligence 
collector.
451
  If the enemy is searching for weapons, “as a last resort, give them to your 
women if caught unexpectedly,” he advises.452   
 In spite of these similarities, Gubbins departed from his Boer inspiration on 
several points.  As we have seen, Gubbins did not encourage or even condone the use of 
enemy uniforms.  A second departure concerns organization.  Discipline was a constant 
problem for the Boers; this ill discipline among the rank and file was mirrored by poor 
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coordination at higher levels, with each commando operating autonomously.  The Boers 
often lacked a coherent strategy.
453
 
They had no overall strategy, no master plan for winning the war.  The activities 
of the various commandos were not coordinated, and there was not even a 
statement of policy regarding purposes or objectives.  From first to last the Boers 
were always long on tactics and short on strategy.  Each independent commander 
was left to harass the British as he thought best.
454
 
To rectify this kind of problem, Gubbins proposed the creation of a Guerilla Bureau, 
“either an individual of the country concerned located with his small staff in the area of 
guerilla activities, or a section of the General Staff (Intelligence Branch) of the Army 
concerned, and located at its General Headquarters, or even a military mission from a 
third party,” i.e., Britain.455  Among such a bureau‟s responsibilities would be 
formulating and coordinating plans, compiling intelligence and providing arms and 
ammunition to guerrillas.  “When a large operation is planned, he will frequently direct 
and lead it in person.”456 
Finally, Gubbins was pragmatic enough to only conduct a guerrilla campaign 
with hope of success; SOE was not interested in romantic resistance simply to make a 
point.  “Sporadic risings are useless,” says the SOE syllabus.457  To justify inevitable 
reprisals against the civilian population, partisan activity needed to be of well-considered 
military value.  “SOE agents strove to ensure that all irregular warfare served the 
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strategic aims of the Allied leaders”458  Farwell offers a scathing critique of the Boers in 
this regard:  
Their struggle was indeed without hope of success, at least of the kind they could 
imagine.  Their deliberate, hopeless prolongation of the war resulted in the deaths 
of additional thousands of brave men.  It resulted in the destruction of their 
farms, which they and their fathers and grandfathers had worked so hard to build, 
and in the slaughters of their herds of cattle and sheep on which their future 
existence and way of life depended.  Worst of all, it resulted in the decimation of 
their women and children.  These proud, stubborn men had much to answer 
for.
459
   
Insofar as possible, Gubbins would keep his hands free of these charges.
460
 
 
T. E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt 
In October 1916, in the midst of World War I, a well-educated young British 
officer named T. E. Lawrence joined the Arabs then revolting against Turkish rule.  The 
forces he led or advised attacked the Medina railway, captured Akaba and ultimately 
Damascus as well.  Even after they linked up with the regular forces pushing east out of 
the Sinai, Lawrence‟s irregulars continued to operate as the right wing of the British 
army.
461
 
Lawrence not only helped lead the Arab Revolt, but he also reflected on this 
group of irregular soldiers and their guerrilla campaign.
462
  Whereas other campaigns, 
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such as those fought by the Irish or Boers, are remembered through a variety of 
memoirs, government reports and histories both official and scholarly, Lawrence own 
writings were – and in many respects still are – the most important sources regarding the 
Arab Revolt.  His volume of memoirs, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, first published in 
1926, was a bestseller.  Less well known is his pithy distillation of guerrilla theory, 
published in Army Quarterly in 1920/21 as “The Evolution of a Revolt,” and republished 
with minor variation by Encyclopædia Britannica in 1929 as “The Science of Guerrilla 
Warfare.”  Until the advent of the Cold War, when he was eclipsed by Communist 
thinkers, Lawrence was probably the most oft-cited practitioner of guerrilla warfare.  He 
was the writer who came to Wilkinson‟s mind when he attended MI(R)‟s training 
school, and Lawrence was read and cited by MI(R).
463
  But in addition to their different 
spellings of “guer[r]illa,” Lawrence and Gubbins offered different approaches to both 
the study and execution of guerrilla warfare.  Nevertheless, similarities exist as well, 
suggesting the debt Gubbins may have owed to what he called “Lawrence‟s epic 
guerrilla campaign.”464 
T. E. Lawrence organizes his thoughts on guerrilla warfare into three “elements, 
one algebraical, one biological, a third psychological.”465  In the case of the first, 
Lawrence notes that “perhaps a hundred and forty thousand” square miles of territory lay 
open to the Arabs in the southern Turkish empire.  “How would the Turks defend all 
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that…?”466  The numbers favored the Arabs: there was simply too much space for the 
Turks to protect.   
Lawrence‟s second element, the “biological,” concerns the components of war, 
“sensitive and illogical” human beings.  Because of unknown human factors, 
commanders are forced to hold a body of men in reserve as a safeguard, thus stretching 
thin their other human resources.  Lawrence worked to magnify his enemy‟s ignorance: 
“We were to contain the enemy by the silent threat of a vast unknown desert, not 
disclosing ourselves till the moment of attack.”467  Lawrence employed “a highly 
mobile, highly equipped type of army, of the smallest size... [used] successively at 
distributed points of the Turkish line, to make the Turks reinforce their occupying posts 
beyond the economic minimum.”468  Ignorance would cause the Turks to array their 
forces in a disadvantageous way, a weakness Lawrence was happy to exploit. 
The third element, the “psychological,” was of particular importance to 
Lawrence considering the Arabs‟ relative inferiority.  “We were so weak physically that 
we could not let the metaphysical weapon rust unused.”469  He explains, “We had to 
arrange [our Arab soldiers‟] minds in order of battle, just as carefully and as formally as 
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other officers arranged their bodies.”470  For Lawrence, the use of psychology is 
primarily strategic, concerned with an individual or group‟s commitment to the war at 
large.  He describes this element as “the adjustment of spirit to the point where it 
becomes fit to exploit in action, the prearrangement of a changing opinion to a certain 
end…. We had won a province when we had taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal 
of freedom: the presence or absence of the enemy was a secondary matter.”471 
To a considerable degree, Gubbins follows two of Lawrence‟s three conceptual 
elements, though without the pseudoscientific language.  With regard to Lawrence‟s 
second element, the “biological” quality of ignorance, Gubbins is in full agreement.  He 
argues in The Art of Guerilla Warfare that the enemy may be incapacitated by 
“compelling [him] to disperse his forces in order to guard his flank, his communications, 
his detachments, supply depots, etc.”472 
Gubbins also follows Lawrence regarding the importance of psychology or 
morale.  Lawrence considers the psychological element primarily with regard to his own 
Arab forces and with an emphasis on the strategic.  Gubbins recognizes this application, 
noting that, “Successful action by the guerillas… will awaken in the people the spirit of 
revolt, of audacity and of endurance, and make them foresee and assist towards the 
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victory that will be theirs.”473  However, Gubbins also gives extensive consideration to 
enemy morale, seeing it as a weak point which guerrillas might attack.  “To inflict 
damage and death on the enemy and to escape scot-free has an irritant and depressing 
effect on the enemy‟s spirit.”474  Indeed, Gubbins even advocates very tactical and 
intimate ways to maximize the psychological impact of attacks on the enemy.  When 
“sniping and killing sentries, stragglers, etc…. use a knife or noose when you can.  This 
has a great frightening effect….  Night-time is best and has the best effect on enemy 
nerves.”475  Likewise, he advocates the “burning of soldiers‟ cinemas… during a 
performance,” an attack calculated to strike terror.476 
There are other similarities as well.  Both writers place considerable emphasis on 
the local population and the need for its sympathies.  Lawrence insists that guerrillas 
“must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of 
not betraying rebel movements to the enemy.  Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent. 
active in a striking force, and 98 per cent. passively sympathetic.”477  Gubbins likewise 
recommends that guerrillas should “endeavour not to offend the people… but to 
encourage their patriotism and hatred of the enemy.”478  However, the population‟s role 
may be active – such as “providing information for the guerillas” – or passive – 
“withholding it from the enemy.”479   
                                                 
473
 AGW, 22 § 82. 
474
 Ibid., 5 § 15.  Cf. PLH, 4 § 6. 
475
 Gubbins, PLH, 39 (Appendix VIII: Sabotage) § 7. 
476
 PLH., 40 (Appendix VIII: Sabotage) § 12.  Emphasis in original 
477
 Lawrence, “Evolution,” 69. 
478
 PLH, 4 § 6. 
479
 AGW, 4 § 12.  Cf. PLH, 4 § 6. 
  
110 
 Likewise, the two authors share mixed feelings about regular officers serving 
with guerrillas.  Lawrence notes that there were “officers and men of Arab blood who 
had served in the Turkish Army,” who could form “the beginning of an Arab regular 
army,” but he downplays their importance, given the limited relevance of regular forces 
to an irregular war.
480
  Gubbins notes that “any guerilla who has a background of 
military training is ipso facto a better partisan;”481 moreover, “it may… frequently be 
advantageous to appoint certain serving army officers for duty with guerillas”482  
However, Gubbins argues that leaders of partisan bands should ordinarily come from 
among the people they lead; if regular officers serve as “assistants to guerilla 
commanders,” a division of labor should result, with the leader “ensuring the cohesion of 
his guerillas” while the officer “supplies… the technical knowledge.”483  Gubbins even 
goes so far as to say that regular officers must “clear their minds of all preconceived 
ideas regarding military procedure….  Training in the full military sense is not 
applicable to guerillas.”484 
 In spite of the many similarities, Gubbins is no mere disciple of Lawrence, 
replicating his ideas.   With regard to Lawrence‟s first element of guerrilla warfare, the 
“algebraical,” we see significant difference in the thought of Gubbins.  Lawrence argued 
that success was highly likely given the vast areas which the Turks could not possibly 
hold.  Gubbins, in contrast, assumes an enemy presence.  This leads to divergence on 
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three points: the likelihood of enemy countermeasures, the plausibility of an unassailable 
base and the relation of guerrillas to conventional forces. 
The greatest point of departure between Lawrence and Gubbins concerns enemy 
countermeasures.  Although Lawrence mentions the sudden advance of Turkish forces at 
Rabegh which threw the Arabs into disarray, his account generally assumes a static 
enemy.
485
  Arab forces could sweep out of the desert, strike the Turkish foe and return to 
the desert without fear of being followed.  Lawrence is little concerned with enemy spies 
or long range patrols hounding his forces.  In stark contrast, Gubbins insists that “the 
enemy will institute counter-measures as soon as guerilla activities against him 
commence,” deploying flying columns, “detachments… mobile by means of horses, 
lorries, etc.,” to sweep the countryside, looking for guerrillas.486  Gubbins expresses 
great concern about the way “modern developments, particularly in aircraft, mechanized 
forces and wireless, have profound influences on guerilla warfare, enabling the enemy 
rapidly to concentrate in opposition to any moves of guerillas that have been 
discovered.”487  Gubbins expects raids, traps, censorship of letters, interrogation of 
prisoners and enemy infiltration of partisan bands.
488
 
 Lawrence does, however, give a nod to the problem of enemy countermeasures 
when he writes in the Encyclopedia Britannica version of his essay that, “Diversity 
threw the enemy intelligence off the track.  By the regular organization in identical 
battalions and divisions information builds itself up, until the presence of a corps can be 
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inferred on corpses from three companies.”489  Enemy intelligence could not discern 
Arab organization because there was so little.  Likewise, Lawrence does reference 
“security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy),” but does not mention most of 
the tactics which concern Gubbins.
490
 
 In a second point of divergence, Lawrence writes that “rebellion must have an 
unassailable base, something guarded not merely from attack, but from the fear of it.”491 
For Lawrence, this base was the desert, adjacent to the more populated areas where the 
fighting occurred.  Gubbins, however, was less sure about such a base.  As we have 
already seen in relation to the Boers, he argued after the war that in Britain the 
Resistance forces had “a secure and accessible base from which [they could] be 
nourished.”492  Nevertheless, the very geographic separation from the Continent which 
made Britain secure also militated against its accessibility.  This was particularly the 
case with regard to Eastern Europe, especially in the early days of the war when the RAF 
possessed limited resources.  Thus, it was not a contradiction of his later thinking, but a 
practical complement to it when he wrote in 1939 that “searches, raids… curfew, 
passport and other regulations” will eventually force guerrillas to abandon their homes 
and “go on the run,” that is to “live as a band in some suitable areas where the nature of 
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the country enables them to be relatively secure.”493  Not everyone would have the 
liberty of fleeing to Britain‟s secure shores, nor could the underground war be carried on 
if everyone did.  Unfortunately, “areas which offer good opportunities for concealment 
are usually just those areas where the maintenance and supply of large guerilla forces 
becomes difficult.  They are usually wild, with little cultivation… and supplies have to 
be brought in specially.”494  This creates a supply tail which ruins the guerrilla‟s 
advantage of mobility.
495
 
Finally, in a third area of divergence, Lawrence suggested that guerrillas might 
succeed alone:  
By careful persistence, kept strictly within our strength and following the spirit of 
our theories, we were able eventually to reduce the Turks to helplessness, and 
complete victory seemed to be almost within our sight….  The experiment was a 
thrilling one….  We believed we would prove irregular war or rebellion to be an 
exact science, and an inevitable success, granted certain factors and if pursued 
along certain lines.
496
   
Such success requires, however, that a guerrilla force face an “army of occupation too 
small to fulfill the doctrine of acreage: too few... to dominate the whole area 
effectively.”497  Gubbins, on the other hand, is not interested in discerning the 
circumstances in which guerrillas can win by themselves; instead, he is concerned with 
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drawing enemy forces away from the main front of a conventional conflict and pinning 
them down.  Therefore the goal of guerrilla warfare 
is to harass the enemy… to such an extent that he is eventually incapable either 
of embarking on a war or of continuing one that may already have 
commenced…. The culminating state of guerilla warfare should always be to 
produce in the field large formations of guerillas, well-armed and well-trained, 
which are able to take a direct part in the fighting… in direct conjunction with 
the operations of regular troops.
498
 
With both convergence and divergence present between the works of these two thinkers, 
an interpretive framework may help explain Gubbins‟s relationship to his intellectual 
forbear.   
During a pause in the fighting in Arabia, Lawrence sought “the equation between 
my book-reading and my movements,” a reconciliation of theory and practice.499  
Gubbins‟s work can be seen as something similar, a refinement of Lawrence‟s theory to 
fit a new practice.  Even when not writing explicitly about Arabia, Lawrence‟s works 
make the most sense in a context of open and desolate geography; for all his universal 
insights – and they are not inconsiderable – his vision sometimes remains bound to the 
particular location of his experience.  Gubbins had a different set of experiences against 
which to measure Lawrence‟s thinking, notably the Irish Revolution.  Moreover, 
although the Second World War had not yet occurred, Gubbins could foresee some of its 
basic contours, including European geography and society; he had to find a form of 
guerrilla warfare which could interact closely with the civilian population and nearby 
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conventional forces, and which could endure the repeated pressures of enemy 
countermeasures made possible by air power and other technological changes. 
Thus, Gubbins transformed Lawrence‟s “algebraical” element – inapplicable to 
Ireland or anticipated operations in Poland and Czechoslovakia – and changed its 
emphasis on space into an emphasis on people.  If the land itself is not of overwhelming 
size, the occupied population is nevertheless too large and complex to be controlled by a 
foreign army.  In one of his more colorful passages, Gubbins insists that, “Given the 
leadership, the courage, the arms and the preparation… there is one thing… that 
[aggressor nations] cannot break, and that is the spirit of the people whose territory has 
been over-run, a spirit expressing itself in uncompromising and steadfast resistance.”500  
Yet even this transformation of Lawrence‟s “algebraical” element must be qualified: the 
population‟s size alone is not sufficient; leadership, courage, arms and preparation are 
also required.   
In his original article, Lawrence called irregular warfare “an exact science.”501  
The Encyclopædia Britannica utilized the term as well.  However, Lawrence wrote 
elsewhere that “handling Hejaz Arabs is an art, not a science, with exceptions and no 
obvious rules.”502  In the midst of this apparent contradiction, Lawrence perhaps best 
explains himself when he writes that “irregular war is far more intellectual than a 
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bayonet charge,” a comment with which Gubbins would likely agree.503  But whereas 
Lawrence looked for “pure theory and… the metaphysical side, the philosophy of war,” 
Gubbins‟s approach is more pragmatic.504  This may best explain the differences 
between the two thinkers.  Gubbins kept those elements of Lawrence‟s work which he 
deemed relevant, while transforming or qualifying those he did not.  This approach 
might seem commonsensical, even obvious, but it was an approach which a genius of 
Lawrence‟s stripe might not choose. 
 
Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Schutztruppe 
 When the Great War broke out in the summer of 1914, young Colin Gubbins 
made his way out of Germany and back to Britain.  Meanwhile, Colonel Paul Emil von 
Lettow-Vorbeck found himself commander of the Schutztruppe (colonial force) in 
German East Africa.  He defended the colony by conventional means until the spring of 
1915, when events compelled him to adopt guerrilla tactics.
505
  Even after he was driven 
from German East Africa in November 1917, Lettow-Vorbeck waged his guerrilla war, 
tying down vast numbers of Allied soldiers who might otherwise have participated in the 
fighting on the Western Front.
506
  Undefeated, he surrendered on 25 November 1918, 
two weeks after the armistice in Europe.
507
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Mackenzie‟s official history of SOE argues that Gubbins drew inspiration from 
the activities of Lettow-Vorbeck.
508
  Historian Simon Anglim likewise contends that 
Holland read Lettow-Vorbeck‟s memoirs.509  In My Reminiscences of East Africa the 
men of GS(R) would have found confirmation of many of the lessons already seen.  This 
comes as little surprise, since Lettow-Vorbeck studied German and foreign colonies for 
the German General Staff (1899-1900), saw action in the Boxer Rebellion in China 
(1900-1901), served for several years in German South-West Africa against the Herero 
rebels (1904-1906) and, most notably, discussed guerrilla warfare with Louis Botha.
510
  
Lettow-Vorbeck writes little in his memoires about the Second Anglo-Boer War, merely 
commenting that he “gained abundant personal experience” and that “the excellent 
qualities of [the Boers]… commanded my respect.”511 
 Even before the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, Lettow-Vorbeck recognized the 
importance of attacking the enemy, since the Schutztruppe‟s purpose was to tie down 
Allied forces which might otherwise deploy against the Fatherland.  “Hostile troops 
would allow themselves to be held only if we attacked, or at least threatened, the enemy 
at some really sensitive point.”512  A prime example was the Uganda Railroad: The 
British could only protect it with extreme difficulty, tying down troops along its entire 
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length of 440 miles.
513
  Likewise, German patrols attacked transport columns behind 
Allied lines, slowing their resupply, inflicting casualties and tying down additional 
troops.
514
 
 In spite of his emphasis on the attack – or at least threat thereof – Lettow-
Vorbeck was not indiscriminate with his forces; instead, he carefully maximized every 
advantage.  Surprise was one of the most useful tools.  Even before the onset of guerrilla 
operations, Lettow-Vorbeck utilized night marches and rapid concentration to take his 
opponents by surprise, as at the Battle of Jassini (18-19 January 1915).
515
  The beaten 
enemy was sometimes pursued at night as well.
516
  On other occasions he used the 
vegetation for cover to achieve surprise.
517
  German and British uniforms looked fairly 
similar, even more so after each had been weathered in the field; Lettow-Vorbeck‟s men 
magnified this similarity by wearing only their shirts – and not their coats – when in 
areas where the locals reported troop movements to the British.
518
  Night marches and 
other ruses were also employed defensively, to escape envelopment by the numerically 
superior enemy.
519
  Lettow-Vorbeck was firmly convinced that “there is almost always a 
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way out, even of an apparently hopeless position, if the leader makes up his mind to face 
the risks.”520    
Lettow-Vorbeck‟s troops were further aided by their mobility and minimal 
logistics.  As the war progressed, his European troops learned to get along with less, 
discarding many items they had previously considered necessities.
521
  Fat was obtained 
from elephant hunting and sugar replaced with wild honey; quinine was produced from 
one kind of local bark, while another was used for bandages.  Lettow-Vorbeck 
personally learned rudimentary boot-making from antelope hide
 
.
522
  Jan Smuts, who had 
fought against the British more than a decade before and now commanded South African 
forces on their behalf, admitted that Lettow-Vorbeck‟s troops were “very mobile and 
able to live on the country, largely untroubled by transport difficulties.”523  
Unencumbered by elaborate supplies, German forces moved faster than the Allies and 
across terrain considered impassible. “Increased independence and mobility,” Lettow-
Vorbeck explained, “used with determination against the less mobile enemy, would give 
us a local superiority in spite of the great numerical superiority of the enemy.”524     
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Throughout the war, Lettow-Vorbeck relied on captured weapons, both out of 
necessity and to reduce dependence on supply lines.
525
  Before the war began he planned 
on capturing weapons, since his native soldiers, known as “askaris,” were armed with 
1871 pattern rifles which used smoky powder, obsolete in modern warfare.
526
  Most of 
the explosives used against the Uganda Railroad were captured from the British,
527
 while 
captured horses and mules were also utilized.
528
 
Even before war broke out, Lettow-Vorbeck planned for battle, since its basic 
contours could be discerned in advance.  While he traveled extensively, his friend and 
subordinate officer Tom von Prince organized the Volunteer Rifle Corps.  Likewise, 
Lettow-Vorbeck tried to arm all the Europeans of the colony with rifles of uniform 
military design.
529
  Gubbins may have learned his emphasis on early planning from this 
German guerrilla.  He argues that “a careful study must be made as early as possible of 
the territories concerned, so as to determine for what methods of warfare each territory is 
suited, and to make the necessary preparations in advance.”530  Likewise, the problem of 
supplying arms “is immensely simplified… if adequate supplies can be obtained before 
hostilities commence.”531  Finally, “the selection and training of regular army officers in 
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the art of guerilla warfare” should begin in peacetime; preferably their “training should 
include a period of residence in the territory concerned.”532   
Lettow-Vorbeck absolutely understood the importance of the local population; 
with only 3,000 Germans at his disposal, nearly 80% of his force consisted of askaris.
533
  
Even most of the Germans in Lettow-Vorbeck‟s army were not regular soldiers at the 
outbreak of the war, but local settlers enlisted in a Volunteer Rifle Corps.  From among 
these came some of Lettow-Vorbeck‟s finest officers.534  Native Africans were an 
excellent source of intelligence, as the German commander very quickly discovered, 
noting that “in their interchange of information the inhabitants tell each other everything 
that happens in their vicinity.  Calls, fire signals, and the signal drums serve to exchange 
and quickly spread all news.”535  Likewise, natives aided Lettow-Vorbeck with their 
knowledge of local features such as fords.
536
  Other sources of intelligence included 
radio intercepts and captured enemy papers.
537
   
 Although the war in East Africa has been called a gentlemen‟s war, and in some 
ways was, Lettow-Vorbeck faced stiff countermeasures.
538
  In March 1915, for example, 
“the Belgians made arrests on a large scale in Ubwari, the inhabitants of which had 
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shown themselves friendly to us, and hanged a number of people.”539  Later on spies, 
drawn from native populations, were sent among the German forces.
540
  Allied armies 
pursued Lettow-Vorbeck continually across German East Africa, Portuguese 
Mozambique and into Northern Rhodesia.  Unlike Lawrence, Lettow-Vorbeck could 
never assume the enemy‟s inaction. 
 Reading Lettow-Vorbeck‟s memoires, one quickly notices the strong leadership 
of the Schutztruppe.  The commander himself demonstrated unbounded energy, 
creativity and selfless determination throughout the war.  Moreover, Lettow-Vorbeck 
had a strong group of subordinate officers, and records that “the long war had produced 
a large number of capable leaders, and their example… roused unbounded enterprise and 
daring.”541  Such men were the kind Gubbins hoped would lead his new guerrillas.  “In 
guerilla warfare, it is the personality of the leader that counts,” Gubbins writes in the Art.  
“He it is who has to make decisions on his own responsibility and lead his men in each 
enterprise. He must therefore be decisive and resourceful, bold in action and cool in 
council, of great mental and physical endurance, and of strong personality.”542 
 
Conclusion 
 In the late 1930s the British government established several organizations to 
study and plan subversive warfare.  Two of these – Section D and MI(R) – not only 
undertook this mission, but did so with varying degrees of cooperation.  Among the most 
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important developments of this era was the formulation of a doctrine, most cogently 
expounded in Gubbins‟s Art of Guerilla Warfare and Partisan Leader‟s Handbook.  
Gubbins drew upon his own personal experiences of unconventional warfare, but also 
extended his vision to encompass lessons learned from the Boers, from T. E. Lawrence 
and from the German commander, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck.
543
  As we shall see in 
Chapter 4, however, Gubbins did not limit his vision to historical case studies of 
guerrilla warfare, but also drew inspiration from conflicts raging around him at the time 
of writing in 1939. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FORMULATING A DOCTRINE: 
CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES 
 
 When J. C. F. Holland was appointed to GS(R), he chose to study irregular 
warfare because he was impressed by contemporary fighting in Spain and China.
544
  
Conflicts of the past, examined in Chapters II and III, certainly provided valuable 
lessons to Britain‟s embryonic forces of subversive warfare.  However, changed 
conditions often limited the utility of lessons from these earlier conflicts.  Warfare in 
1938 or 1939 did not look the same as it had in 1902 or 1918 due to technological 
changes – most notably the widespread introduction of air power.  Moreover, with the 
exception of Lawrence‟s Arabian activities, all the conflicts heretofore examined saw the 
role of counterinsurgent played by Britain.  Several conflicts in the 1930s provided more 
up-to-date lessons in guerrilla warfare, with the added advantage that Britain‟s future 
opponents – Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan – often fought on the 
counterinsurgent side, making the lessons more directly applicable.   
The analysis which follows not only draws on contemporary accounts and later 
scholarship, but also on British Military Intelligence reports, to which MI(R) – as a 
component of the Military Intelligence Directorate – had at least limited access and to 
which it sometimes contributed.  Making full use of such a variety of sources, we can 
complete our picture of irregular warfare in the years before the Second World War.  In 
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some cases we can directly observe the ways in which Gubbins drew upon and 
synthesized existing models into one which fit Britain and its future needs.  In other 
cases the extent information from Gubbins, Holland and MI(R) is too thin to posit 
definitive conclusions, though we can draw parallels speculate upon likely or possible 
influence. 
 
The Spanish Civil War 
 In the summer of 1936, years of political unrest in Spain came to a head when tit-
for-tat violence created an opening for an attempted coup by members of the military.
545
  
Gens. José Sanjurjo, Emilio Mola, Francisco Franco, and Manuel Goded argued that the 
military had to save Spain from a left-wing government and impending anarchy.  The 
coup failed to seize control of the government or many of the major cities apart from 
Seville.  Nevertheless, the rebels – known as the Nationalists – quickly captured large 
swaths of León and Old Castile, the more conservative regions of the country.
546
  With 
Spain divided roughly in half between the Nationalists and the Republican government, 
or “Loyalists,” civil war followed. 
 The conflict quickly attracted international involvement.  Germany and Italy 
airlifted Nationalist troops from Morocco to mainland Spain, the first major airlift in 
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history.
547
  Both nations subsequently provided combat forces.  Although the Soviets 
withheld major combat forces, they supplied planes, tanks, and artillery pieces to the 
Republicans, along with large numbers of advisors, including an NKVD contingent.
548
  
Lesser material support was also provided by Portugal and Mexico to the Nationalists 
and Republicans, respectively.  In spite of the official policy of non-internvention by 
most foreign countries, large numbers of international volunteers fought on both sides.
549
 
 The Spanish Civil War has been remembered by military historians primarily as 
a testing ground for the weapons and tactics of the Second World War, particularly in 
regard to the mobile warfare of German armored columns backed by close air support.
550
  
However, the Spanish Civil War also provided a venue for guerilla operations.  In 
Andalucia a guerrilla brigade was organized by a partisan with the nom de guerre of 
Maroto; meanwhile, the Soviet NKVD sent aktivki, small sabotage units, behind 
Nationalist lines.
551
  Indeed, the conflict gave us the very term “fifth column,” used to 
describe subversive forces.  Nationalist Gen. Emilio Mola famously commented that he 
had four columns converging on Republican-held Madrid, but the assault would be led 
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by a “fifth column” of Nationalist supporters already inside the city.552  However, 
Mola‟s boast led to a brutal effort to root out right-wing sympathizers in Madrid, 
demonstrating the phenomenon Gubbins had witnessed first-hand: the destruction of 
partisan forces acting prematurely against overwhelming force.
553
  It is uncertain 
whether Gubbins specifically studied the “fifth columnists” of Madrid, though it seems 
likely given the wide circulation of Mola‟s new phrase in the press and Gubbins‟s own 
use of the term; if Gubbins indeed examined this episode, it doubtless confirmed his 
careful approach to utilizing irregular forces.
554
 
More generally, Gubbins commented that Spain was an “obvious” example of 
“the crippling effect of subversive and para-military warfare on regular forces.”555  The 
war likewise inspired Holland with its use of “gym-shoes, light equipment, evasive 
tactics,… mobility, etc.”556  Outside MI(R) others noticed the lessons of resistance as 
well.  Dennis Wheatley, a British writer, explained in 1940: “In the Spanish Civil War 
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villagers often held up well-trained troops, and even tackled tanks, although in most 
cases they had only the most rudimentary arms….  Skillful planning, quick action and 
resolution can often offset superior arms.”557  There were, however, voices of caution as 
well.  The Assistant Military Attaché in Paris, who visited Spain during the conflict, 
argued that, due to its various abnormalities, “the greatest caution must be used in 
deducing general lessons from this war: a little adroitness and it will be possible to use it 
to „prove‟ any preconceived theory.”558  Moreover, neither the Republican General Staff 
nor their Soviet tutors ever fully embraced guerrilla warfare, even when the conventional 
conflict was lost; thus, unconventional warfare was the exception, not the rule, in 
Spain.
559
 
Although largely focused on other issues, the reports of MI3a – the section of 
Military Intelligence responsible primarily for France and Spain – suggest the possibility 
of guerrilla warfare early on, since the Nationalist army, “on occupying any large 
town… send out columns to dispose of any opponents in the neighbourhood.”560  If 
partisans could succeed in avoiding these sweeps by mobile columns, they might be able 
to resist for some time.
561
  One report describes the region of Asturias in northern Spain 
as “an amazing country.  More difficult for an offensive than anything I have seen on the 
North West Frontier or in Abyssinia.  From a guerilla point of view it looks as if it could 
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be held for ever.”562  Another report noted that even after the loss of Asturias by the 
Republicans, “scattered bands of fanatics” took to the mountains.563 
 Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, one of the British officers who observed the war in Spain, 
described it as “quite unlike any war I have so far taken part in.”564  Britain‟s Assistant 
Military Attaché in Paris concurred, describing it as  
a war in which the majority of the participants are almost entirely untrained, a 
war in which comparatively small forces are strung out on a vast length of front, 
a war in which modern weapons are used but not on the modern scale, and, 
finally, a war in which there have been more assassinations than deaths in 
battle.
565
   
Fuller went on to observe that the front “is it in no way continuous, but… hard to 
discover.”  Battles “appear to be quite small affairs.”566  The partisan warfare he 
described was much more urban than rural.  He explains,  
It is in no sense a great war, a trench war or even a guerilla war.  Instead, if I may 
give it a name, it is a city war….  [Franco] can fight only where the Reds are, and 
as they dare not enter his area,… and as they are supported by the rabble in the 
towns… they are compelled to hold on to the cities, consequently it is there that 
Franco has to attack them.
567
   
Though Fuller resists use of the term “guerilla,” his description leaves open the 
possibility of partisan warfare within the cities.   
 Spain certainly provided examples of subversion as well as guerrilla warfare.  
Every Nationalist battalion had “a loud speaker squad… which accompanies the unit 
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into the line for the purpose of disseminating propaganda to the enemy.”568  Likewise, 
radio stations routinely broadcast propaganda, to friendly populations and also to the 
enemy.
569
  The combatants, as observed by the British, were certainly aware of the 
effects of eroding morale on their troops.  After one of his later visits, Gen. Fuller 
commented that Republican will to resist only held because “there is generally a firing 
squad at hand ready to restimulate it.  In Barcelona, unless you do as you are told, you 
become a Trotskyite, and are liable to be shot on sight.  This is not a normal war.”570 
Likewise, he notes elsewhere that “so far as literature goes, the Red retiring forces were 
amply provided.  Everywhere one moves a truly amazing number of pamphlets, leaflets 
and newspapers is to be found….  From what I picked up, one hundred per cent. was 
political.”571  Though commanders in all ages have to concern themselves with the 
morale of their troops, Holland and Gubbins may have seen in Spain new proof that the 
loyalty of soldiers – for or against their leaders – cannot be assumed, but is open to 
manipulation.  One very common method of controlling men had been seen by Gubbins 
in Ireland a decade and a half before: killing suspected traitors and leaving their bodies 
about with an attached explanatory note.  Republican placards accused the dead of being 
fascists; Nationalists pinned their victims‟ union membership cards to their chests as a 
sign of their perceived treachery.
572
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 The Nationalist cause in Spain inherited the bulk of the pre-war military, and 
with it its leadership, support services and organization.
573
  Republican forces, on the 
other hand, consisted of civilian volunteers and paramilitary formations, the kind of men 
and women Holland and Gubbins expected to mold into partisans.  While both men were 
impressed by the possibilities of partisan warfare, the problems the Republicans faced in 
Spain were similar to those faced by the Boers and the IRA: poor discipline, 
disorganization and factions.  In August 1938 British Military Intelligence reported that 
Republican forces were in a state of “confusion and indiscipline,” with “a complete 
absence of co-ordinated supply and medical organisation, each unit being fed by its own 
political organism regardless of others.”574  It was reported that the Republican war 
effort “is being carried on in separated districts by small parties, who are fighting each 
other for their political ideals independently of their respective acknowledged 
Governments.”575  If the South African and Irish examples had not already demonstrated 
the need for coordination – such as that provided by the Art of Guerilla Warfare‟s 
Guerrilla Bureau – study of the Spanish Civil War drove home the point once again. 
 The war provided other notes of caution as well.  Fuller, for example, reported 
that he observed tanks which had been destroyed; “it was claimed that these machines… 
were put out of action by throwing bottles of petrol on them followed by a hand grenade.  
This I do not believe.  They obviously were put out of action by A. P. [armor piercing] 
bullets….  I am of [the] opinion that this petrol tactics has been purposely exaggerated to 
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give confidence to the troops.”576  To would-be partisans, this is a sobering reminder that 
not all accounts of bold action by para-military irregulars are true; to act as though they 
were and to encourage others to do so would be dangerous.  In 1939 Gubbins would 
encourage partisans by reminding them that “guerilla warfare is what a regular army has 
always most to dread.  When this warfare is conducted by leaders of determination and 
courage, an effective campaign by your enemies becomes almost impossible.”577  In 
spite of this optimism, caution of the sort that Fuller provided led Gubbins to temper his 
comments.  The same passage in the Partisan Leader‟s Handbook warns that “the 
enemy will become more and more ruthless in his attempts to stop you,” while the 
subsequent SOE Syllabus explained that “sporadic risings are useless.”578  Fuller noted 
in 1938 that “battles are not won by clichés (slogans) or Liddell-Hartisms.  That has 
been the Red mistake.”579  He and the men of MI(R) would have likely disagreed about 
the potential value of irregular operations or the indirect approach; however, they may 
have heeded his cautions to some extent, holding them back when others, like Hugh 
Dalton, were more enthusiastic. 
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The Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-1939 
 Following the British conquest of Palestine during the Great War, the territory 
was given to Britain as a League of Nations mandate.  Even before the creation of the 
mandate many Zionists eyed the ancient home of the Israelites as a future Jewish state; 
an influx of Jewish immigration in the interwar years created difficulties between the 
resident Arab population and the growing Jewish population.
580
  These communal 
tensions came to a head in a particular way when, on 15 April 1936, three Jews on the 
Nablus-Tulkarm road were shot by a group of Arab assailants.
581
  Riots broke out at one 
of the funerals and two Arabs were killed in a Jewish revenge attack; on 18 April the 
Arabs called a national strike and the following day an Arab mob – driven on by rumors 
of wholesale murder by Jews –rampaged, engaging in “violent and indiscriminate 
attacks on every Jew or European, regardless of age or sex.”582  The British had a full-
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fledged revolt on their hands.
583
  The author of one staff college text concluded from the 
Arab Revolt that “modern rebellion has assumed a form which makes its prompt 
suppression essential.”584  Gubbins himself argued that “it has been shown countless 
times in history that where firm enemy action has been taken in time against small 
beginnings, such action has always met with success.”585  Palestine was not, however, 
such a case.  One GS(R) report observed that “in Palestine, the active insurgents are 
believed never to have exceeded a total of 1,500,” but they exerted influence far beyond 
their numbers.
586
 
 Counterinsurgency was not new to the British military; it had faced such 
conflicts throughout the Empire and recently in Ireland.  Indeed, as historian Rory Miller 
explains, “many of those serving in the civil and military wings of the Palestinian 
administration in the late 1930s had served in Ireland or worked on Irish issues....  Many 
of the security tactics first applied in Ireland were used to respond to the revolt in 
Palestine.”587  However, Tom Bowden argues that “those who transferred to Palestine 
appeared not to have retained any of the politico-military lessons taught by the course of 
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the Irish War of Independence.”588  Moreover, Philip Anthony Towle contends that “the 
Palestinian revolt resembled the post-1945 guerrilla uprisings much more closely than 
any other insurgency with which the British had to deal between the World Wars.”589  It 
was both rural and urban, motivated by nationalism and ethnic hatred as well as other 
issues; Arab operations were directed by a religious leader, the Mufti of Jerusalem, who 
fled to Lebanon in 1937, and received propaganda support via radio from both Italy and 
Germany.
590
  The rebels captured some of their weapons – notably Lewis machineguns – 
from their British opponents, while other weapons were smuggled in though French 
Syria or British Trans-Jordan.
591
 
 British forces faced an escalating series of challenges, from civil disturbances 
and rioting to “arson, sniping, bombing and attacks on motor cars,” as well as 
assassination of police and security personnel.
592
  Attacks against bridges, rails, and the 
trains that traveled on them were frequent.
593
  The rebels certainly demonstrated 
Gubbins‟s claim that a rail ambush requires “some plan to wreck the train, either by 
derailing it, by blowing a mine under the engine, or other means.”594  In addition to 
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outright explosion, the Arabs “could spread or lift a rail” to derail a train.  “There was no 
doubt about the Arabs being expert.  Once, hidden beside a damaged piece of line, were 
found, neatly laid out, all complete to nuts and screws, the things required to mend it.  
The platelayers were Arabs.”595  Telephone communications, oil pipelines and the 
Jerusalem water supply were also attacked, as were mail vans.
596
  To the men of MI(R), 
studying the revolt, these tactics looked familiar.  “It is believed,” Holland wrote, “that 
the Mufti‟s instructions to the Palestine rebels are, to some extent, based on Irish 
practice.”597 
Taking a page from South Africa, Sir Charles Tegart, the special advisor to the 
Palestine Police, ordered the construction of blockhouses in the most rebel-infested 
areas.
598
  British sources do not directly address the motive behind Arab attacks on 
railroads; the suggestion is often that they were attacked simply because they were there.  
But a history of the Palestine Police Force observes that “railways had to be placed 
under constant guard, and this drained men from other important tasks.  In the end, to 
keep the railways running, an intolerable strain was placed upon the security forces.”599  
A keen military observer would have perceived the potential value of guerrilla attacks to 
a larger conventional effort. 
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 The Arab rebels did not limit their attacks to cities or infrastructure; vehicles on 
rural roads were ambushed as well.  The Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion explain 
that  
the great majority [of these attacks] bore the same characteristics: most of them 
started with an attack on a convoy and ended with the arrival of aircraft and 
reinforcements rushed to the scene in response to a call from the wireless lorry of 
the escort.  Where the enemy managed to escape heavy casualties it was usually 
due to darkness overtaking the action before the reinforcing aircraft and troops 
could strike.
600
   
On many occasions the road was “heavily blocked by huge boulders rolled down from 
the hillside.” 601  A second line of stones was often deployed before a vehicle could get 
turned around, and mines were also used to destroy vehicles.
602
  In the city of Jaffa, 
“nail-strewing in the main streets” was employed to support a strike of the city‟s buses 
and taxis by keeping other traffic off the roads.  The same tactic was later employed on 
rural roads to stop British patrols.
603
 
Most guerrillas were not foolish enough to remain engaged against superior 
forces, but escapedto the safety of nearby caves or slipped among the civilian 
population.
604
  The Military Lessons explain that 
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ambush parties would consist of anything from seven to twenty men fairly 
widely scattered, who often wore black cloaks and when stationary were almost 
invisible….  They always chose their positions well as being easy to evacuate, 
while any approach from the road, either frontally or from a flank, would involve 
a difficult climb.  They were seldom prepared to stand and fight, and took care 
not to stage an ambush at the same place more than once on any one day.  
Generally they retired in haste as soon as the troops had debussed and started to 
attack, so that by the time the attackers gained their [the rebels‟] position the late 
occupants were several hills away.
605
 
The British typically pursued ambushers, first with “light fast motor transport” on the 
roads and then with “motor-borne pack donkeys” once the pursuit moved “off the 
roads.”606  The objective for the British – and the situation to be feared by the rebels – 
was “to get to grips with the hostile elements and bring them into subjection.”607  
Sustained contact was always a one-sided affair.
608
 
Attacks were not limited to lines of communication.  On 16 May 1936 
unidentified gunmen (presumably Arabs) entered a cinema in Jerusalem‟s Jewish quarter 
and opened fire.
 609
  In September 1937 the Nazareth District Commissioner was 
assassinated by guerrillas.
610
  As had happened in Dublin, murder was committed in 
broad daylight on the streets of Jerusalem.
611
  The security forces and Jewish civilians 
were attacked by the rebels, but so too were Arabs who worked for the government, 
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refused to participate in the strike, or were otherwise deemed unacceptable to the rebel 
cause.
612
 
The rebels began the conflict with fairly large bands of partisans, but “these 
became split up owing to our [British] activities and owing to the fact that a large armed 
band is difficult to conceal and is liable to suffer heavy casualties.”613  This may have 
alerted Gubbins to the fact that “the speed of modern communications, i.e., motor, 
wireless, etc., and the presence of aeroplanes make it very difficult for a large party to 
remain concealed for any length of time.”614   In later stages of the Arab Revolt partisan 
bands sometimes coalesced together and operated as a single unit, but in so doing they 
decreased their mobility and increased their chances of being identified by the British; in 
due course severe defeats followed.
615
  Gubbins‟s guerrillas would not commit the same 
error, as he warned them time and again that “the organization of guerillas must not be 
of a higher degree than circumstances will, with reasonable safety, and a view to 
efficiency, permit.”616 
 Among the problems faced by British forces in Palestine was the heavily Arabic 
composition of the police.  While many Arab policemen served with impartiality and 
devotion to duty, others betrayed details of future operations to the rebels, as had been 
the case with the Royal Irish Constabulary in Ireland.  This was not only the result of 
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divided loyalties, but also assassination of Arab policemen and threats to their 
families.
617
  So serious was the problem that the British worried about the “risk of [Arab 
police] going over to the rebels with their arms.”618  Intelligence collection among the 
general Arab population was even more difficult, confirming Gubbins‟s later observation 
that a hostile population “will actively co-operate in providing information for the 
guerillas” or at the least “withholding it from the [occupying] enemy.”619   
Apart from outright treasonous passage of information, the rebels also benefitted 
from “unguarded telephone conversations, discussion of operations in public places, and 
carelessness in handling secret documents in offices….  Information regarding the 
movement of troops was transmitted by inhabitants, who watched camps and roads and 
sent their messages by means of lights in houses, bonfires and smoke signals.”620  One 
contemporary account explained that rebel villages were “undisturbed unless a 
temporary military invasion burst suddenly upon them.  As a rule, they had ample 
warning and could move out of the way till the activity died down and the troops went 
back to their camps.”621  Gubbins, recognizing the source of the guerrillas‟ strength and 
information, pointed out to his partisan leaders that “military action is greatly facilitated 
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by the support of the local population.  By this means, warning can be obtained of all 
hostile moves, and it will not be possible for the enemy to carry out surprise action.”622 
In light of the rebels‟ “all-seeing” intelligence, British forces in Palestine 
attempted to  
deceive it.  Many expedients were tried, but nearly all failed – however well 
executed – because of a leakage of plans almost at the source.  Ruses tried 
included the spreading of false news, dropping troops quietly from moving 
vehicles at night, the use of “Q” buses containing troops disguised as Jewish 
passengers or workmen, and the adoption of circuitous routes by M.T. 
[mechanical transport] columns.
623
   
“Road traffic was used… often as a bait with which to draw out armed bands and bring 
them to action.”624  In July 1936 the British attempted a major sweep of the Nablus area, 
hoping to encircle and capture some rebel bands.  “Like most drives under such 
conditions,” write Charles Townshend, this effort was “a failure.”625  The 8th Division‟s 
summary of the conflict concurred that drives always failed.
626
  As a result, later efforts 
involved occupying villages in an attempt to force rebels away from their usual sources 
of food and shelter and into the open, where they could more easily be engaged.
627
 
Searches became a routine part of the British effort.  Ambushes or firefights with 
the rebels were plotted on maps, allowing authorities to make an educated guess at 
which villages harbored rebel fighters.  Such locations were usually cordoned off at 
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night and searched at dawn, in accordance with the principles laid out in a 1934 military 
handbook, Notes on Imperial Policing.
628
  A contemporary account explains that  
arms were usually well hidden at some distance from the houses.  On one 
occasion, a group of women were seen seated on a rug near a village….  
Someone had the bright idea of looking under the rug.  The ladies at first failed to 
understand, and then combined protest with loud lamentation when they saw that 
bluff was useless.  Under the rug the earth had been newly dug.  The earth was 
dug up again, and in a narrow trench was found a little arsenal of arms 
ammunition.
629
 
Although viewed by British commanders as punitive measures aimed at “regaining the 
initiative,” these searches generally strove to be civil and disciplined, and were therefore 
broadly cautious in their approach.
630
  The same could not be said of the Special Night 
Squads organized by Orde Wingate in 1938. 
 Wingate graduated from Woolwich in 1923 and came to Palestine in late 1937; 
he was soon posted to General Headquarters as an intelligence officer.
631
  Wingate was a 
distant cousin of T. E. Lawrence, whom he studied in some detail.  Although Wingate 
became known as a practitioner of unconventional warfare and is often placed alongside 
Lawrence in this regard, Wingate was highly critical of his relation, both as a soldier and 
as a man.  Biographer Christopher Sykes explains, “He believed that Lawrence‟s 
military ideas were fallacious and he deplored the cult of which he was the centre.”632  
Most specifically, Wingate quibbled with Lawrence‟s total reliance on native forces.  In 
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one episode which took place in Abyssinia a few years after the Arab Revolt, Wingate 
initially rebuffed the advances of a local chieftain who wanted to fight alongside him.  
Wingate only accepted his offer after the chieftain agreed to provide his own arms and 
Wingate had forced the chieftain into a subordinate position.
633
  Wingate would utilize 
local forces only if he was certain he could retain control of their activities and would 
not be fleeced in the process.  Otherwise he would rely on his own men. 
Organized in 1938, the Special Night Squads (SNS) consisted of British soldiers 
and members of the Jewish Supernumerary Police, most of whom were also members of 
the unofficial Jewish defense militia, the Haganah.
634
  These small mobile units engaged 
in aggressive patrolling and counter-ambushes against the rebels.
635
  The SNS certainly 
satisfied one British report‟s contention that “the secret of success in operations is 
always to retain the initiative and to do something new.  The rebels soon get to know 
about a particular method and take steps to defeat it.  They should be kept continually 
guessing.”636  In order to achieve the element of surprise, the SNS first made use of 
excellent intelligence, possibly from within rebel bands, which was always carefully 
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checked to weed out double agents.
637
  Wingate‟s forces then moved by circuitous 
routes, operating under the assumption that “in Palestine someone is always watching 
you.”638  In the approach to the Battle of Dabburiya (11 July 1938) the SNS “left their 
stations in the short twilight, some travelling east, and Wingate‟s party travelling 
north… with a party of girls in the car as further cover for his intentions.  Then after dark 
all the lorries travelled along the Nazareth-Tiberias road, some going east, some west, 
dropping men off at prearranged intervals, the lorries never slowing down.”639  Just as 
Holland had been impressed by the use of rubber-soled shoes in Spain, so too in 
Palestine the SNS used the same, to make themselves both lighter and quieter.
640
  By 
hook or crook, Wingate would have his surprise.   
 The stations operated by the SNS were unlike ordinary British military 
instillations.  On parade or operations Wingate was an autocrat, but the stations were 
democratic with elected committees of grievances.
641
  This may seem like an odd 
approach to leadership, but the SNS‟s unusual composition – including both civilians 
and soldiers – and unconventional operations required a special arrangement.  Wingate‟s 
leadership style is not so distant from Gubbins‟s description of a guerrilla leader, who 
must be able “to control his followers and win their unquestioning obedience without the 
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close constraints of military organization and discipline which are the antithesis of 
guerilla action and a drag on its efficiency.”642 
Wingate also held unique ideas about training.  Like many of Gubbins‟s writings, 
Wingate‟s surviving lecture notes “are precise, brief, to the point, and mainly 
technical.”643  But Wingate also commented on more general matters, arguing, for 
example, that “great soldiers were serious and diligent in their youth… and many of 
them were people of outstanding moral character.”  He was also critical of the 
professional soldier, admonishing his men to “learn his discipline and calmness… but 
don‟t imitate his brutality, stupidity and drunkenness.”644  Gubbins too questioned the 
usefulness of professional soldiers, though never in such strong language; likewise he 
could write with a flourish now and again, reaching beyond the details of guerrilla 
warfare to the heights of the human spirit.
645
 
As Sykes explains, “training and operation were not sharply divided, indeed to a 
large extent the squadsmen were trained through taking part in operations.”646  This 
contrasts both with Gubbins‟s 1939 publications and his subsequent work with SOE.  In 
the Art of Guerilla Warfare, Gubbins writes that “the narrow limits of the training [a 
guerrilla] requires… and the careful, detailed rehearsal of projected coups should enable 
him… to match even the best trained troops.”647  Thus, while Gubbins suggests that 
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guerrillas need little training, he also calls for “detailed rehearsal,” something Wingate‟s 
fast tempo may have left out.  Likewise, Gubbins insists that “a few rounds spent on 
perfecting shooting, and testing of rifles, will be amply repaid.”648  While Wingate 
appears not to have objected to using “a few rounds” in training, such an allotment 
would be much scarcer for a guerrilla force than for the SNS; one can question what 
Wingate‟s priorities might have been under other constraints.  In another departure 
between the SNS and the Art, Gubbins insists that guerrillas be trained in the “use of the 
various destructive devices such as bombs, road and rail mines, etc., which are such a 
special and useful feature of guerilla warfare.”649  While the roles of Gubbins‟s forces as 
guerrillas and Wingate‟s as counter-guerrillas easily explain the absence of this element 
in the latter‟s training regime, this all-important matter highlights the imperfections of 
the parallel between the two thinkers.  Finally, any notion of training through operations 
was undermined by the very existence of SOE‟s system of schools, which thoroughly 
trained agents before inserting them into occupied territory (see Chapter V). 
 Wingate‟s operation was not all quirks and idiosyncrasy; he insisted on 
inspecting weapons-cleaning after returning in the dawn hours from a long night of 
patrolling.
650
  If perhaps a touch obsessive, this is simply good soldiering, though it too 
is paralleled in Gubbins‟s observation that weapons “must be protected against damp, 
rust, etc.; remember that your life and that of your friends may depend on a weapon in 
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good order.”651  Such fundamentals, though not unique to unconventional warfare, can 
take on special importance, particularly when the supporting services enjoyed by many 
regular troops are absent. 
The SNS were an aggressive anti-guerrilla force, but also functioned as a semi-
guerrilla force of their own.  Wingate eventually worked for MI(R)‟s Middle East branch 
in 1940; it was their idea, not Wingate‟s, to operate native forces behind enemy lines in 
Abyssinia.  By this time Gubbins was busy liaising with the Poles and Czechs and then 
commanding the Independent Companies in Norway (see Chapter V).  However, 
MI(R)‟s doctrine, crafted by Gubbins, had already been set in place, and served as 
Wingate‟s guidelines in Abyssinia.  Anglim explains: 
Wingate inherited an existing operation applying Gubbins‟ recommended 
operational procedures faithfully, and produced afterwards a set of operational 
procedures of his own derived partially from Gubbins‟ as shaped by his 
[Wingate‟s] own experiences in Palestine and Ethiopia.652   
Thus, we know Wingate followed Gubbins‟s ideas; it is less clear if influence went the 
other way.  Anglim continues: 
Perhaps the biggest difference [between the two] was that Wingate insisted, 
increasingly, on concentration of force and resources, rather than the dispersal 
and economy of effort that was the hallmark of other MI(R) operations, and his 
moving away from subversion and partisan warfare – about which he seems 
never to have been enthusiastic – towards use of purpose-designed regular forces 
to menace enemy lines of communication, with occasional support from local 
irregulars provided they didn‟t get in the way.653 
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In short, Wingate was a commando; he was not a true guerrilla in Abyssinia, and 
probably had not been in Palestine either.
654
 
Wingate‟s aggressive patrols did, however, confirm Gubbins‟s experience in 
Ireland that guerrillas will be hounded by anti-guerrilla forces.  These examples led him 
to conclude that only for a time could partisans live “in their own homes” before “this 
will soon be rendered impossible by the searches, raids, etc.”  Indeed, Gubbins expected 
“detachments... [to] be sent out to search the country, moving by circuitous and 
haphazard routes, employing scouts and advance guards, and probably assisted by 
aircraft.”655  While aircraft played only a supporting role in Ireland, they were a key part 
of the counterinsurgency effort in Palestine; Gubbins‟s description points to the new 
lessons learned from this conflict.
656
   
Other aggressive actions by the British authorities likewise confirmed the 
dangers that irregular warriors are apt to face.  The Military Lessons of the Arab 
Rebellion observes that “the best deterrent [against bombing of British vehicles] would 
probably have been the carrying of hostages.” This is qualified, however, with a caveat 
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of lamentation: “had it been permitted.”657  Other measures were, however, permitted.  
At 4:00 am on 18 June 1936 the Royal Engineers entered the Old City of Jaffa, which 
had been evacuated of its inhabitants.   
Demolition work was started at once.  By nightfall a road ten metres wide had 
been driven right through from one side of Jaffa to the other….  Later… a north 
and south circular road was blown through the Old City….  At about the same 
time a notorious quarter of tin shanties, known as “Tin Town”, was demolished 
amid a deafening clatter by the simple process of driving tanks across it after its 
occupants… had been deported to their native Syria.658 
If this was how Britain dealt with rebellion, could anti-Nazi partisans expect lesser 
measures at the hands of the Third Reich?  Gubbins‟s many cautions were not idle. 
Any consideration of the lessons learned by MI(R) from the Arab Revolt must be 
qualified by the generally low opinion the British held of their Palestinian opponents.  
The Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion described “the Palestinian Arab” as  
not a fighting man: even when led and reinforced by trained and experienced 
individuals from Iraq, Syria and Trans-Jordan, the rank and file still retained their 
characteristics of carelessness, lack of enterprise, and a wholesome regard for 
their own skins.  They had none of the military qualities of, for instance, the 
tribesmen of the North-West frontier of India.
659
   
The 8
th
 Division‟s summary of the conflict notes that, “on the whole the enemy have 
been most unenterprising in their methods.  They have not evolved any new tactics of 
note.  They open fire from ambush and usually withdraw as soon as attacked.”660 
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Throughout the fighting, both leadership and training were in short supply among 
the rebels.
661
  Indeed, Fawzi al-Qawuqji, the Lebanese Druze who was arguably the 
single most important military leader among the rebels, explained to the radical Syrian 
newspaper Al Kabas: “I started to constitute an Iraqi band of young men who were 
trained in the Army, in order that the „expedition‟ should be organised in military 
methods, in order not to repeat the anarchy that had prevailed in the Syrian revolt” of 
1925-1927.
662
  The Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion admits that “after Fauzi‟s 
arrival the [rebel] bands soon demonstrated more effective leadership and organization, 
while the extension of their sphere beyond the areas of habitual activity showed that 
their numbers had increased.”663  Nevertheless, Fawzi never enjoyed leadership of all the 
rebels, who were divided by tribal loyalties and by goals; some fought for political 
liberty, while others were mere thieves or unemployed opportunists.  Under such 
conditions, it is unsurprising that the rebels fought piecemeal and ineffectively.
664
  
Someone studying the conflict, as MI(R) did, might draw the conclusion that in order to 
be effective guerrillas must be organized by a single leader or a coordinating agency, the 
precise conclusion to which Colin Gubbins came.   
In July 1939 the military commander in Palestine – by then Major General 
Bernard Montgomery – declared that the rebellion was “now definitely and finally 
smashed.”  It was certainly winding to a close, though Townshend comments that “few 
observers would have shared Montgomery‟s conviction it was the outcome of his 
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actions.  Rather it seemed that… the insurgency had died away – in the nick of time for 
Britain, as international tension screwed up to the pitch of imminent European war.”665 
 
Irregular Warfare in China
666
 
The Second Sino-Japanese War 
 Relations between the ambitious Empire of Japan and its Chinese neighbor were 
poor for decades.  Japan defeated China in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), 
annexing the island of Taiwan and gaining hegemony over Korea.
667
  The transformation 
of China from a monarchy to a republic in 1912 did little to improve relations or 
strengthen China‟s ability to resist aggression.  During the Great War Japan seized the 
German concession of Shandong; though it was eventually returned to China in 1922, 
Japanese designs in the region were obvious.  In 1928 Japanese and Chinese troops came 
to blows in Shandong Province.
668
  Moreover, China‟s internal situation was by no 
means pacific, a situation Japan exploited.
669
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 In September 1931 elements of the Japanese Army perpetrated a small explosion 
against a Japanese rail line in Manchuria and blamed the event – known as the Mukden 
Incident – on Chinese troops.  Under the pretext of defending its interests, Japan invaded 
Manchuria on 19 September; the area was quickly overrun and the puppet state of 
Manchukuo was established.  Additional clashes continued for several years.
670
 
 On 7 July 1937 Japanese troops stationed at the Marco Polo Bridge, which 
provided access to Beijing, staged nighttime maneuvers.  One of the Japanese soldiers 
went missing, possibly spending the night in a brothel.  The Japanese commander 
insisted on searching the nearby town of Wanping; the local Chinese garrison 
commander refused.  Shots were exchanged and by the morning of 8 July open fighting 
occurred between the two sides.  Over the course of the next month Japanese forces 
pushed deeper into China, capturing Beijing in early August.  A few days later the 
fighting spread to Shanghai.  This was not simply another “incident,” but a full-scale 
conflict, the Second Sino-Japanese War.
671
 
 In spite of the Japanese onslaught, the Chinese learned to resist in various ways.  
One MI(R) officer argued that “the value and function of the guerillas was not 
recognised by the Chinese until after the fall of Nanking in December 1937.  Since then, 
considerable attention has been paid, not without success, to increasing their sticking-
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power and effectiveness.”672  Chinese guerrillas harassed lines of communication and 
supplies.
673
  They made use of speed and surprise, employing ambushes and other tactics 
which allowed them to bring superior numbers to bear against small isolated units.  
When large attacks could not be conducted, so-called “sparrow war,” characterized by 
small pricks with sniping, landmines, or even firecrackers, was utilized.
674
  Such 
operations were frequently carried out by the Eighth Route Army, the Communist 
formation of the tentative anti-Japanese army of national unity.
675
  Guerrilla operations 
were, however, also in accordance with the plan annunciated by Chiang Kai-shek, the 
Nationalist leader, who exhorted his commanders “to use special operations units and 
plainclothes agents, scattering them everywhere, to deal with the enemy rear areas.”676   
 British Military Intelligence believed the Chinese turned to irregular warfare not 
on ideological grounds or out of a Lawrence-esque belief in the efficiency of guerrillas, 
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but out of necessity.  One British report explains that the Chinese, lacking adequate 
shells, could not return fire against Japanese artillery.
677
  Edgar Snow, an American who 
interviewed Mao in 1936, confirmed this view, observing that 
Both the air force and such mechanization as has taken place… are looked upon 
by many as costly toys… quite incapable of retaining a rôle of initiative after the 
first few weeks, since China is almost utterly lacking in the basic war industries 
necessary to maintain and replenish either an air force or any other highly 
technical branch of modern warfare.
678
  
This use of irregular forces in China did not go unnoticed by MI(R).  Studying China 
was a significant part of Holland‟s task when he took his post.679  Among the Notes on 
the Sino-Japanese War assembled by British Military Intelligence may be found the 
cover page of a report by GS(R) titled “Considerations from the wars in Spain and China 
with regard to certain aspects of Army Policy.”680  Sadly, the remainder of the report has 
been shorn from the cover and does not reside in the same part of the National Archives, 
if at all.  Nevertheless, the report confirms that GS(R) produced analysis of the war in 
China, analysis which was circulated beyond the doors of Holland‟s office to a wider 
audience in Military Intelligence and perhaps throughout the War Office.  Some of the 
other documents within the Notes on the Sino-Japanese War are clearly not from 
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GS(R)/MI(R), but other portions have ambiguous authorship and may come, in part or in 
whole, from Holland and his men. 
The elements of Chinese guerrilla warfare mirror earlier conflicts and the ideas 
espoused by Gubbins in his 1939 writings, in which he argued that guerrilla warfare 
succeeds by “compelling the enemy to disperse his forces” to guard his communications 
and supplies.
681
  Japanese lines of communication were hit hard.  One “Japanese 
telegraph official,” who spoke to the British, admitted that “the lines were still frequently 
cut” by the Chinese, while foreign missionaries and Chinese chauffeurs reported that in 
some areas only “strongly protected convoys of 50 cars or more” were capable of 
traversing key roads, while railroad “track is frequently damaged,” with the result that 
“the Japanese can no longer depend on [these] line[s] of communications.”682  A British 
officer with a sense of humor reported that “the new [Japanese] Garrison Commander… 
was installed and on 10
th
 April the guerillas celebrated his arrival by dismantling 6,000 
feet of telephone wire.”683  Henri de Fremery, a Dutch observer, noted that guerrillas 
posed such a threat that the Japanese tried to time their maneuvers with extreme 
precision so as to avoid far-flung lines of communication whenever possible.
684
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The Japanese resorted to holding village headmen responsible, on pain of death, 
for the integrity of telegraph and rail lines in their areas, in an effort to end the attacks.
685
  
Moreover, along railways a blockhouse was constructed every three miles and security 
forces were raised to protect the lines.  Such a strategy of blanketing lines of 
communication had barely worked in South Africa, where the Boers were so few in 
number; here in China, De Fremery observed that “despite [the Japanese defenses], a 
great many attacks are made against the lines.”686  All these reports find an echo in 
Gubbins‟s observation that “modern large-sized armies, entirely dependent as they are 
on the regular delivery of supplies, munitions, petrol, etc., for their operations, present a 
particularly favourable opportunity for guerilla warfare, directed against their 
communications by road, rail or water, and against their system of internal postal and 
telegraph communications.”687   
In addition, the Japanese suffered from the vastness of both the Chinese 
geography and the depths of popular opposition.  The North China Daily News reported 
in 1939 that Chinese youths recruited to fight for the Japanese were mutinying and going 
over to the guerrillas.
688
  A British report concludes that “so long as the Chinese 
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continue their guerilla tactics ultimately they may be able to defeat the Japanese because, 
in order to cope with the guerilla tactics the Japanese will require a much larger force 
than they have at present in China.”689  In addition to the casualties suffered by the 
Japanese, the guerrilla war tied down Japanese troops which might otherwise have been 
employed at the front and imposed huge – and, in the long term, arguably unbearable – 
financial costs.
690
  Such a situation accords with Gubbins‟s observation that an invader 
“will be working usually amidst a hostile populace; without their co-operation his task 
will be more difficult and will require a larger number of his own men to carry it out.”691   
 As with other conflicts, however, there were notes of caution regarding China.  
Some irregulars were drawn from Shanghi‟s notorious Green Gang; others were reported 
to be “quarrelsome,” requiring that a “small body of [regular] troops” be dispatched to 
“improve organisation.”692  A British missionary, writing to the British ambassador, 
explained that the nearby guerrillas, though “a pretty harmless set of chaps [and] very 
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pleasant” in their relations with him, were “not popular with the people as they help 
themselves to what they want” and “the farmers have to supply them with food.”693   
Although such actions made the guerrillas unpopular with the local population, 
the Japanese also worked to defame irregular forces of Chinese resistance through the 
use of agents provocateurs.  On 13 August 1938, the first anniversary of hostilities in 
Shanghai, there were widespread fears of attacks by Chinese partisans; however, a 
British Military Intelligence report indicates that the only trouble came when members 
of the Japanese Special Service Section, operating in civilian clothes, attempted to 
intimidate and humiliate Chinese residents of the American and British sectors of the 
city, hoping to start incidents which might justify Japanese repression.
694
 
 Some members of British Military Intelligence did not subscribe to the implicitly 
pro-Chinese views expressed by their colleagues.  Major-General F. S. G. Piggott, the 
military attaché in Tokyo, undertook a visit to Tientsin in April 1939.  His report 
describes as “absolutely convincing” the Japanese “diagrams of [Chinese] terrorist 
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organizations, statistics of outrages, [and] types of infernal machines.”695  Whether or 
not Gubbins shared Piggott‟s assessment of the Chinese resistance as “terrorists” – and it 
is likely he did not, given the tone of his writings in 1939 and his subsequent support for 
resistance movements elsewhere – there was still useful information to be gleaned from 
the attaché‟s reports.  According to the Japanese briefings Piggott received, Chinese 
fighters were organized with a headquarters in the British Concession within Tientsin, a 
neutral territory where they could usually find safe haven.  Three kinds of units operated 
in Japanese-occupied territory: “Army property destruction group[s]” which destroyed 
“stores, rations, ammunition, transport, etc.”; “„Terrorist Group[s], composed entirely of 
girls between the ages of 20 and 24,” who utilized “inflammable and explosive 
substances… concealed in scent-bottles, cigarette cartons” and similar containers; and 
“Civil factory destruction group[s],” which targeted buses, rails and shops.696   
In Ireland the rebels made use of resources from Germany and the United States, 
but lacking geographic proximity to a third party, did not make considerable use of 
neutral territory.  Likewise, neutral neighbors did not play a major role in the Russian 
Civil War, nor in most of the conflicts Gubbins studied (the role of ostensibly neutral 
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France in the Spanish Civil War excepted).  But in China partisan forces made use of 
neutral territory in a way Britain certainly noticed, since it was her own.  In the same 
year as Piggott‟s report, Gubbins wrote that the “field of action for guerilla warfare” 
includes “neutral countries,” from which weapons and explosives may be run.697 
 Piggott does not explain why the Chinese utilized young women for their 
operations; these women may have operated where men would raise greater suspicions.  
This phenomenon would not have been foreign to Gubbins‟s experience in Ireland, 
where elderly women carried guns for the IRA, since they were usually exempt from 
searches.
698
  Moreover, Gubbins himself later argued that “women and children… are 
less suspect and probably could enjoy greater immunity from search.”699   The female 
teams on which Piggott reported may have also used their feminine charms, another 
concept found in Gubbins‟s writings.700 
 Both praise and blame imply that Chinese operations were significant enough to 
merit notice.  However, the majority of Chinese Nationalist Army officers lacked faith in 
guerrilla warfare and spent little time concerning themselves with its tactics.  Even Dai 
Li, head of Nationalist intelligence and security, who organized one of the earliest 
Nationalist programs in guerrilla warfare, did so primarily to keep an eye on the 
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Communists, who depended heavily on guerrilla warfare.
701
  This ambivalence on the 
part of certain Chinese leaders seems to have trickled down the ranks; De Fremery 
observed that “guerrilla troops themselves are easily satisfied with a minimum 
performance, and it is only owing to their great strength of numbers that anything at all 
is achieved.”702  There were lessons to be learned in China, but it was hardly a perfect 
model for the future SOE. 
 
Gubbins and Mao 
 Although Chiang Kai-shek spoke and wrote on guerrilla warfare, Mao Tse-tung 
eclipsed him in this field, not only during the decades of the Cold War, but even during 
the Second Sino-Japanese War, in which the Communists held substantial control of the 
guerrilla movement.
703
  Indeed, De Fremery, the Dutch observer, argued that “red 
troops... have applied the tactical concepts suggested by Mao Tse Tung with success.”704  
In 1937 Mao authored On Guerrilla Warfare (Yu Chi Chan), of which the first known 
English translation was made by Samuel Griffith of the US Marine Corps in 1940, the 
year after Gubbins authored his handbooks.
705
  There is no evidence that Grand, Gubbins 
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or anyone else at MI(R) read Mao‟s work in the late 1930s; however, the points of 
convergence and divergence between Gubbins‟s and Mao‟s doctrine are worth 
considering for several reasons.  Firstly, Mao‟s work was certainly widespread; even in 
Nationalist zones of China it was “widely distributed… at 10 cents a copy.”706  Portions, 
the entirety, or a summary of On Guerrilla Warfare may have been available to MI(R).  
This could have come about through an unpublished (and presumably now lost) English 
translation, perhaps by one of the Chinese linguists in the War Office or SIS.  MI(R) 
may have also come across a description or translation in a language other than English; 
after all, Gubbins was a qualified interpreter in both Russian and French, had passed the 
preliminary Urdu exam and had a passing knowledge of German and Italian.
707
  
Secondly, apart from any knowledge of On Guerrilla Warfare itself, the men of MI(R) – 
though possibly ignorant of the text‟s existence – may have discerned some of its 
principles at work in the operations about which Military Intelligence reported.   
 While acknowledging Lenin‟s contribution to the development of guerrilla 
warfare, Samuel Griffith describes Mao‟s On Guerrilla Warfare as “the first systematic 
study of the subject.”708  Whereas Gubbins‟s works are tactical, Mao‟s is mostly 
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theoretical.  Nevertheless, the primary difference between the two authors concerns the 
role of ideology.  Griffith observes that “the fundamental difference between patriotic 
partisan resistance and revolutionary guerrilla movements is that the first usually lacks 
the ideological content that always distinguishes the second.”709  The description is 
apropos.  Gubbins – who acquired a fierce hatred of Bolshevism in Russia – wrote 
virtually nothing about ideology; the closest he came are a few passages about the ability 
of the human spirit to resist oppression.  But Mao‟s work is suffused with ideology, 
arguing that anyone who divides the political and military aspects of guerrilla warfare 
“must fail.”710  Moreover, Mao places an extremely strong emphasis on the role of the 
people, contending, for example, that “the moment this war of resistance dissociates 
itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it dissociates itself from 
hope of ultimate victory.”711  Gubbins places a strong emphasis on the local population 
as well, but does not ascribe to it Mao‟s pseudo-mystical significance.712 
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 A more subtle point of departure involves the matter of organization.  Mao 
argues that “guerrilla bands that spring from the masses of the people suffer from lack of 
organization,” and calls for the organizing of guerrilla units up to the level of 
brigades.
713
  As we have seen in the Irish context, Gubbins warns about over-
organization and the opportunities it creates for counter-guerrilla forces.  The difference 
in views here may be explained by a difference in geography – large portions of China 
were never occupied by the Japanese, making organization less dangerous – or by Mao‟s 
ideological interest in organization stemming from the Marxist tradition.   
Along related lines, Mao‟s organization looks surprisingly conventional, 
consisting of brigades with their own administration, engineers, and finance units; 
battalions include machine-gun and medical sections.
714
  There is very little in the 
organization which suggests the need for clandestine or mobile operations, nor an 
emphasis on ambushes or other tactics favorable to guerrillas.  Likewise, Mao calls for 
each guerrilla district to establish an armory to produce – among other things – bayonets, 
a weapon Gubbins warned was “quite unsuitable for guerillas and “only for use in shock 
action which should be eschewed.”715  That Mao‟s guerrillas would attempt shock 
assaults, which provide little chance of escape in the event of failure, and would not be 
concerned with concealment suggests a considerable degree of regular operations.
716
  In 
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this sense Mao‟s guerrillas represent a halfway house between true guerrillas – 
conceptually distinct from regular forces and operating under their own logic – and 
militia units which, though distinct from regular forces, strive to emulate them.
717
 
 Gubbins recognized that partisans‟ first task is survival; Mao expresses a similar 
sentiment, arguing that “our strategy and tactics must aim to avoid great decisive battles 
in the early stages of the war.”718  Instead, Mao argues that partisans should “exterminate 
small forces,… harass and weaken large forces,… attack enemy lines of 
communication,… establish bases… [and] force the enemy to disperse his strength.”719  
Gubbins concurs with regard to attacking supplies and communications, which force the 
enemy to disperse; however, he appears uninterested in establishing bases.
720
  That Mao 
wanted to occupy and control liberated areas of China, whereas Gubbins had no interest 
in seizing continental territory for Britain, may explain this different approach. 
 Both thinkers agree on the importance of preserving guerrilla forces from enemy 
actions.  Mao observes that “the enemy, in an endeavor to consolidate his gains, will 
attempt to extinguish guerrilla bases by dispatching numerous bodies of troops over a 
number of different routes.”721  This was a phenomenon with which Gubbins was 
familiar, having seen it in Ireland and written about it in 1939: “The commencement of 
offensive action by the enemy will be marked by the institution of „flying columns‟... 
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which will be sent out to search the country.”722  In spite of this similar assessment of the 
problem, the two diverge on its solution.  Mao insists that enemy sweeps “must be 
anticipated and the encirclement broken by counterattack.”723  Gubbins is more humble 
about guerrillas‟ chances in such an engagement: “It may... prove possible to combine 
several parties together and destroy [the enemy column].  If, however, the enemy‟s 
measures are so comprehensive as to lead to unnecessary risk, it will often be better for 
the guerillas to lie quiet… or move to another district.”724 
 In spite of these divergences, Mao and Gubbins agree on a great many points.  
Like Gubbins and the Boers before them, Mao argues that the “retention of the 
initiative” is an “essential requirement” of guerrilla warfare.  To this end he advocates 
“carefully planned tactical attacks” utilizing “speed” and “exterior lines.”725  Likewise, 
“the movements of guerrilla troops must be secret and of supernatural rapidity” to ensure 
surprise.
726
  Such mobility and surprise allow guerrillas to concentrate against weak 
enemy detachments and destroy them.  At all times, the focus is on mobile attack, not 
static defense.
727
 
Likewise, Mao and Gubbins both understood the importance of captured 
equipment from the enemy.  While Gubbins expresses a preference for having weapons 
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in place before the outbreak of hostilities, he freely advocates capturing weapons from 
the enemy.
728
  Mao is more coy in expressing this idea: “We have a claim on the output 
of the arsenals of London as well as of Hanyang, and what is more, it is to be delivered 
to us by the enemy‟s own transport corps.”729 
 Both Gubbins and Mao acknowledged the significance of partisan leaders.  “In 
guerrilla warfare,” writes Mao, “small units acting independently play the principal 
role,” and thus leaders must display a high degree of initiative and good judgment.730  
Mao describes the model guerrilla leader as “well educated in revolutionary technique, 
self-confident, able to establish severe discipline, and able to cope with 
counterpropaganda.”731  He “should have the following qualities: endurance… [the 
ability] to mix easily with the people; his spirit… must be one of strengthening the 
policy of resistance….  He must study tactics,” and he must possess “complete 
loyalty.”732  Gubbins‟s list is shorter, but not substantially different: “A leader must have 
courage and resource, he must be intelligent and a good administrator and be a man of 
quick decision.  He must know intimately the country in which he is operating.”733 
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 Mao recognizes the “lack of discipline, which at first prevails” among partisans, 
and prescribes stern leadership and political officers to strengthen that discipline.
734
  
Gubbins writes nothing in either of his 1939 works about poor discipline in the sense of 
misbehavior by individual soldiers, but he does discuss the solution to overly-
independent partisan bands: a Chief or Guerrilla Bureau responsible for “co-ordination 
of plans..., intelligence and planning,… [and] provision of such supplies as the guerillas 
may receive.”735  In due course, the country sections of SOE would fill much that role.736   
 Local circumstances were emphasized by both thinkers, with Mao noting that 
“guerrilla warfare, though historically of the same consistency, has employed varying 
implements as times, peoples, and conditions differ.”737  As we have already seen, 
Gubbins concurs that guerrilla operations are “dependent on the local conditions.”738  
Foremost among local conditions, both thinkers recognize the importance of the local 
population.  Mao famously observes that the people “may be likened to water and the 
[troops] to the fish who inhabit it”; elsewhere he insists that the people‟s responsibilities 
include “local sentry duties, securing information of the enemy, arresting traitors, and 
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preventing the dissemination of enemy propaganda.”739  As we have seen in earlier 
examples, Gubbins agrees on the importance of the local population, though he assigns 
them fewer duties, primarily intelligence collection.
740
 
 The propaganda value of guerrilla success is apparent in the writings of both Mao 
and Gubbins.  Mao argues that the activities of Chinese guerrillas “hamper the Japanese 
and undermine their control in the northeast, while, at the same time, they inspire a 
Nationalist revolution in Korea.”741  While this may have been a rosy assessment of 
Chinese successes and their impact, he hit upon an idea which Gubbins also took up: the 
ability of guerrillas to inspire resistance.
742
    
 In opposition to the ideas of T. E. Lawrence, Mao and Gubbins agree that 
guerrilla forces are but one component of a larger effort and cannot win without regular 
forces.  Mao stresses that “in a war of revolutionary character, guerrilla operations are a 
necessary part….  This warfare… must coordinate with the operations of our regular 
forces.”743  He clearly argues that “the concept that guerrilla warfare is an end in itself 
and that guerrilla activities can be divorced from those of the regular forces is 
incorrect.”744  MI(R) was certainly aware of this strategy.  One report noted that 
“Lawrence could not have won his war without [the regular forces of General] Allenby: 
Allenby could have won his war without Lawrence.  Chinese high strategy recognises 
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that guerillas can only represent a subsidiary military effort.”745  Moreover, both Mao 
and Gubbins emphasized a kind of culmination of guerrilla activity in conventional 
warfare.  Mao claims that guerrillas‟ first function is “to conduct a war on exterior lines, 
that is, in the rear of the enemy.”  However, as the war effort progresses guerrillas 
should also “establish bases” and eventually even “extend the war areas.”746  Gubbins 
writes that, “A population hostile to the enemy‟s occupation” may engage in resistance 
“culminating in a general rising of the people against the enemy.”747 
 In spite of the emphasis found in both thinkers on coordination with regular 
troops, both also show reservations about their direct use with partisans.  Mao notes that 
“orthodox armies may… temporarily function as guerrillas.  Likewise, guerrilla units... 
may gradually develop into regular units.”748  Nevertheless, he cautions that “historical 
experience shows us that regular army units are not able to undergo the hardships of 
guerrilla campaigning over long periods.”  Moreover, “leaders of regular units engaged 
in guerrilla operations must be extremely adaptable.”749  Gubbins, likewise, warns that 
“preconceived ideas of military procedure” need to be discarded by regulars serving with 
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guerrillas; indeed, “the very fact of… being regular officers may prejudice their position 
in the eyes of the partisans.”750 
 Surprisingly, Mao and Gubbins‟s stated policies are almost diametrically 
opposed on the question of traitors.  While Gubbins calls for their ruthless and rapid 
elimination by death, Mao simply encourages “officers [to] continually educate the 
soldiers and inculcate patriotism in them.  This will prevent the success of traitors.  The 
traitors who are in the ranks must be discovered and expelled.”751  This is a rather pacific 
penalty for betraying one‟s comrades-in-arms in a wartime situation, one that certainly 
does not accord with Communist Chinese practice.  But then, one must recall that Mao, 
who, in the words of historians Jung Chang and Jon Halliday,“offered [American 
journalist Edgar] Snow a mixture of valuable information and colossal falsification,” had 
a penchant for purposeful lying.
752
  An alternative account of Communist treatment of 
traitors is given by De Fremery, who records that “every person who accepts… a puppet 
relationship [with Japan] is considered to be a traitor and the number of those who have 
already had to pay for their treason by death is large.”753  Likewise, one British officer 
observed that “any signs of trading with the enemy is certain death.  Chinese travelling 
with Yen or Federated Reserve Bank notes [issued by the Japanese] are shot out of 
hand.”754  It seems unlikely anyone followed Mao‟s mild advice regarding traitors. 
 In general, in spite of the geographic and ideological gulf separating Mao and 
Gubbins, an analysis of these contemporary thinkers reveals a surprising degree of 
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affinity.  In spite of their radically different backgrounds and political affiliations, both 
men made similar arguments about unconventional warfare from opposite sides of the 
globe.  The extent to which Gubbins was inspired specifically by Mao or his writings 
awaits the revelation of new primary sources. 
 
Early Operations in China 
MI(R)‟s interests in China were not simply academic.  On 1 August 1939, Peter 
Fleming, who had traveled through much of Asia in the interwar years, was recruited by 
MI(R) “as the leader of a small party of officers whose mission would be to stir Chinese 
guerrillas into more effective action against the Japanese.”755  At the request of MI(R) he 
also produced a paper titled “Notes on the Possibilities of British Military Action in 
China,” in which he proposed a multi-pronged British Mission to China, consisting of a 
“Mission Headquarters at Chunking” to liaise with Chiang‟s headquarters, a propaganda 
component, technical training for the Chinese, advisory details in the field, and “sub-
missions” including junior officers who would “organise and, where possible… lead 
personally local offensive action against the enemy.”756  He also proposed the creation 
of a British, Indian or Australian cavalry force in the Mongolian Corridor northwest of 
Beijing, arguing that the terrain was ideal for irregular warfare, allowing for a small 
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force to make a great impact.
757
  Wherever British forces might serve in China, Fleming 
argued that the Chinese  
would be pleasurably surprised to find foreign officers coming with them under 
fire; and it would be the surest way to overcome the obstacles of pride, jealousy 
and “face” which will be encountered in local commands.  The average Chinese 
general will not take kindly to foreign direction or control, however tactfully 
imposed on him; but he will view with gratitude, respect and astonishment a 
foreign officer who undertakes in person, and with success, the distasteful task of 
fighting.
758
   
Fleming‟s proposals were accepted by 8 August, when two MI(R) representatives met 
with him to discuss the plans, including his departure for China in the middle of 
November.  Fleming was permitted to recruit his own force, made up of men such as 
Martin Lindsay, an Artic explorer who had served for ten years in the regular Army and 
had learned Chinese in Shanghai.  These plans all came to naught in the third week of 
September when the Foreign Office vetoed even clandestine support to the Chinese, not 
wanting to exacerbate tensions with Japan, or find Britain in a second war, having 
recently acquired one in Europe.  Fleming, however, stayed with MI(R), producing plans 
for anti-Japanese propaganda which effectively anticipated Japanese moves in 1941.
759
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German Subversive Forces 
 A final source of inspiration to Gubbins and the men at MI(R) was the enemy 
himself.  In an address to the Cambridge University Officers Training Corps many years 
after the war, Gubbins explained how the British government was impressed by  
the tremendous harvest that Germany had reaped through the use of these 
[unconventional] means, for example the subversion of Austria in 1939, the rape 
of Czechoslovakia in 1939 all without a shot being fired – and then in 1940 the 
elimination of France as a combatant, fundamentally attributable to the rot in 
Government circles achieved by German „5th Column‟ activities before the War 
even began and the complete lack of confidence that ensued: subversion had won 
in the final round with a knock-out.
760
 
In 1940, Hugh Dalton echoed this sentiment in a letter to Lord Halifax: “We have got to 
organize movements in enemy-occupied territory comparable to… – one might as well 
admit it – to the organizations which the nazis themselves have developed so remarkably 
in almost every country in the world.”761  Not all the successes attributed to Nazi agents 
actually happened, but when understanding the thinking of Colin Gubbins, what matters 
was perception in Britain, not reality on the Continent.  And the perception that the 
Allies had suffered at the hands of German fifth columnists is widely attested.  It became 
dogma within SOE that “Britain and her Allies” had experienced “the strength and 
success of the enemy fifth column” before realizing that the Allies too could engage in 
subversive warfare.
762
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 In 1934 the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the intelligence wing of the Nazi SS 
organization, sent its first spy abroad to Paris.
763
  That same year a court in Lithuania 
heard testimony that the Sozialistische Volksgemeinschaft, an organization of ethnic 
Germans, was prepared “to join up with the SA [Sturmabteilung – Nazi paramilitary] 
units which were expected from Germany within a few days.”764  In January 1935 an SD 
assassination team killed an anti-Nazi broadcaster in Czechoslovakia.
765
  Meanwhile, a 
well-known German refugee disappeared from the streets of Basle, Switzerland; the man 
arrested by authorities confessed to the crime, in collaboration with Germany‟s 
Gestapo.
766
  In 1936 the Abwehr, German military intelligence, began forming war 
organizations (krieg organisationen) in most of the neutral states of Europe; these teams, 
which included personnel for both espionage and sabotage, were disguised as diplomatic 
staff.
767
   
These and other activities, real and imagined, found their way into the press.  In 
1935 German refugees in Paris published Das Braune Netz (The Brown Net), an exposé 
of Nazi activities across Europe; the book estimated that Germany had 48,000 agents 
carrying out propaganda and espionage and coordinating 24,000 local groups of 
Germans abroad.
768
  In 1937 German anarchists published the Schwarz-Rotbuch (Black-
Red Book), a collection of documents seized in Spain, detailing various subversive 
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activities.  In London an English edition was produced.  Dutch historian Louis de Jong 
explains, “The general public, perhaps, was not much roused, but in police and judicial 
circles and in the secret services of many countries the publications were seriously 
studied.”769  Further attention was drawn to German activities by actions of other 
governments.  In 1938, eighteen Abwehr agents were arrested in the United States.  
When Abwehr activities in the Soviet Union came to light the German consulates in 
seven cities were closed.
770
  Likewise, in the spring of 1939 nine Nazis were deported 
from Britain.
771
 
 Prior to the Anschluss, the annexation of Austria in 1938, Germany supplied 
arms to the Austrian Nazi Party, which attempted, through illegal propaganda and 
agitation, to topple the Austrian government.  In 1934 Austrian Nazis assassinated 
Chancellor Englebert Dollfuss.
772
  In January 1938 a raid on the Austrian Nazi 
headquarters revealed plans for armed insurrection.
773
  As de Jong explains, “Beyond the 
German frontiers people didn‟t worry about whether the Vienna rebels… had acted on 
direct orders from Berlin….  The complicity of the German Reich was evident.”774  
Dollfuss‟ successor, Kurt Schuschnigg was forced from power when he postponed a 
promised plebiscite on union with Germany.  Germany threatened Austria and told 
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Schuschnigg to resign in favor of Arthur Seyss-Inquart, his minister of the interior and a 
Nazi sympathizer; on 11 March Schuschnigg left office, but Austrian President Wilhelm 
Miklas refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart chancellor.  So Seyss-Inquart appointed himself, 
and– on the orders of his German masters – invited German troops into Austria, 
ostensibly to help restore law and order.
775
  Austria‟s independence was over. 
 It is often remembered that Czechoslovakia‟s dismemberment was permitted by 
the great powers of Europe at the Munich Conference.  It is less often recalled that Adolf 
Hitler had in Konrad Henlein, leader of the Sudetendeutsch Partei, a voice willing to 
speak his propaganda and agitate for “rights” the Czech government could never grant 
its German-speaking minority.  Meanwhile, Henlein‟s henchmen, receiving support from 
the Abwehr, threatened armed insurrection.
776
  In the Asch-Eger district they made good 
on this threat, though the government declared martial law and quickly squashed the 
would-be revolt.
777
  The Munich Conference betrayed the Czechoslovak republic, but 
Henlein‟s agitation made Munich possible. 
 Prior to the invasion of Poland, teams from the Abwehr‟s II Department 
(Sabotage) were given the task of attacking specific Polish archives – notably those of 
Polish military intelligence – and securing them for German use.  These men were no 
mere commandos, however; they operated in Polish uniforms.
778
  Other teams of 
volksdeutsch were infiltrated into Poland well before the invasion proper and given the 
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task of seizing such economic targets as iron and coal mines.  Still other Abwehr teams 
were tasked with securing bridges and the Jablunkov Pass into Silesia.
779
  But it was the 
Sicherheitsdienst (SD) which dressed as Polish soldiers and attacked a German radio 
station at Gleiwitz, providing the ostensible justification for Germany‟s invasion.780 
 The Abwehr‟s II Department included the 800th Special Purpose Instruction 
Regiment Brandenburg, the brainchild of Hauptmann (Captain) Dr. Theodor von Hippel, 
a veteran of Lettow-Vorbeck‟s guerrilla campaign in Africa.  Von Hippel envisioned a 
unit “to seize vital objects such as bridges, tunnels, crossroads and armaments plants and 
hold them until the arrival of the leading units of the German Armed Forces.”781  By 
design the new unit included men fluent in the languages of Germany‟s neighbors.782  
Although formed after the assault on Poland, the Brandenburgers saw plenty of 
subsequent action.  During the invasion of Denmark they dressed as Danish soldiers or 
civilians and seized crossings over the Great Belt, the strait which divides the country in 
half.
783
  In the invasion of the Low Countries and France Brandenburgers seized river 
and canal crossings before the retreating Allies could destroy them.  Again, enemy 
uniforms – this time Dutch – were used for surprise.  In one instance German 
commandos posed as Dutch policemen escorting German Army deserters in order to 
clear a Dutch checkpoint.  The Brandenburgers were further aided by local Dutch agents 
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(known as V-Männer
784
), and volunteers from the Dutch National Socialists.
785
  In 
Reims, France, a truckload of secret files from the French Western Army was seized by 
a German agent posing as a French lieutenant.  In Paris, Brandenburgers, posing as 
Belgian, Dutch and French refugees, seized the files of French military intelligence 
headquarters before they could be evacuated.
786
 
 In Ireland, fears of German agents and fifth columnists persisted throughout the 
war.  In May of 1940, Sir Charles Tegart, who had previously advised the Palestine 
Police, stoked the fears of the new British prime minister, Winston Churchill, reporting 
that hundreds or even thousands of German agents were infiltrating Ireland to topple the 
Irish government in preparation for an invasion of Britain.
787
  It was not only the British 
who worried; following the fall of the Netherlands, Irish Taoiseach (prime minister) 
Éamon de Valera became anxious about German agents.  So concerned was he that he 
appealed to Britain for arms against this potential threat.
788
  Worries that German U-
boats were resupplying in the rocky bays of Western Ireland never seemed to go away, 
though they were never substantiated.
789
 
 German operations were noticed on both sides of the Atlantic.  Col. William 
Donovan, of subsequent OSS fame, and Edgar Mowrer, a journalist, authored a short 
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work titled Fifth Column Lessons for America.  They concluded that “no amount of 
genius would have accomplished what the Germans accomplished in so short a time 
without two [non-military] elements.  These were the Germans abroad and sympathizers 
in the victim countries.”790  In both Czechoslovakia and Poland they saw the hand of the 
volksdeutsch community aiding the Nazis.   
Directed by the German Gestapo… the minority leaders found means of 
terrorizing or otherwise inducing practically all the Germans to become spies and 
agents….  Some ten thousand of them were actually trained in special camps in 
Germany to be forerunners, agents and guides to the invading army columns 
when the time came.
791
   
Incredible actions were attributed to these German operatives: “Germans disguised as 
Polish soldiers spread panic through the villages.  Germans speaking Polish issued false 
instruction[s] and orders to the people by wireless.  Still others remained deep behind the 
lines and from there signaled objectives and instructions to German air men.”  In 
Norway, they claimed that “air fields… fell to attacks by German soldiers hidden in the 
holds of merchant ships anchored in the fjords or moored of the quayside.”  In Denmark, 
German agents “by their constant threats and interference with the Danish Government, 
had produced a state of mind bordering on terror that contributed to drive any thought of 
real resistance from the Danish mind.”  Nor were the Low Countries spared this 
onslaught of saboteurs: “Germans hidden in barges seized the Moordyke Bridge in 
Holland….  The 120,000 [German residents of the Netherlands] occupied their leisure in 
propaganda and espionage for the Nazis….  When Hitler finally struck, the 120,000 
turned on their placid hosts with the fury of dervishes and, where they could, shot them 
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down in cold blood.”792  In Belgium “the thousands of dissatisfied Flemings and the 
Dinase (Dietsche Nationals Solidaristen) and members of Leon Degrelle‟s Rex [fascist 
party] saw to” it that the bridges over the Albert Canal were not destroyed, as Belgian 
defense plans called for.
793
 
 Certainly not all of these allegations were true.  As de Jong demonstrates, a great 
many of the reports of the German “fifth column” were bogus.794  But they remain 
significant for two reasons.  Firstly, they inspired fear.  If Britain was threatened – and 
by 1940 everyone agreed she was – some sort of response was needed.  Irregular 
activities, ultimately centered in SOE, proved part of that response.  Secondly, German 
subversion – real or imagined – provided an inspiration.  “You will remember,” Gubbins 
reminded the Danish-English Society after the war,  
in the years 1938 and 1939 and even earlier the success of the Nazi party and 
leaders in using unorthodox methods to subvert governments, to penetrate 
disputed territory, to created “fifth columns,” to attack their potential adversaries 
from within so as to weaken resistance to eventual aggression.  We were late in 
Britain in appreciating the immense effect of these activities but just before the 
War a very small nucleus of people were taken aside and told to study what 
actions of this nature could be planned and undertaken to harass Germany in the 
event of War.
795
 
Gubbins and the men of MI(R) indeed studied.  Before long war would be upon them, 
and their ideas tested in practice. 
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Conclusion 
 Gubbins was most certainly a man of his times who drew upon lessons available 
from a variety of sources.  That most of the ideas he propagated were not originally his 
own hardly detracts from the achievement of recognizing examples which proved useful 
in the near future and distilling them to a brief set of principles and guidelines.  In spite 
of this achievement, it should be mentioned that several subjects are omitted from the 
Art of Guerilla Warfare and The Partisan Leader‟s Handbook.  Nowhere does Gubbins 
mention the aerial re-supply of guerrillas, an essential aid to the resistance in both 
Europe and Asia during the Second World War; air power is only ever mentioned as a 
threat to guerrillas.
796
  Gubbins‟s gaze may simply have been too historical, looking only 
to existing examples.
797
  However, he or another member of MI(R) proposed in 1940 
that “the ideal would be for the [guerrilla] force to… be supplied by air enroute, and… 
receive by parachute the explosives, special weapons, etc, which it requires.”798  Thus, 
any deficiency in Gubbins‟s conception of supply was corrected. 
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 Secondly, Gubbins does not directly address the question of reprisals which 
partisans and civilians were likely to face.  Mackenzie comments that “General 
Gubbins‟s recollection is that this was deliberately omitted, as a point best passed by in 
silence.”799  A careful reading of the Handbook, however, reveals a clear, if understated, 
grasp of this problem; Gubbins reminds those resisting that “as your activities develop, 
the enemy will become more and more ruthless in his attempts to stop you.”800 
 In the late summer of 1939, Gubbins‟s days with MI(R) were drawing to a close, 
having authored the Art and Handbook, leaving his intellectual stamp upon Holland‟s 
young organization.  Although formally remaining with MI(R) for a time, Gubbins spent 
nearly the first year of World War II serving elsewhere: with the Military Mission to 
Poland, leading an Independent Company in Norway, and then planning for the defense 
of Britain itself with guerrilla forces.  By the time he returned to MI(R) in 1940 it had 
evolved into the new Special Operations Executive. 
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CHAPTER V 
GESTATION OF GUBBINS‟S THINKING 
AND THE CREATION OF SOE 
 
No. 4 Military Mission 
 Gubbins returned to London from his second trip to Warsaw on 19 August 1939; 
no sooner had he arrived then plans were being made for another trip.  With intelligence 
suggesting that a German invasion of Poland would come by the beginning of 
September, military missions were being planned to Poland and Romania.
801
  Holland 
wanted to make sure these had an MI(R) element, and he received permission from the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff to call up certain MI(R) personnel without waiting 
for a general mobilization.
802
  Gubbins later explained, “My appointment to Warsaw in 
the event of War had been arranged in July with the D.M.I., so that I had two roles, the 
official one as Chief Staff Officer and the unofficial „to stimulate and assist the Poles 
and Czechs in Guerilla warfare.‟” 803  Gubbins was chosen for this unique role because 
he was one of the few who could fill it: he had the conventional credentials – including 
experience as an ADC and training at Staff College – to be a Chief of Staff, but was also 
an acknowledged guerrilla warfare expert who had been with Holland since GS(R) 
days.
804
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 The military mission – No. 4 by designation – was led by General Adrian Carton 
de Wiart, whom Gubbins had met in France.  Never a man for peacetime service, Carton 
de Wiart had retired from the British Army and settled in eastern Poland, where he was a 
long-term guest on the estate of Prince Karol Radziwiłł.  Thus, when war seemed 
imminent, he was already in Poland, meeting with the various Polish services in Warsaw 
before the military mission ever left.
805
 
 Gubbins and the rest of the party traveled the long way round Europe, across 
France, then to Alexandria, then Greece, and finally through Romania to Poland.  They 
crossed the border on the night of 2/3 September, the Germans having invaded on the 
first.
806
  Earlier in the year Holland had written that “foreign General Staffs might be 
encouraged to leave behind selected and trained parties of troops to act as centres for 
local guerilla activities.”807  But Gubbins had highlighted “the importance to Poland of 
preparations for guerilla warfare,” in light of “the veritable withdrawals her armies will 
be compelled to carry out in the early stages of a war.”808  Now that Polish forces were 
collapsing around them, however, there was little the MI(R) contingent could do to 
organize guerrilla bands.  Nor was there much the rest of the military mission could offer 
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the Poles.  The result was depressing.  Gubbins describes the scene the day after arriving 
in Poland: 
Lunch had been arranged for us at a hotel in Lyublin and we sat inside, still 
wearing our civilian clothes as our country was not at war.  While having our 
meal we heard on the radio that Britain had declared war on Germany.  I 
immediately ordered my officers and men to put on their uniforms and we went 
out into the town square to rejoin our buses.  The square was completely filled by 
a huge crowd, cheering and shouting “England is beside us.  Long live England.”  
We were each of us lifted bodily into the air and carried into our buses already 
loaded with flowers.  My heart was filled with sadness and foreboding.
809
 
Shortly thereafter Gubbins made contact with Carton de Wiart.
810
  The Poles 
were in desperate straits, and with the fighting quite fluid there was little concrete 
information.  Gubbins dispatched one of his men, Tommy Davies, via the Baltic States 
to London to personally explain to the CIGS just how bad the situation was.
811
  Gubbins 
and the men of MI(R) were unable to do much in the way of organising guerrilla 
activities.  To have brought up the matter of stay-behind parties before the fall of Poland 
might have appeared defeatist; besides, the German campaign was unfolding far too 
quickly for any sort of joint planning.
812
  The speed of the German advance was helped 
by the drought conditions that summer, which meant that rivers ran quite low and did not 
provide the obstacles that Polish plans expected.
813
  On the morning of 5 September the 
Polish General Staff – military mission‟s counterpart for liaison activities – left Warsaw 
for Lukow, fifty miles to the southeast.  Utilizing MI(R) money provided via the British 
embassy, the military mission was able to purchase two cars and a truck in which to 
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follow the rapidly-moving Polish General Staff.  This was only the first of several moves 
by the General Staff; at each turn, the military mission struggled to find out where the 
General Staff was going next and to follow them.
814
 
 At one point Gubbins was able to give a spare wireless set to General Wacław 
Stachiewicz, the Polish Chief of Staff, who was out of touch with some elements of the 
Army.  But by and large there was little Carton de Wiart or the Military Mission could 
do to stem the German tide.
815
  Swift action by the Royal Air Force, the support Britain 
was best positioned to take at the moment, was beyond the authority of the military 
mission.  Meanwhile, General Stachiewicz freely admitted he lacked knowledge of the 
battle; a Polish artillery major encountered by Gubbins admitted that his unit had no 
guns, only their side arms.
816
  With the Red Army‟s crossing of the Polish frontier on 17 
September, any hope of staving off defeat evaporated.
817
  Peter Wilkinson, a member of 
the Mission, recalls that when Gubbins received official word from the Polish General 
Staff of the Soviet invasion,  
he… made a moving little speech in French in which he expressed his sympathy 
for the Polish predicament and his admiration for the courage with which the 
army had fought against overwhelming odds.  He promised that Britain would 
fight on until Poland was once more free and its territory restored.  After this we 
shook hands and took our leave.
818
   
The No. 4 Military Mission stayed in Poland for a short while longer before making its 
way across the Romanian border, with countless Polish refugees.  Most of the Mission‟s 
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members quickly returned to Britain by sea, though Carton de Wiart and Gubbins stayed 
in Bucharest for an extra week to write up the official report of the Mission.
819
  The 
report‟s descriptions of blitzkrieg went unheeded and those mentioned in the despatch 
were ungazetted until the British Expeditionary Force was encircled by the Germans at 
Dunkirk in the following year.
820
 
 
The Coming of War in Britain 
Meanwhile, with the coming of war, Section D moved its headquarters to the 
countryside, fearing – like most organizations of the time – that London would soon be 
leveled by aerial bombardment.  The Frythe, a Victorian neo-gothic private residential 
hotel near Welwyn, Hertfordshire, was requisitioned on 1 September, the very day the 
Germans invaded Poland.  In spite of the war‟s advent, a spirit of amateurism, even 
levity, still prevailed at Section D.  The entire section lived at the Frythe, with wealthy 
members supplying their own cars for transport.  Darts and table tennis were common 
forms of diversion.  The only security incident in the autumn of 1939 was a bizarre 
series of episodes involving “ghostly whistling, banshee wailing and stealthy prowling 
round the house.”  At one point an armed sentry – provided by the Bedfordshire & 
Hertfordshire Regiment – was assaulted by an assailant who “escape[d] down „spook 
alley‟ with a gleeful cackle of eery laughter.”821  The culprit?  The hotel‟s manager, who 
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had fiercely opposed the requisitioning of the property, and was trying to scare away his 
new guests.  The involvement of the local police eventually ended the incidents.
 822
 
 With the coming of war, Holland decided it was time to move himself and MI(R) 
back to the War Office.  As Gubbins explained, Holland “had no faith in „D‟ [Grand], 
with his wild cat and fantastical schemes, never getting down to brass tacks and specific 
achievements.”823  Nevertheless, cooperation continued between the two organizations.  
Wilkinson explains that, although he was employed by MI(R) in early 1940, he spent as 
much time at Section D, where he “was given a desk in their Balkan section and allotted 
the secret symbol DH/M.”824 
 In addition to the MI(R) component of the No. 4 Military Mission, Holland and 
his staff were busy elsewhere.  As Gubbins put it, Holland believed his “function was to 
produce ideas, work them up to a practical stage and then cast them off to grow under 
their own steam under whomever in M.I.R. he had brought up for the purpose.”825  A 
prime example of this concept came in the autumn of 1939, with a “Prisoners of War” 
project.  Even before there were any British prisoners, Holland recognized that, with the 
coming of war, there would be.  And thus he began to consider how they might escape 
from the enemy and evade pursuers, making their way home.  Norman Crockatt was 
brought on board as General Assistant; the project rapidly grew, until Holland cast it off 
all together to became an independent agency, MI9, the War Office‟ escape and evasion 
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service.
826
  Similar schemes involving deception and raids into Italian-occupied Ethiopia 
were also spun off once they became too big for MI(R).
827
  In December 1939 plans 
were begun to send an MI(R) mission to Finland and some secret preliminary scouting 
was conducted in Norway and Sweden in February and March 1940; these efforts, 
however, ended when the Finns capitulated to the Russians in March and Germany 
invaded Norway in April.
828
   While Holland was thinking up clever projects and the 
men of Section D were chasing ghosts, Gubbins was soon back on the Continent.  
Although he and Carton de Wiart arrived in London on 4 October, there was no work for 
them there, the British Expeditionary Force‟s leadership already having been chosen.  
But Holland had other ideas: he sent Gubbins to Paris, as head of a reconstituted No. 4 
Military Mission.  The Polish and Czech General Staffs were both there, so it was the 
obvious place to establish contact with underground forces in the two occupied 
countries.  Gubbins left for Paris on 20 November.
829
 
 In theory the reconstituted mission was in Paris to liaise with the General Staffs; 
in practice, it was there to coordinate partisan warfare, something about which their 
French hosts were rather more skeptical.
830
  Gubbins did not even try to visit the Polish 
or Czech training units under French command, nor did he visit the Polish divisions held 
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in reserve behind the Maginot Line; the French would not have been pleased.
831
  Further 
complicating the Mission‟s work was the fact that Section D was also in Paris.  A 
nominal division of labor was worked out between the two British agencies: MI(R) 
liaised with the French military, while Section D was responsible for work with the 
Deuxième Bureau, France‟s external intelligence agency.832  This was quite natural, each 
working with the opposite of its own parent agency (though the Deuxième Bureau was 
under the auspices of the French military, unlike the civilian Foreign Office, which 
oversaw SIS).  It was also, however, a gross oversimplification: Gubbins‟s primary 
contact was not a Frenchman at all, but his friend Stanislav Gano, who was now the 
deputy chief of Polish military intelligence.
833
 
 The Polish Home Army, the new underground army that was forming under Nazi 
occupation, had agents in Budapest and Bucharest.  If MI(R) could get weapons and 
other forms of material aid to these agents, they could then get it into Poland.  Alas, 
MI(R) had no means of getting material even to the Balkans.  Section D, however, had 
numerous lines flung across the region; MI(R) would utilize these.  At first, cooperation 
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was difficult: Gubbins could not provide Grand with the precise details of what was to 
be shipped; Grand refused to go forward without such information and jealously guarded 
the details of Section D‟s capabilities.  To break the impasse, Gubbins sent Peter 
Wilkinson, who had served with the No. 4 Military Mission in Poland, to work directly 
with the Balkan unit of Section D.  MI(R) was able to make use of Section D‟s channels, 
but they could handle far less material than the Poles needed.
834
 
 Relations with the Czechs were also fraught, though for different reasons.  The 
Czech government in exile – termed the Czech National Committee – resided in Britain, 
but was not yet recognized by the British government in late 1939.  That made any 
contact problematic.  But further complicating MI(R)‟s efforts to work with the Czechs 
was the fact that the commander of their intelligence service, Colonel František 
Moravec, was working with SIS, which – for understandable security reasons – was not 
keen on sharing him.  So in December 1939 Gubbins and Wilkinson simply got in direct 
touch with General Sergěj Ingr, Commander-in-Chief of the Czechoslovak Army, then 
resident in Paris.  The Czech General Staff was in communication with the Czech Home 
Army via channels independent of Moravec, and so Gubbins was able to get in touch 
with the Home Army without infringing on SIS‟ authority.835 
 Gubbins‟s time with the No. 4 Military Mission came to an end once and for all 
on 23 March 1940, when he left Paris for London, to plead for a dramatic increase in the 
supplies given to the Poles; in his stead he left brevet Major Wilkinson in charge of the 
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Mission.
836
  Under Wilkinson the Mission grew, with representatives in Budapest, 
Belgrade, and Bucharest who reported directly to Wilkinson and met with Polish and 
Czech agents in the various Balkan capitals.
837
 
 
The Independent Companies 
 On 9 April 1940, Germany invaded Denmark and Norway.  MI(R) was called 
upon to draw up plans for amphibious raids against Norway‟s western coast. 838  Gubbins 
concluded that a typical infantry battalion was too large for such purposes, while a 
regular infantry company was too small; furthermore, neither was properly trained or 
equipped for autonomous operations.
839
  Thus he settled upon the concept of an 
“independent company,” small enough to engage in mobile harassment action, but 
designed to operate on its own for up to a month, away from the ship that served as its 
floating base.
840
  Four days after the German invasion, Lt. Col. Holland submitted a 
proposal to the CIGS, recommending that elements of the Territorial Army should be 
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trained for raiding operations.
841
  The demands of wartime led to the rapid realization of 
MI(R)‟s vision. 
 Gubbins‟s experience with the Independent Companies was not exactly practice 
in guerrilla warfare.  In their conception the Companies were designed “to act as 
guerillas and by successful action gradually to raise the morale of the local population 
and to organize from it local guerilla bands.”842  However, in practice they had no 
connection to the Norwegian Resistance, contrary to William Stevenson‟s claim that 
Gubbins “made a desperate attempt in Norway to organize an armed resistance.”843  
Indeed, once the Independent Companies were placed within a conventional formation 
midway through the campaign, even the mobility envisioned for them was lost.  
Nevertheless, Gubbins‟s Norwegian experience was significant in that it gave him 
additional battlefield experience, this time against the Germany‟s Wehrmacht.  
Moreover, his brief service broadened his base of knowledge regarding small-level 
irregular operations. 
 Holland‟s initial proposal of 11 April was quickly accepted and expanded.  On 
20 April the Independent Companies were formally approved: as many as ten 
Companies would be raised from volunteers in the UK who had completed their training 
and were awaiting deployment to France.
844
  Each company, composed of twenty 
officers and 270 other ranks, included its own engineers and signals, light machine guns, 
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two-inch mortars and an anti-tank gun.
845
  As historian Eric Morris observes, “Gubbins 
was the obvious choice to command this scratch force.”846  By 25 April the No. 1 
Independent Company had been filled out with volunteers from the 52
nd
 (Lowland) 
Infantry Division and made its way to Scotland, where it met up with Gubbins and its 
new staff.
847
  Training was grueling, bringing TA soldiers up to regular infantry 
standards and then teaching them necessary skills for irregular operations: night marches 
by compass, slitting throats, and sabotage.
848
 
The Independent Companies were not MI(R)‟s only project in Norway.  Four 
MI(R) officers had just arrived as “assistant consuls” when the Germans invaded; one 
was captured and the other three only escaped with difficulty.
849
  On 13 April an MI(R) 
party under Captain Peter Fleming – whose plans in China had been curtailed – landed in 
Namsos to conduct reconnaissance.
850
  A military mission to Norway – designated No. 
10 – was organized and dispatched via Stockholm on 16 April.  MI(R) officers were 
included in the mission, which had the task of liaising with Norwegian forces and 
encouraging guerrilla warfare.  The mission harried the German invaders as best it could, 
but its remnants were forced to cross into neutral Sweden on 12 May.
851
  Three days 
after the military mission was dispatched, Major Jefferis, Gubbins‟s co-author on How to 
Use High Explosives, landed in Norway with a sergeant and 1,000 lbs. of explosives for 
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demolition purposes.  He was training Norwegians at Lillehammer in demolitions when 
the city was overrun; he fought as an infantryman with the retreating British until 
evacuation on 28 April.
852
 
On 2 May Gubbins received orders from General Hugh Massy, Commander of 
the British Expeditionary Force going to Norway, to command SCISSORSFORCE, a 
formation composed of Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 5 Independent Companies, assisted by eight 
Indian Army officers with experience in mountain warfare on the Northwest Frontier.
853
  
The Germans had captured the northern port of Narvik early in the campaign but, cut off 
by Britain‟s Royal Navy, this garrison was isolated from other German forces in 
Norway.  Gubbins was given the task of keeping the Germans out of Bodø, Mo, and 
Mosjøen, three key towns straddling the Arctic Circle just south of Narvik, preventing 
the Germans from unifying their positions.
854
  His orders stated he was to “ensure that all 
possible steps by demolition and harrying tactics to impede any German advance [be 
taken]….  Your companies… should not attempt to offer prolonged frontal resistance but 
should endeavour to maintain themselves on the flanks of the German forces and 
continue harrying tactics against their lines of communication.”855  The commander of 
No. 1 Independent Company was specifically told to “get to know the country 
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intimately.  Make use of locals but do not trust too far.  Use wits and low cunning.”856  
Two days after receiving orders, Gubbins and his men sailed for Norway.
857
   
 No. 1 Independent Company engaged in fierce street-by-street fighting against an 
unexpected German amphibious landing near Mo, but the British forces were repulsed.  
Mosjøen, the southernmost of Gubbins‟s three charges, was cut off and Gubbins chose to 
withdraw Nos. 4 and 5 Companies to Bodø, rather than try to push the Germans back 
into the sea.
858
  This initial phase of fighting gave Gubbins new insight into the 
Independent Companies.  The one action in which they were permitted to carry out their 
assigned mission of harassing German flanks and communications – an ambush 
organized by Captain J. H. Prendergast, Indian Army, and carried out by No. 5 Company 
and Norwegian forces on the morning of 9 May – had been a success.859  Nevertheless, 
the Germans advanced much more quickly than expected, covering 150 miles of difficult 
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terrain in a single week.
860
  Moreover, the Independent Companies‟ intended role as 
harassing light infantry was compromised by the heavy ammunition and extensive food 
supplies they were expected to carry.
861
  Finally, the collapse of organized Norwegian 
resistance cut short the opportunities for the Companies to play their harassing role.
862
  
Instead, the Companies were, as Eric Morris observes, mostly “squandered in main force 
operations.”863 
 Regrouping further north, SCISSORSFORCE was placed by General Massy under 
the command of 24
th
 (Guards) Infantry Brigade and given an essentially conventional 
role.
864
  
 
This organizational shift had major implications for Gubbins when 24
th
 
Brigade‟s commander was forced to withdraw the following day, due to an attack on his 
ship.  This left acting Colonel Gubbins the most senior member of the unit, and he 
assumed command.
865
  The ensuing operations were not glorious.  Gubbins was forced 
to relieve Lieutenant-Colonel T. B. Trappes-Lomax of his command of 1 Btn. Scots 
Guards for refusing orders and retreating before the enemy.
866
  The Guards and 
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Independent Companies defended Bodø for a time, though they were hammered by 
German forces and evacuated before the city fell.
867
 
On the night of 31 May/1 June, Gubbins and the last of the men under his 
command were withdrawn from Norway.  In spite of the setbacks, Gubbins acquitted 
himself well, leaving him one of the few officers to come out of the campaign with his 
reputation intact.
868
  For his service he was awarded the Distinguished Service Order.  
General Claude Auchinleck, who had overall command of the ground forces in Norway, 
commented in his final report that “the swiftness and efficiency with which the 
evacuation was carried out reflects great credit on Brigadier Gubbins and his staff.”  In a 
private letter to the CIGS, Auchinleck gushed, “Gubbins has, I think, been first-class.  
Should be a divisional commander or whatever the equivalent may be in the New 
Army!”869  Such praise not only speaks to Gubbins‟s abilities but also to the 
opportunities that likely awaited him in the wartime Army. 
 
The Auxiliary Units 
As Gubbins was evacuating his forces from Norway, a new problem arose: what 
if Britain itself was invaded?  This question was answered, in part, by the Inter-Services 
Projects Board.  Proposed in April 1940, the Board had members from the Admiralty, 
Air Ministry, War Office, Chiefs of Staff, and SIS.  It was created with a four-fold 
purpose:  
                                                 
867
 Adams, Doomed Expedition, 79-85, 89; Haarr, Battle for Norway, 297-98, 300.  
868
 Wilkinson and Astley, Gubbins and SOE, 67. 
869
 Ibid., 67.  Internal quotations from Gubbins personal papers and Alanbrooke papers (Liddell-Hart 
Center, King‟s College, London).  Gen. Auchinleck‟s report was written after Gubbins‟s subsequent 
promotion to brevet brigadier. 
  
200 
(1) To co-ordinate projects for attacking the enemy by irregular operations.   
(2) To prevent the lapsing of any project of value.   
(3)  To provide Service planning staffs with advice and intelligence derived from 
the exchange of ideas between members of the Board.   
(4) To ensure that the operations of each service were complementary to the 
others.
870
 
On 27 May the Inter-Services Projects Board agreed to raise a force which would 
operate in close cooperation with the military in order to resist an invasion of Britain.
871
  
Since Section D and MI(R) were the experts on sabotage and subversion, they were 
given the task of raising the nucleus of a resistance force, under the aegis of General 
Headquarters Home Forces.
872
  A division of labor between MI(R) and Section D was 
agreed for the project: MI(R) would be responsible for those waging guerrilla warfare, 
while Section D officers would be attached to the dozen Regional Civil Commissioners 
or (once an area fell came under martial law) the local military commander.  These 
Section D officers arranged headquarters storehouses and carried out a whispering 
campaign to encourage resistance among the general population.
873
   
Separate plans for MI(R) and Section D elements of these home defense units 
were curtailed in July 1940.  An internal SOE history, which appears to have its roots in 
Section D, argues that the merger of these elements resulted from a decision that 
civilians should not carry out sabotage, for fear of enemy reprisals.
874
  However, 
historian David Lampe contends, in agreement with Wilkinson and Astley, that Section 
D‟s overenthusiastic efforts raised the suspicions of local military commanders, who 
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complained to General Headquarters Home Forces.
875
  In either case, the Commander-
in-Chief Home Forces, General Edmund Ironside – with whom Gubbins had served in 
Russia – decided that all guerrilla resistance in Britain should be under military control.  
Thus he created the General Headquarters Auxiliary Units and placed Colin Gubbins – 
recently returned from Norway – in command.876  As Gubbins explained, the new unit‟s 
mission was “to act offensively on the flanks and in the rear of any German troops who 
may obtain a temporary foothold in this country.”  Secondarily, “the other role is 
Intelligence.”877  A handful of men from Section D‟s operations were incorporated into 
the new “Aux Units,” as they came to be called, though most were “told simply that their 
organization no longer existed.”878 
The Aux Units were anticipated somewhat by General Andrew (“Bulgy”) 
Thorne, commander of XII Corps in southeast England.  Concluding that the German 
Navy would be able to carry out no more than large-scale raids, and not a full invasion, 
Thorne believed stout defense of England‟s coasts could prevent the enemy from gaining 
a beachhead.
879
  In the summer of 1940 he requested from General Hastings Ismay at the 
War Office someone who could organize and train a group of men to stay behind enemy 
lines and cause havoc in the rear, should the Nazis invade.
880
  Accordingly, Peter 
Fleming, who had already done work for MI(R) and was recently returned from Norway, 
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was sent.  Beginning with a handful of TA soldiers, two aviators with a wireless set, and 
sapper subaltern Mike Calvert, Fleming set out recruiting locals and organizing the XII 
Corps Observation Unit, a stay-behind resistance force.  He and his men mined bridges, 
laid booby traps and constructed underground hide-outs for future resisters.
881
  The XII 
Corps Observation Unit was eventually rolled into the Auxiliary Units, becoming its 
local branch in Kent.
882
 
In organizing his small staff, Gubbins drew upon men he knew from Poland and 
Norway.
883
  These dozen men – known as Intelligence Officers to disguise the real 
nature of their work – were each responsible for a sector of the British coast, where they 
would organize cells of about half a dozen local men.
884
  Ironside gave Gubbins 
authority to draw personnel from regimental depots to assist in training the Auxiliary 
Units.
885
  Many members of the cells themselves came from the Home Guard, 
particularly veterans of the Great War.  All were men who knew their area well and had 
extensive experience out of doors.
886
  Local constables conducted background checks on 
the Aux Units, but were never told the reason.
887
  All members had to sign the Official 
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Secrets Act, and most kept to it with extreme rigor, even decades after the war.
888
  
Organization was intentionally kept loose; although coordination would at times be 
useful, tight organization could have been exploited by the Nazis to roll up the entire 
organization.
889
 
Training was carried out at Coleshill House, a manor located outside Swindon, in 
the Berkshire hills.  Here new recruits were given intensive basic instruction, while some 
received specialized training in particularly tactics or weapons.
890
  Instruction was 
carried out under the sharp eye of an officer of the Indian Army, though Gubbins himself 
also took a direct part in training new recruits.
891
  The Aux Units were given a variety of 
new weapons and sabotage devices, often before units in the Regular Army.
892
  In 
addition, they were issued with rubber-soled agricultural boots, allowing for quieter 
operations, as Holland and Wingate had advocated.
893
 
Although the Auxiliaries would have operated when the Allies were on the 
strategic defensive, whereas the Resistance ultimately participated in the strategic 
offensive, the tactics of both were quite similar.  The Aux Units emphasized, for 
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example, night time movements, studying the habits of enemy posts, and the 
maintenance of silence, three topics later covered by the SOE syllabus.
894
 
David Lampe claims that each Aux Unit cell had a camouflaged underground 
hideout, stocked with food, arms and ammunition, in which it would wait for German 
forces to pass over it before engaging in attacks behind the enemy lines.  Following an 
invasion they would never return to their civilian homes until hostilities were over.
895
  
However, Gubbins himself writes only that “particular units have the special role of 
occupying prepared „hide-outs.‟”896  It is unclear if he means that only certain cells 
would ever utilize these hide-outs, or if various units took turns always being posted to 
their bases.  In either case, Lampe‟s description of the Auxiliaries as operating only after 
an invading army had passed is at odds with Gubbins‟s own description of Intelligence 
Officers serving as a “liaison officer between the military Commander and the 
[Auxiliary] units,” in time of invasion.  Likewise, his orders that “no demolition of 
installations, or of bridges and communications generally, are to be carried out except on 
the direct order of the military Commander,” suggests that he expected Aux Units to 
remain in frequent contact with regular British forces.
897
  This view is further reinforced 
by Gubbins‟s suggestion that a “small nucleus of regular troops” in each sector would be 
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useful not only for training and security but also for forming “special fighting patrols… 
if invasion comes.”898 
Peter Fleming‟s assessment of the Auxiliary Units was not particularly upbeat.  
Although they would likely have justified their existence, “reprisals against the civilian 
population would have put us out of business before long,” he later reflected.  “In any 
case, we would have been hunted down as soon as the leaf was off the trees….  I doubt if 
we should have been more than a minor and probably short-lived nuisance to the 
invaders.”899  Gubbins concedes that “their usefulness would have been short-lived,” but 
he observes that “they were designed, trained and prepared for a particular and imminent 
crisis.”900  Besides, they cost practically nothing, a virtue SOE would also exhibit, 
relative to the total cost of the British war effort.
901
 
As the war continued and the likelihood of a German invasion receded, 
increasing numbers of the Auxiliary Units‟ sharpest members left the organization to 
apply their expertise to  more active work at the new Special Operations Executive.
902
  
Not least to make this move was Colin Gubbins.  Lampe claims that Gubbins received 
“his first opportunity to test M.I.(R) theories about modern guerrilla warfare” at the Aux 
Units.  While it is true that the Units‟ function was properly guerrilla, unlike the 
Independent Companies, their lack of actual combat makes it difficult to call this a 
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proper test of MI(R) theory.  Nevertheless, Gubbins here organized and trained a 
guerrilla force, valuable experience he would finally put to full-fledged use at SOE. 
 
Creation of SOE 
 In spite of intelligence received through the Poles, the German strike into the 
Low Countries and France in the spring of 1940 caught MI(R) and Section D almost as 
much by surprise as it did the War Office and SIS.
903
  As a result, Britain‟s clandestine 
response was not impressive.  Officers from Section D managed to smuggle £500,000 of 
industrial diamonds out of Amsterdam and £84,000,000 gold out of Bordeaux; they 
failed, however, to evacuate Madame de Gaulle from France.  MI(R) sabotaged the oil 
stocks at Gonfreville in Normandy, but did little more.
904
  Courier operations through the 
Low Countries, carrying propaganda or intelligence, became much less frequent; Italy 
likewise presented increasing difficulties.  The Balkans alone remained open to courier 
lines, via Cairo, through the summer of 1940.
905
  Although Section D and MI(R) had not 
halted the Nazi drive west, the prospect of the entire European continent in Nazi hands – 
with Britain itself on the brink of invasion – was the impetus needed to bring about 
reform of the clandestine services.
906
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Churchill had long been intrigued by irregular warfare.  As a young man he had 
observed the Cuban War of Independence and particularly admired the way the 
guerrillas used intelligence to enhance the effectiveness of their limited forces.
907
  He 
likewise observed the Second Anglo-Boer War at very close range – including capture 
by and escape from the Boers, giving him personal experience operating behind enemy 
lines.
908
  In parliament he was a regular supporter of intelligence, be it foreign (the 
Secret Service Bureau, which became SIS), domestic (MI5) or military (Naval 
Intelligence), even during periods when he otherwise supported cuts to the military 
budget.
909
 
Others were certainly coming around to the position that sabotage and subversion 
might have a key role to play in the next stages of the war.  On 25 May 1940 the Chiefs 
of Staff submitted to the War Cabinet an assessment that if France fell “Germany might 
still be defeated by economic pressure, by a combination of air attack on economic 
objectives in Germany and on German morale and the creation of widespread revolt in 
her conquered territories.”  Stimulating revolt was “of the very highest importance.  A 
special organization will be required, and plans... should be prepared, and all the 
necessary preparations and training should be proceeded with as a matter of urgency” 
since otherwise “we should have no chance of contributing to Europe‟s 
reconstruction.”910 
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The Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) had been created in 1939, with 
Ronald Cross, a Conservative MP, as its minister.  It was initially seen as a revival of the 
First World War‟s Ministry of Blockade, concerned with the economic blockade of 
Nazi-occupied Europe.
911
  When Churchill came to the premiership, he asked Hugh 
Dalton to become Minister of Economic Warfare in his new coalition cabinet.
912
  Dalton 
had a high opinion of the ministry, believing it could win the war.  However, he wanted 
to unite its economic work with a political role, creating a single entity conducting both 
political and economic warfare, which could bring down the Nazis.  After all, Dalton, a 
Labourite steeped in international socialism, considered the purpose of economic 
pressure to be political change in the enemy state; thus, political and economic warfare 
should be coordinated by a single ministry.
913
   
 It is unclear how Dalton found out about the existence of Section D and MI(R).  
Dalton biographer Ben Pimlott suggests that Gladwyn Jebb, then private secretary to Sir 
Alexander Cadogan (Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office) informed him.  
In any case, almost as soon as he became Minister, Dalton began planning how he might 
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bring them into his orbit.
914
  On 1 June 1940 he noted cryptically in his diary, “The D 
plan is being concocted.”915 
  Meanwhile, as the British Expeditionary Force was evacuated from Dunkirk, 
DMI Beaumont-Nesbitt put forward two papers from J. C. F. Holland, which proposed a 
Directorate of Irregular Activities within the War Office, which would have “a measure 
of control” over EH and the more secretive services (i.e., MI5 and SIS), and would also 
liaise with the Air Ministry, Admiralty, and Foreign Office.
916
  Both MI(R) and Section 
D would be rolled into the new creation.
917
  A week later War Minister Anthony Eden 
forwarded the plan to Churchill.  The prime minister was no doubt keen on irregular 
warfare, but the opportunities open to such a single-service outfit were deemed too 
small; a larger organization was needed.  Churchill pushed the problem onto Maurice 
Hankey, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
918
  On the evening of 13 June Hankey 
met with Grand and Holland “to discuss certain questions arising out of a possible 
collapse of France.” All agree on the need for the coordination of raiding and subversion 
under a single minister.  Hankey agreed to informally sound out the Chiefs of Staff.
919
  
But the Chiefs were already working on other plans, and on 15 June they established 
Lieutenant-General A. G. B. Bourne, Royal Marines, as Commander of Raiding 
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Operations and advisor to the Chiefs of Staff on Combined Operations.
920
  Under 
pressure from Churchill, and against the wishes of the Chiefs, this post was superseded 
by the Director of Combined Operations, first filled by Vice-Admiral Roger Keyes.
921
  
Out of the Independent Companies Combined Operations built its signature force, the 
Commandos.
922
 
 Although Combined Operations took up some of the raiding duties which had 
been previously discussed, as a purely military organization, its role in subversion was 
limited.  Thus did the need remain for something else.  On 28 June Cadogan circulated a 
paper summarizing this state of affairs, echoing the proposals given by Holland and 
affirmed by Beaumont-Nesbitt earlier in the month.  Most broadly, Cadogan insisted that 
sabotage and subversion “should be concentrated under one control.”  More specifically, 
he argued that “they should probably be divorced from SIS, which is more concerned 
with intelligence, and has enough to do in that sphere.”  Instead, these functions should 
be “placed under military authority as an operation of war…, the whole thus coming 
under control of the DMI.  If possible, the staff should be housed in the War Office.”  
Thus, Section D and MI(R) would not officially be merged; rather, the former would be 
“amalgamate[d]” into the latter, with the final creation remaining under the authority of 
the War Office.
923
  There was little support for building a new organization around 
Section D; as Foot explains, “Even more than MI R it had managed to antagonise a 
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considerable number of established authorities, British and allied, whose help might 
have been of value had they been more tactfully approached.”924  Under Cadogan‟s plan 
“the DMI would… be responsible for (1) sabotage, (2) subversive propaganda, and (3) to 
some extent, propaganda in all countries.”  The funding, however, would have to remain 
secret, and so “would have to come from the SIS vote and could be paid through the 
Director of the SIS.”925  Cadogan recommended that the DMI should be jointly 
responsible for sabotage operations not only to the War Office, but also to the Foreign 
Office and the Ministry of Information.
926
  Nevertheless, it is worth noting that he – the 
Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Office – was willing to invest considerable 
authority in the War Office, and to fund it from the SIS, ultimately part of his own 
organization.  Cadogan‟s commitment to sabotage reform ran deep enough that he was 
willing to lose this inter-ministerial turf battle. 
 Dalton, on the other hand, was fiercely opposed to the plan.  “It proposes to give 
too much to [the] D.M.I.,” he wrote in his diary. 927  A few days before Cadogan‟s 
proposal, he recorded his desire to have an organization with civilian and military 
branches, led by a soldier jointly responsible to the MEW and the War Office.
928
  Now 
he wanted it “under [Attlee], with me doing a good deal of it.”929  The consistent theme, 
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in spite of this vacillation, was Dalton‟s own role.  Cadogan complained, “Dalton [is] 
ringing up hourly to try to get a large finger in the Sabotage pie.”930   
Cadogan‟s proposal for a combined organization with extensive purview, under 
the direction of the DMI, was discussed on 1 July at a meeting called by Halifax in his 
office at the Foreign Ministry.  Present were Cadogan; Gladwyn Jebb, Cadogan‟s private 
secretary; Beaumont-Nesbitt; Dalton; Hankey; Lord Lloyd, the Colonial Secretary and 
an old friend of T. E. Lawrence‟s; Menzies; and Desmond Morton, from Churchill‟s 
private office.  Lord Lloyd voiced the general feeling of support for a strong 
coordinating body.
931
  In spite of broad agreement in favor of Cadogan‟s proposal, 
Dalton was adamant that while “war from without” could be waged by soldiers, 
subversive “war from within” would be “better conducted by civilians.”932  He was 
desperate to get the new organization within his ministry. 
At the end of the meeting Halifax asked the participants to consider nominees to 
head the new organisation; the next day Dalton replied by letter that he proposed fellow 
Labourite Attlee, supported by Dalton and the MEW.
933
  First, he looked to past 
examples, as had Holland and Gubbins:  
We have got to organize movements in enemy-occupied territory comparable to 
the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland, to the Chinese Guerillas now operating 
against Japan, to the Spanish Irregulars who played a notable part in 
Wellington‟s campaign or – one might as well admit it – to the organizations 
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which the Nazis themselves have developed so remarkably in almost every 
country in the world.
934
   
 
Dalton then goes on to argue that the organization under consideration must be civilian, 
and of a socialist bent: 
This “democratic international” must use many different methods, including 
industrial and military sabotage, labour agitation and strikes, continuous 
propaganda, terrorist acts against traitors and German leaders, boycotts and riots. 
It is quite clear to me that an organization on this scale and of this 
character is not something which can be handled by… either the British Civil 
Service or the British military machine.  What is needed is a new organization to 
co-ordinate, inspire, control and assist the nationals of the oppressed countries 
who must themselves be the direct participants.  We need absolute secrecy, a 
certain fanatical enthusiasm, willingness to work with people of different 
nationalities, complete political reliability.  Some of these qualities are certainly 
to be found in some military officers and, if such men are available, they should 
undoubtedly be used.  But the organization should, in my view, be entirely 
independent of the War Office machine.
935
 
Dalton‟s relentless lobbying, which exasperated so many of his colleagues, ultimately 
paid dividends.  Hankey passed the conclusions of the 1 July meeting through Neville 
Chamberlain, Lord President of the Council, to Churchill.  Meanwhile, Halifax met with 
the prime minister on 7 July; both agreed to the creation of a new sabotage and 
subversion organization, merging Section D and MI(R), under Dalton.
 936
  When Halifax, 
Chamberlain, Atlee and Cadogan met four days later, Cadogan had come around to the 
idea of giving the new organization to the MEW.
937
  It only remained to ink the deal. 
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 A few days later a draft of a “most secret paper” was circulated to the people 
concerned regarding the new organization.
938
  On 16 July Churchill asked Dalton to take 
charge of sabotage and subversion.
939
   More formally, Chamberlain, Lord President of 
the Council, signed the “most secret paper,” which, on the prime minister‟s authority, 
created “a new organization… to co-ordinate all action, by way of subversion and 
sabotage, against the enemy overseas....  This organization will be known as the Special 
Operations Executive,” or, as Churchill affectionately called it, the “Ministry of 
Ungentlemanly Warfare.”940  Dalton was specified as chairman, with Sir Robert 
Vansittart assisting him.  They “will be provided with such additional staff as [they] may 
find necessary,” allowing them to pull officers from other services.  All subversive 
policies had to be approved by the chairman, even if carried out by another department; 
in return, he required the approval of the Foreign Minister or other ministers when 
relevant.  Moreover, Dalton was required to keep the Chiefs of Staff “informed in 
general terms of his plans, and, in turn, receiv[e] from them the broad strategic 
picture.”941  The arrangement was finalized on 22 July when the War Cabinet approved 
the paper with only minor amendment.  The meeting minutes noted that “it would be 
very undesirable that any Questions in regard to the Special Operations Executive should 
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appear on the Order Paper” of the Commons.942   The organization would remain 
entirely secret throughout the duration of the war.
943
 
In the mythology that has grown up around SOE, Churchill‟s role in its creation 
and his uttering – according to Dalton – of the famous phrase “set Europe ablaze” have 
taken on legendary proportions.  The prime minister‟s role was certainly important, but 
the original leadership came from Grand and Holland; Gubbins, Beaumont-Nesbitt and 
others provided assistance in the development of what would become SOE.  Even so, 
serious historians continue to fall prey to the romance of Churchill as founder of SOE.  
John Keegan, for example, describes SOE as “Churchill‟s scheme” and “his 
conception.”944  Credit where credit was due: SOE was not Churchill‟s brainchild.945 
In late July and into August, the workaday details of SOE began to fall into 
place.  Halifax sent Dalton a pair of notes giving him control of Section D and the secret 
propaganda wing of EH.
946
  Meanwhile, the open propaganda wing of EH was left at the 
Ministry of Information, for the time being.
947
  The chief of SIS was apparently not even 
informed of the creation of SOE – and the removal of Section D from his sphere – until 
three weeks after the fact.
948
  For a time, MI(R) continued to live an independent 
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existence, though Holland was sent a new deputy, Brigadier Humphrey Wyndham, and 
MI(R)‟s eventual inclusion in the new SOE was all but inevitable.949  Vansittart had been 
named Dalton‟s deputy to appease the Foreign Office.  However, “nobody really 
expected the Chief Diplomatic Adviser to leave the Foreign Office,” so Gladwyn Jebb, 
who held the post of Assistant Under-Secretary at MEW, was Dalton‟s de facto 
lieutenant for sabotage and subversion.
950
 
By the end of July, SOE was organized into three branches.  The secret 
propaganda operations of EH were established as SO1, responsible for propaganda, 
under the leadership of Rex Leeper, a civil servant born in Australia.  SO2, created from 
Section D, was responsible for operations.  Finally, SO3, under the leadership of 
Labourite Hugh Gaitskell, was responsible for research and planning.  It was organized 
along regional and country lines, following the pattern of a similar MI(R) organization.  
It was quickly swamped with paperwork, however, and never functioned properly; it was 
soon absorbed into SO2.
951
  SO1 was never an integrated part of SOE; Leeper was 
twelve years senior to Jebb, making oversight difficult.  In November 1940 SO1 moved 
its headquarters from London to Woburn, Bedfordshire, creating a physical division in 
addition to the bureaucratic one.  Thus, SOE was an organization with two separate 
functions: sabotage and propaganda.  The unified concept of “subversion,” 
encompassing both, had been vigorously promoted by Dalton, but was stillborn.
952
  In 
December 1940 Hugh Dalton would demand that the Ministry of Information transfer 
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the rump of EH – its open propaganda wing – to SOE.  He would lose the battle that 
ensued, and in August 1941 EH‟s two branches were reunited as the Political Warfare 
Executive (PWE), under a committee composed of representatives of the Ministry of 
Information, the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and the Foreign Office.
953
  SOE‟s active 
role in propaganda was over. 
On 28 August 1940 Sir Frank Nelson was named first executive head of SOE by 
Dalton.  A former Bombay merchant who had served with the Bombay Light Horse and 
as a military intelligence officer during World War I, Nelson then served in the 
Commons as a Conservative before also conducting intelligence work for SIS out of the 
Basle embassy at the beginning of the Second World War.
954
 When Nelson arrived, 
Grand remained within SOE as his deputy.
955
  Nelson said he was impressed by Grand; 
however, he complained to Jebb that the organisation he inherited had “no project 
anywhere near completion,” and needed a “radical overhaul” and “drastic reorganizing 
on economic grounds alone.”  Not surprisingly, Nelson recommended that Grand be 
placed “outside the organisation.”956  Kim Philby contends that a purge of Grand‟s 
followers ensued, a claim which is confirmed by Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart‟s entry in 
his diary that he heard“MI6 [i.e., Section D] officers had preferred to resign rather than 
be under Dalton.”957  Jebb insists that veterans of Section D were incorporated into the 
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new SOE, though apparently only in small numbers.
958
  Dalton referred to Grand in his 
diary as “King Bomba” and believed him disloyal to the new organization.  Having had 
enough, Dalton decided to remove Grand on 18 September 1940.
959
  That same day 
Dalton sent the following message to Grand: 
I have given further thought to the arrangements concerning the D organisation 
and have reached the conclusion, with regret, that, under the re-organisation on 
which I have now decided, there will be no further opportunity for the use of 
your services.  I must, therefore, ask you to take such leave as is due to you as 
from September 20
th
, and to consider yourself, as from that date, no longer a 
member of the D organisation.  I am sending copies of this letter to Sir Alexander 
Cadogan, General Beaumont-Nesbitt, CD and C.
960
 
Jebb contends this was done with good reason, since, under Grand‟s leadership, Section 
D had “spent much of its time conducting subversive operations less against the enemy 
than against… MI(R).”961 
Meanwhile, Dalton could not rest until MI(R) was firmly within his grasp.  On 
19 August he authored a secret paper titled “The Fourth Arm,” in which he argued that 
there was considerable overlap between the new SOE and MI(R), which still fell under 
the authority of the War Office.  He called for cooperation from the Army, Navy, and 
RAF and contended that “subversion should be clearly recognised by all three Fighting 
Services as another and independent Service.”  To soften the blow, however, he 
suggested that “I have no views on strategy as such, and I shall certainly not attempt to 
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formulate any.”962  His lobbying was probably unnecessary at this point.  On 2 October 
1940, MI(R) was officially dismantled, its assets migrating to SOE.
963
  Holland‟s 
departure did not cause the fireworks that Grand‟s did, as he went on to serve as a Major 
General in the Mediterranean Theater and was made a Knight of the Bath for his 
efforts.
964
 
 
Gubbins at SOE 
 In November 1940 Gubbins, back from Norway, was seconded to SOE at the 
personal request of Dalton.  His arrival was certainly significant; Jebb comments that 
“the real motive force in the machine [SOE] always seemed to me to be Colin 
Gubbins.”965  In fact, Wilkinson and Astley argue that “Jebb‟s incisive mind and 
exceptionally wide inter-departmental experience, coupled with Gubbins‟s tenacity and 
military experience, made them… a formidable combination” when it came to advancing 
SOE‟s mission.966  Gubbins was offered a promotion to brigadier and higher pay at SOE 
than in the Army, but the new organization hardly offered him the prestige of 
commanding the brigade or even division which would have likely come to him by 
virtue of his performance in Norway.  Wilkinson and Astley conclude that “his decision 
to join SOE can only be attributed to a conviction that, if properly coordinated with 
regular operations, guerrilla warfare on the mainlined of Europe might prove decisive in 
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what might otherwise be a single-handed struggle against Hitler….  Gubbins may well 
have believed that with his unique MI(R) background this is where his duty lay, at any 
rate for the time being.”967 
 On 18 November Gubbins arrived at SO2, bringing his secretary, Margaret 
Jackson, and his GSO2, Peter Wilkinson, with him from the Auxiliary Units.
968
  In 
December Gubbins was made Director of Training and Operations.  Admittedly, there 
were rather few operations to direct at that time, since George Taylor, an Australian 
from Section D, had specific responsibility outside of Gubbins‟s jurisdiction for most of 
the few projects that were actually up and running.
969
  Indeed, this was, in many ways, a 
rather depressing time to join the organization.  Although the War Cabinet concluded at 
the end of September that “the stimulation of the subversive tendencies already latent in 
most countries” was “likely to prove a valuable contributory factor towards the defeat of 
Germany,” successes were few.970  A month before Gubbins arrived, SOE made its first 
attempt at smuggling an agent into France, in this case via torpedo boat.  The attempt 
failed.
971
  The first attempt to drop an agent by parachute into the same country also 
failed in November.
972
  Indeed, SOE did not successfully insert an agent into France 
until 5 May 1941, more than nine months after its creation.
 973
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Gubbins explains that at this time “SOE was… under great pressure to 
commence operating as soon as possible in order to help maintain the morale of the 
occupied countries, to try and prevent the Germans making free use for war purpose of 
the rich countries they had over-run, and to hamper and delay their activities generally 
wherever possible.”974  “Speed was our guiding principle owing to the perilous position 
of our country.  Improvisation had to be the order of the day.”975  The resources at his 
disposal were quite limited, however.  With regard to his training duties, “there was… 
practically nothing existing, just one explosives school and a dozen officers and 
civilians.”  Operations were no better: “There was no contact with anyone in the 
occupied countries, no wireless, no personnel, no special equipment, no aircraft – in fact 
– blank.  All this had to be built up from scratch.”976  SOE‟s small size did have its 
advantages, however.  “In the early months of our existence,” he explained, “no one was 
much interested in our activities… except the Prime Minister – to spur us on.”977   
In July 1941 SOE produced a paper which outlined the model for future 
operations, involving two distinct kinds of resistance groups.  The first, sabotage groups, 
were to be quite small for security and were to be recruited and trained by SOE.  These 
were a kind of elite force, and would operate in advance of imminent liberation.  The 
second group, secret armies, would be much larger and supported though conduits by 
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SOE; held in reserve until such time as Allied liberation forces were on the offensive, 
these forces would then attack communications, seize airfields and produce general 
disorder in the enemy‟s rear, forcing him to spread his forces across a wide area.978  This 
was a refinement and a natural development of Gubbins‟s earlier writings.  Gubbins had 
recognized the importance of sabotage in maintaining morale in occupied nations and 
undermining the enemy occupation; on the other hand, he understood the danger of 
reprisals and of premature activity.
979
  This distinction allowed SOE to carry on a small 
amount of targeted sabotage without endangering all resistance assets by willy-nilly 
operations.  The distinction does, however, introduce a degree of confusion into 
historical analysis: the natural inclination is to focus on the activities of the sabotage 
teams when measuring SOE‟s success, though support to resistance secret armies was 
every bit as much an SOE mission. 
 In his new work Gubbins was able to draw upon his past experiences, not only 
for concepts, but also for personnel.  “I was fortunate,” he recalled, “in being able to call 
in as my key men certain officers who had been with me in Poland at the war‟s 
beginning, others who had been with me in the brief Norwegian operations of my 
Independent Companies, and again others whom I had used to raise and train the 
Auxiliary Units.”980  Although the new SOE was far more institutionalized than the little 
GS(R) operation Gubbins had run with Holland, the same spirit of irregularity prevailed.  
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Of the men Gubbins brought in as his lieutenants, “only two were regulars, and 3 or 4 
territorials.”  The rest had passed through MI(R)‟s training program at Caxton Hall.  
“They were business men with foreign languages and experience, explorers and 
mountaineers, lawyers with international experience, yachtsmen and even one novelist – 
but he knew his Europe backwards and was all out for blood.”981 
As SOE grew and Gubbins began to organize larger operations, new challenges 
arose: 
As and when our operations began to impinge on those of the other services – 
e.g. ships seized by use in Norway – raids by us on the French coast – it 
obviously became necessary to co-ordinate our operations with all others.  This 
was done thought liaison officers at the three Ministries, and also finally by the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee where I frequently had to appear in some awe, and 
even the War Cabinet – when matters reached that level, which, of course, I 
always hoped they would not.
982
 
Gubbins did not see much of Dalton, working more closely with the Chief of SOE, first 
Nelson and then his successor, Sir Charles Hambro.  Nevertheless, from the interactions 
they had, Gubbins describes Dalton as a man with “immense enthusiasm, & 
determination to get things moving.”983  Gubbins recalled one occasion when he and 
Dalton inspected a school in Scotland, and Dalton suggested that, rather than taking cars, 
they walk from one facility to another, across the hills.  Rain poured down as they ran 
the last mile and a half of their journey.  In spite of temporarily losing a shoe in the mud, 
Dalton “talked without stopping as we splashed our way home; he had really enjoyed 
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himself.”984  Although Gubbins admired this zeal, Dalton‟s left-wing tendencies could be 
grating, as when he assumed that any skepticism from within SOE was the result of 
conservative bias against him.  Nevertheless, while Dalton loathed businessmen and civil 
servants, he gave a pass to soldiers, since he had himself served on the Italian front 
during the Great War.
985
 
 
SOE Training 
The Schools 
Both MI(R) and Section D had training schools before the establishment of SOE.  
MI(R)‟s classes at No. 2 Caxton St. have already been mentioned.  Section D‟s school 
was established in June 1940 to train men of various nationalities who could then recruit 
and train others.  A house in Hertfordshire was requisitioned and a commandant – 
Commander Peters, Royal Navy – was appointed.  Among his four instructors were the 
Soviet spies, Anthony Burgess and Kim Philby.  The program of training, lasting six 
weeks, covered both theoretical and practical matters, including explosives, cover, 
counter-espionage and the use of firearms.  The first class, consisting of Norwegians, 
Belgians, Frenchmen and a Scot, completed their training on 12 October 1940.  
Discipline among the French was poor and the site‟s security was found to be lacking.986 
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 Initially, the new SOE obtained permission from the War Office to train its 
agents at Lochailort, in the wilds of Scotland‟s western highlands.  The training school 
there had been established by MI(R) for the Independent Companies and now served the 
Commandos.
987
  The problem with this arrangement was that it was usually desirable for 
SOE to keep groups of different nationalities separated from one another, for security 
purposes; thus, what SOE needed was not a single school, but a network of them.  Under 
Gubbins‟s orders, the use of a number of houses in the nearby Arisaig area was 
acquired.
988
  As seen in Section D‟s requisition of the Frythe in September 1939, 
government use of private residences during the war was common.  With domestic help 
in short supply, traditional country house living became virtually impossible; the owners 
of many great houses found that having their home requisitioned for clandestine 
purposes was a blessing, since the government paid for up-keep.
989
 
 The system of schools that emerged was organized into several stages.  Recruits 
first attended a Preliminary School, usually destination-specific, where they received 
two or three weeks of general military training, emphasizing physical fitness, map 
reading, and basic use of firearms.
990
  A well-stocked bar was always maintained, to test 
how much students did – or did not – reveal when beguiled by alcohol.991  Those who 
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passed this initial course then attended one of the Paramilitary Schools in the Arisaig 
area for three or four weeks.  Here students were trained in mountaineering, small boat 
work, armed and unarmed combat, and raiding techniques.  Weapons instruction 
included major British, German, Italian, and American weapons.  Railway sabotage was 
practiced against actual tracks and trains.
992
  As many as a third of the recruits would fail 
this course.
993
  Those who passed then attended Parachute Training School at RAF 
Ringway, outside Manchester.  As Gubbins explained, “90% of our personnel went to 
their destinations in the field by air and parachute, hence the universal parachute 
training.”994  Although he recognized its necessity, SOE‟s Director of Training was not 
enthusiastic about this component: “Parachuting was then in its infancy – not much fun 
about it.  I never enjoyed it myself nor did the bulk of our personnel.”  Nevertheless, it 
was important enough that Gubbins had all his staff jump.
995
   
Only after these first three rounds of training were recruits asked if they would be 
willing to serve in an occupied country; prior to this point, the precise nature of SOE‟s 
work was kept secret.
996
  Although, in theory, the recruit knew nothing of an essentially 
sensitive nature, those who failed their training or chose not to continue, were often sent 
to an “Inter-Services Research Bureau Workshop” at Inverlair, Scotland, until any secret 
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knowledge gained had become irrelevant.  “The Cooler,” as this holding pen was known, 
implied no treason or moral failing, and students were held only as long as necessary, 
before being released back to their military units or the civilian world.
997
 
 Having completed their preliminary, paramilitary and parachute training, and 
having been told of their true mission, recruits were finally sent to Finishing Schools, 
located in Hampshire, near the village of Beaulieu.  These were specific to the intended 
destination and mission.
998
  These month-long courses covered such topics as cover 
stories, codes, forgery of documents, safe-breaking, enemy uniforms, and other 
knowledge needed to survive under cover in Axis-controlled territory.
999
  Scotland Yard 
and MI5 assisted with some aspects of this training, explaining police and 
counterintelligence tactics.
1000
  Students were never physically harmed, but they were 
awoken in the dead of night by men in Gestapo uniforms and cross-examined at length; 
an agent whose cover story could not hold up under questioning from instructors playing 
dress-up could hardly be expected to survive an encounter with the real enemy.
1001
  
Graduation from the Finishing School usually involved a multi-day test.  Students were 
organized into small teams and given some sort of mission in the local area, often the 
theft of military equipment or the placing of explosives.  Often they had to rendezvous 
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with a previously unknown accomplice, who would be known by certain signals.  The 
local police were given rough descriptions of the students and told to be on the look-out.  
Before the exercise began, students were given a telephone number to memorize; if 
arrested, it would get them out of jail.
1002
 
 Occasionally agents required additional specialized training, beyond the 
Finishing School.  This was provided by Specialist Schools that taught technical matters 
such as wireless telegraphy, industrial sabotage, clandestine printing, and advanced boat 
work.
1003
  To aid these schools, SOE drew on the knowledge of various experts.  
“Contact was made with the larger insurance companies,” Gubbins explains, “whence 
we gained invaluable insight and knowledge as to the really vital parts of all types of 
installations and plants, the parts whose destruction involved their highest loss of profit 
claims.”1004 
 SOE‟s network of schools began in Britain but came to straddle the globe, with 
facilities in Palestine, Egypt, India, Ceylon, Australia, and Canada (see Chapter VI).  As 
territory was liberated, new schools were also established in Algeria and Italy.
1005
  
Gubbins frequently visited these schools, and when doing so often wore the Scottish kilt 
with his uniform, in defiance of Army regulations.
1006
  In total, the SOE schools trained 
6,810 students, of whom only 480 were British SOE agents; the rest were from sixteen 
                                                 
1002
 Maj. G. M. Forty, “History of the Training Section of SOE, 1940-1945,” 37-38, TNA: PRO, HS 7/51; 
Foot, SOE: An Outline History, 69. 
1003
 Gubbins address to Cambridge University Officers Training Corps, 26 October 1962, 14, Gubbins 
papers 4/1/6, IWM; Foot, SOE: An Outline History, 69.  The propaganda school, STS 39, commanded by 
Maj. J. W. Hackett, not only served SOE, but also the Political Warfare Executive (PWE).  Cf. Maj. G. M. 
Forty, “History of the Training Section of SOE, 1940-1945,” 77, TNA: PRO, HS 7/51. 
1004
 Gubbins to the Bradford Junior Chamber of Commerce, 6 December 1961, 5, Gubbins papers 4/1/5, 
IWM. 
1005
 Foot, SOE: An Outline History, 70. 
1006
 Wilkinson and Astley, Gubbins and SOE, 80. 
  
229 
foreign nations, as well as 872 students from Britain‟s Secret Intelligence Service and 
172 students from the Special Air Service.
1007
 
 
The People 
 The deputy that Gubbins inherited at SOE‟s training section proved invaluable.  
Jack Wilson had been Deputy Head of Police in Calcutta, where he had considerable 
experience in counter-subversion activities against nationalists and Communists, and 
served under Sir Charles Tegart, who later advised the British administration in Palestine 
during the Arab Revolt.
1008
  In addition, Wilson was a friend of Robert Baden-Powell‟s 
and extremely active in the international scouting movement.  He utilized the lessons of 
Scouting for Boys when training the Armed Police of India, and he later served as the 
Chief Instructor of the Boy Scout Training Centre at Gilwell Park, outside London.
1009
  
With such an obvious background he had been recruited into MI(R) in 1940, trained the 
Independent Companies, and then moved to SOE.
1010
 
 The instructional staff of the training section mirrored the early pioneers of 
GS(R) and Section D.  Many of these men, though not all, had military experience.  
They came from all walks of life, often from the distant corners of the Empire.  In many 
cases they brought with them lessons learned from foreign countries or irregular 
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conflicts.  As the war effort progressed, returned agents served as instructors, providing 
eye-witness descriptions of life in occupied territories.
1011
 
William E. Fairbairn was by far the most famous instructor, in his own day and 
in the present.  Variously known as Fearless Dan, The Shanghai Buster, or Deacon, he is 
described by William Cassidy as “a quiet man, with the manners of a priest.”1012  
Swearing and drinking were unknown to him; in his spare time he never read and 
appeared to have no intellectual concerns.  George Langelaan, one of his students, 
describes him thus: “Off duty, his conversation was limited to two words: yes and no… 
All his interest, all his knowledge, all his intelligence – and he was intelligent – 
concentrated on one subject and one subject only – fighting.”1013   
Born on 28 February 1885, in Surrey, W. E. Fairbairn was one of fourteen 
children; he was named for the four-time prime minister William Ewart Gladstone.  
With an elder brother in South Africa and two in the Navy, young Fairbairn left an 
apprenticeship as a leatherworker to join the Royal Marines, at the age of fifteen years 
and ten months.
1014
 
While serving with the Legation guard in Seoul, Fairbairn got his first taste of 
Asian warfare.  Since Britain and Japan were allied at the time of the Russo-Japanese 
War, celebrations were held for each Japanese success.  These festivities were an excuse 
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for various competitions, including in bayonet fighting.  The Royal Marines prided 
themselves on their team, of which Fairbairn was a keen member, until they met their 
Japanese opposite.  The British were trounced.  “For the first time,” he wrote, “we had 
been hit with the butt of the rifle, tripped and thrown and what was worse SHOUTED at by 
our opponents.  This was not „cricket.‟” 1015  Fairbairn did not, however, take the loss 
sitting down.  After a month of practice – using the Japanese methods – the British 
called for a rematch and won.
1016
 
In 1907 Fairbairn, having left the Royal Marines, joined the Shanghai Municipal 
Police (SMP), which was responsible for law enforcement in the International 
Settlement.
1017
  After being beaten by criminals one day and left for dead, Fairbairn 
began the study of Asian martial arts; in the years ahead he studied under the leading 
instructors of the region, eventually becoming the first Caucasian to earn a Black Belt in 
jujitsu.
1018
  Moreover, Fairbairn created his own unarmed fighting system – “Defendu” – 
which drew upon jujitsu and boxing, and was intended for use by members of the SMP.  
Fairbairn described his new method as offering a “number of admittedly drastic and 
unpleasant forms of defense but all are justifiable and necessary if one is to protect 
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himself against the foul methods of a certain class.”1019  In addition to growing in his 
personal knowledge of Asian martial arts, Fairbairn‟s position in the SMP also grew; in 
1910 he was appointed Musketry & Drill Instructor, training all SMP recruits: European, 
Japanese, Sikh, and Chinese.  In response to three months of intense rioting, Fairbairn 
created the Reserve Unit (RU), sometimes known as the Shanghai Riot Squad, a 
specially trained and equipped mobile unit.  It was the first of its kind in the world, 
pioneering advanced methods of riot and crowd control, as well as handling armed 
robberies, criminal standoffs, and sniper situations.
1020
 
If serving in the police force of one of the world‟s roughest cities was not 
experience enough, Sino-Japanese conflict created new difficulties for Fairbairn and the 
SMP.  In 1932 the Shanghai Municipal Council was forced to declare a state of 
emergency and in 1937 the city experienced full-scale urban warfare between the 
Japanese and Chinese.  By this time Fairbairn was Assistant Commissioner of the SMP 
and had a major role in trying to ensure safety in the middle of this warzone.  In one 
instance he was single-handedly responsible for securing the release of 153 Chinese 
prisoners – men, women and children – slated for execution by the Japanese.1021  
In 1940 W. E. Fairbairn reached fifty-five, the mandatory retirement age in the 
SMP.  He left with full honors, but was not idle for long; within weeks of his arrival 
back in Britain he was recruited to train his fellow countrymen and commissioned as a 
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captain in the secret service, training MI(R), MI9, the British Commandos, and (when it 
came into existence) SOE.
 1022
   
Fairbairn taught unarmed combat, knife fighting, and pistol shooting.  In the 
streets of Shanghai, he and his colleague Alan Sykes, who also came to work for SOE, 
developed a new shooting technique that forewent the old-fashioned and time-
consuming methods of duelists in favor of a quick draw and a pair of shots fired from the 
waist, with the knees bent.
1023
  Likewise, they developed the Sykes-Fairbairn fighting 
knife, adopted by SOE, the Commandos, the Special Air Service, and OSS.
 1024
  In 
addition to all these combat techniques, Fairbairn also taught the recruits a variety of 
clandestine skills, such as boarding and leaving moving trains, breaking into houses, and 
scaling cliffs.
1025
  As William Cassidy explains, his methods were highly effective: 
Stripped of all the unnecessary trappings, his system of unarmed combat made it 
possible for a person of average strength and skills to meet and win against an 
opponent trained in the martial arts.  His unparalleled experience with knife 
attacks and attacks with blunt instruments – unlikely to be duplicated in this day 
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and age – provided a sound basis for instruction in the use of or defense against 
edge weapons, batons and clubs.
1026
   
Fairbairn – and others who served at the fringes of the Empire – brought to SOE a 
recognition of extreme circumstances and the extreme measures for which they call.  In 
due time these lessons would be shared not only with SOE and other British clandestine 
organizations, but with the Americans as well.  
 
The Syllabus 
 The SOE training syllabus, a collection of outlines and summaries of training 
lectures, was derived from The Art of Guerilla Warfare, The Partisan Leader‟s 
Handbook, and How to Use High Explosives, the work Gubbins had co-authored with 
Jefferis.
1027
  The syllabus was, however, constantly in flux; as agents returned from the 
field, they were debriefed and the lessons learned incorporated into the training 
program.
1028
  Nevertheless, its essential elements remained the same across the years of 
the Second World War, and its content, though differing somewhat from one school to 
the next, was centrally controlled by SOE‟s Training Section.1029  The syllabus may be 
broken into five unequal sections: (1) techniques of clandestine life, (2) enemy 
countermeasures, (3) propaganda, (4) communications, (5) paramilitary fieldcraft.
1030
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Each of these sections echoes Gubbins‟s own writings, though only the first need be 
considered, since the general overview it offers prefigures the other four sections. 
 The first section of the syllabus begins with a description of the “objects and 
methods of irregular warfare.”  It notes that the Axis powers exploit “their own,… 
satellite and… occupied territories” politically, economically, and strategically.  Thus 
the goal of irregular warfare is to coordinate “spontaneous resistance,” since “sporadic 
risings are useless.”1031  Those who participate in irregular warfare should see 
themselves as “a cog in a very large machine whose smooth functioning depends on 
each separate cog carrying out its part efficiently.”1032  Thus, just as the 1939 writings 
make clear that guerrillas must cooperate with regular forces as part of a larger effort, so 
too that same message was repeated to SOE agents from the very beginning of their 
training.  The syllabus goes on to explain that the enemy must be fought politically, 
economically, and strategically, through espionage, propaganda, passive resistance, 
sabotage and guerrilla warfare.  Targets include “the enemy‟s morale and that of his 
collaborators… the enemy‟s man-power and communications… [and] material 
profitable to the enemy.”1033  Such widespread attacks would accomplish Gubbins‟s 
stated goal of “compelling the enemy to disperse his forces in order to guard his flank, 
his communications, his detachments, supply depots, etc.”1034   
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This first section of the syllabus then goes on to discuss seven sub-topics: (1) 
Self Protection, including such various issues as security for W/T, make-up and disguise, 
informants and cover; (2) Police Methods and Counter Measures, a matter more fully 
covered in the second section, but here discussing police techniques such as surveillance, 
searches, and interrogation; (3) Agent Management, including motives, recruiting and 
handling; (4) Organisation of agents into cells; (5) Communications, both within and 
outside a single Resistance unit; (6) Operations, from passive resistance and subversion 
of troops to selection of targets for attack; and (7) The Emergency Period, that is, when 
an agent first lands and must make contact with a reception committee.
1035
  Some of 
these topics correspond to Gubbins‟s writings more closely than others.  He wrote 
nothing in 1939, for example, about make-up or disguises.  One could speculate why 
Gubbins omitted this topic.  Perhaps he considered himself unqualified to write about it; 
perhaps he thought it would have little relevance for a military organization such as 
MI(R), which was bound, by the terms of the Hague Convention, to utilize uniforms.  
Whatever the reason, make-up and disguises do not appear in his 1939 writings, nor do 
management of individual agents, nor their organization into cells.  One could see in 
these gaps a departure by the SOE syllabus from Gubbins‟s earlier writings.  While the 
syllabus certainly represents development the ideas of the Art and Handbook, the case 
for continuity is easily seen when examining major topics from both periods: 
countermeasures, communications, and planning attacks. 
                                                 
1035
 Rigden, ed., SOE Syllabus, 31. 
  
237 
As discussed earlier, Gubbins had a profound concern for enemy 
countermeasures, a worry shared by the SOE syllabus.  Issues of particular emphasis are 
similar, including systems of control such as curfews and passports, raids and searches, 
and penetration by enemy agents.
1036
  Gubbins observed in the Art of Guerilla Warfare, 
however, that the enemy “will be working usually amidst a hostile populace; without 
their co-operation his task will be more difficult and will require a larger number of his 
own men to carry it out.”1037  The tension that he anticipated between the occupier and 
the occupied is more explicitly discussed in the syllabus: “There will always be a 
conflict… between the desire to achieve maximum security through efficient [counter-
espionage] activity, and the need for the economic and politic life of the country to 
continue in as efficient and satisfactory a manner as possible.  Recognition of this 
conflict is essential.”1038  In other words, an occupier cannot lay down a perfect security 
net without angering the local population and making utilization of the region‟s 
resources cumbersome; spies and saboteurs can exploit the resulting security gaps. 
 On the matter of communications, Gubbins warned in 1939 that “all means of 
communication that are open to interception by the enemy must be used with the greatest 
discretion – i.e. civil postal service, telephone and telegraphs, etc.”1039  In contrast, “the 
passing of information verbally and direct is clearly the safest and in many ways the 
most reliable means.”1040  The syllabus likewise cautions that the mail is “fairly easily 
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investigated by police” and gives a range of measures that should be taken when using it, 
from codes and secret inks to varied addresses and nondescript paper.  In the end, 
however, “if suspected, do not use [the] post for subversive correspondence.”1041  
Likewise, the telegraph is “to be used sparingly.”  Like Gubbins‟s earlier writings, the 
syllabus concludes that couriers are “slow but surer than other methods.”1042 
 One final parallel from this section may suffice to demonstrate the development 
from the Art of Guerilla Warfare and The Partisan Leader‟s Handbook to the wartime 
training of SOE agents, with regard to both its continuity and changes.  Appendix III to 
the Handbook – Destruction of an Enemy Post, Detachment or Guard – describes 
preparations for attacking a target and admonishes guerrillas that “you must get detailed 
information of the posts in your area.”1043  Twenty three specific points to observe are 
listed.  The syllabus, covering the same topic, likewise insists that good information 
must be acquired first, and lists nineteen points to consider.
1044
  A majority of the points 
covered in the syllabus were anticipated in the Art and Handbook.  The points unique to 
the syllabus fall into a handful of clearly defined topics.  Point (o) asks whether “normal 
types of errors and accidents in [the target] factory… can… be reproduced artificially.”  
Point (p) similarly asks about the presence of bottle-necks: “At what point will damage 
do most harm?”1045  These two clearly represent the kind of technical knowledge gained 
from insurance companies and manufacturers, knowledge which was conveyed at the 
Specialist Schools.  Another departure is found in Point (r): “Can [landmarks for guiding 
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aircraft] be created or found?”1046  This interest in the use of airpower by forces friendly 
to partisans represents less a change in ideas and more a change in battlefield realities.  
When Gubbins wrote in 1939, the most probable resisters were Poles and Czechs.  
British air support to either nation was likely to be extremely limited, due to both the 
finite range of aircraft and the intense anti-aircraft defenses they would encounter while 
flying over long stretches of German territory.  But by September 1943, when this 
particular lecture was written, British and American forces had captured Sicily 
(Operation HUSKY) and were landing on the Italian mainland (Operations AVALANCHE, 
BAYTOWN, and SLAPSTICK); thus northern Italy, as well as occupied France and the Low 
Countries, were now within operational range of Allied aircraft, making it plausible for 
partisans to call in air strikes.  As the war progressed, SOE made small adjustments to 
Gubbins‟s ideas, bringing them in line the latest developments; however, the essential 
concepts of his 1939 writings remained at the heart of the SOE syllabus. 
  
Promotion 
Reshuffles 
 In February 1942, following the fall of Singapore, the British government was 
reshuffled.  Hugh Dalton, Minister of Economic Warfare, was moved to the Board of 
Trade.  He was replaced at the MEW by Roundell Cecil Palmer, at the time Viscount 
Wolmer, though a few days later he succeeded his father as 3
rd
 Earl Selborne.
1047
  At the 
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time Cadogan believed Selborne “would work” in the post, “but he‟s not very 
inspiring.”1048  Nevertheless, Gubbins and many others were relieved to see the 
departure of Dalton, always a micromanager of SOE and source of friction with 
Whitehall.  Moreover, Selborne listened to Gubbins and was willing to champion his 
cogent and professional views on irregular warfare.  Whereas Dalton had sometimes 
viewed SOE‟s work as a rather melodramatic socialist crusade, Selborne was more 
practical and focused.
1049
 
 A few months after Dalton‟s departure and Selborne‟s arrival, Sir Frank Nelson 
stepped down as the head of SOE.  Nelson had performed the valuable but exhausting 
task of trying to check Dalton‟s more extravagant plans, and in the process he had 
burned himself out.
1050
  Decades after the war, Gubbins remained polite in his treatment 
of Dalton, though his assessment of the situation is clear:  
[Dalton] drove himself hard & his leading figures in SOE equally hard, perhaps 
too hard in one or two cases as in that of Sir Frank Nelson our first Chief.  
Politically they were poles apart & I would say that neither of the two tried to 
hide the fact: further Sir Frank felt that Dalton was conducting affairs as if he, 
Dalton, were the Chief Executive… & interfering in the running of the show.  
There was considerable truth in Sir Frank‟s complaints on this score.1051 
Before their departures, Nelson and Dalton discussed the matter of SOE‟s next director.  
Gubbins‟s name was proposed; although Nelson suggested that Gubbins was “on his 
merits the best choice,” but cautioned, according to Dalton‟s diary, that “he is [a] 
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difficult personally and likes only to work with people whom he himself has picked.”1052  
As it happened, Nelson was replaced by Sir Charles Hambro, a former Eton cricket 
captain and Coldstream Guard, and a prominent banker.  Hambro had been Chairman of 
the Great Western Railway and had ties to Scandinavia.  In November 1941 he was 
named a deputy to Nelson, while Gubbins had become responsible for Western 
Europe.
1053
  Hambro was a brilliant amateur, a man Jebb said “lives by bluff and 
charm.”1054  Gubbins was initially unsure of him, but under Hambro‟s leadership SOE 
became a regular and respected element of the war effort.  One of Hambro‟s first acts 
upon arrival was to appoint Gubbins his Deputy for Operations; in recognition of this 
new position, Selborne managed to wrestle out of the War Office a brevet promotion to 
Major-General.
1055
 
 
Director of SOE 
 In September 1943 a fierce disagreement broke out between the Commander-in-
Chief Middle East, General Sir Maitland Wilson, and SOE regarding Balkan policy.  
The Chiefs of Staff and Foreign Office were pulled into the squabble as well.  The 
resulting compromise placed SOE‟s operational activities under the relevant theater 
commander, an outcome unacceptable to Hambro and his Deputy for Administration, Sir 
John Hanbury-Williams.  Both resigned.  This left Gubbins, a man who had argued since 
his GS(R) days that irregular forces need to be closely coordinated with regular 
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operations, the most senior SOE officer.  Selborne had no difficulty obtaining 
Churchill‟s approval for Gubbins‟s appointment as Director of SOE.1056  Gubbins would 
remain at the helm of SOE until its dissolution on 1 January 1946. 
Gubbins‟s new position merely confirmed the central role he already played, as 
“the real motive force in the machine,” to borrow Jebb‟s phrase.1057  This final 
promotion allowed Gubbins to complete the work of creating SOE in his own image, 
according to the ideas he had first formulated four years before.  Whereas Hugh Dalton 
had envisioned a “Fourth Arm” which would employ propaganda and subversion to 
foment a general rising of the working class, Gubbins was more realistic about what his 
agents might achieve, instead envisioning a paramilitary effort which would work 
alongside local resistance forces and in cooperation with the theatre commander.  
Having seen the potential effectiveness of indigenous resistance movements, and 
believing that resistance would have to be on a large scale to be effective and justify the 
inevitable reprisals against civilians, Gubbins concluded that success would necessarily 
come in cooperation with the governments-in-exile in London, many of which were in 
contact with – if not always in control of – resistance forces in their home countries.  
Perceiving the need for larger efforts and disciplined coordination, Gubbins shifted SOE 
away from its civilian past, creating a paramilitary organization capable of integrating 
with regular troops.
1058
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 Dennis Wheatley, who worked at the London Controlling Section devising 
deception operations, provides an unusual picture of Gubbins during his time as Director 
of SOE.  Like earlier accounts, Wheatley describes Gubbins as having little interest in 
official dress: “[He was] a dapper little man.  Instead of the slacks or battle-dress worn 
by the majority of Army officers employed in War Departments, he always wore 
beautifully cut Bedford cord breeches, highly polished field boots and spurs.”  His 
parties were attended by officers of the Free Forces, the Poles and Czechs he so admired, 
as well as Frenchmen, Norwegians, Belgians and Dutch.  They were, unsurprisingly, the 
kind of men SOE dropped behind enemy lines.  But the most striking part of Wheatley‟s 
description involves Gubbins‟s relationship with women.  He was a “man who excelled 
in surrounding himself with lovelies….  The hostesses [at his parties] were a score or 
more of beauties, mostly ex-débutantes, hand-picked by Gubby from the hundred or 
more girls that he employed in his office.” 1059  Wheatley provides few other details, but 
the suggestion is risqué.   
 Gubbins had been distant from his first wife, Norah (“Nonie”), for a long time – 
they eventually divorced in 1944 – and he certainly enjoyed the cosmopolitan life of 
intelligence.
1060
  However, Wheatley‟s picture should be taken with more than a grain of 
salt, not only because Wheatley was an author of pulp fiction in peace-time.  SOE 
certainly employed a large number of women, something in the neighborhood of 3,200 
of them, over half the total strength of the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY).  These 
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women served as wireless operators, drivers, secretaries, and domestic help at the 
country house schools.
1061
  Wheatley‟s suggestion of impropriety involving such women 
appears misplaced, however.  After the war Donald Hamilton-Hill asked Gubbins to 
look over the manuscript of a novel about SOE.  Gubbins replied:  
I do not mind your “conversational details” [but]… I do think that you should be 
very careful in laying any stress on female relationships and luscious F.A.N.Y‟s 
and things of that nature….  I think you do want to avoid anything which would 
make your book a “succès de scandale” and would hope that you would not 
denigrate our own F.A.N.Y‟s in any way, who were of course as signal personnel 
at the core of our success: I would not like people to think that male/female 
relations entered into our daily tough work in any degree.
1062
 
Perhaps Gubbins was simply interested in preserving his good name or that of SOE, 
though this was only one of a raft of books that appeared about secret operations after 
the war, and a book with which he had no official connection.  Indeed, Gubbins 
acknowledges in the letter that spies and sex was a theme that had “already been abused 
by cheap authors.”1063  After a survey of the surviving material, this defense rings true. 
 Joan Bright Astley, who herself worked for Gubbins, provides a considerably 
different take on a scene not so different from Wheatley‟s: 
Whatever their rank or status, [the FANYs] looked to Gubbins as their patron.  
He, for his part, always took a personal interest in their welfare.  To celebrate the 
New Year [in 1942] he organized at one of the training schools an all-ranks 
dance for members of his staff to which he invited the FANY drivers.  Presided 
over by Mrs. [Phyllis] Bingham [Commander of the FANYs], it was as decorous 
as an end of term party at a girls‟ school; however, Gubbins wore the kilt and led 
the Scottish dancing until the small hours of the morning.  At a time when senior 
officers were not expected to enjoy all-ranks dances, Gubbins proved an 
exception….  In staff relations, as in much else, he was ahead of his time.1064 
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Conclusion 
The four years from the outbreak of war in September 1939 to Gubbins‟s 
appointment as Director of SOE in September 1943 were significant and dynamic 
period, for the war generally and for SOE specifically.  Likewise, Gubbins‟s time at the 
organizations helm, lasting two additional years, saw the zenith of SOE‟s operations.  
Nevertheless, as SOE grows this story tappers off, for two different reasons.  Firstly, 
although the experiences of war led to innovations in irregular operations, SOE‟s basic 
doctrine became increasingly fixed.  Gubbins‟s ideas were continually reinforced, as one 
layer was added to another: his significant contribution to the thinking of MI(R), itself a 
major component of the new SOE; his impact as SOE‟s first Director of Training, 
beginning in 1940, upon thousands of new agents; his increased influence when 
Selborne, a man willing to listen, became minister in 1942; and, finally, his leadership as 
Director after 1943.  Thus, although the pace of sabotage only increased, the history of 
ideas settled down.  The second reason our story begins to fade here is that this is where 
the existing body of literature takes up its account.  General histories, usually short on 
SOE‟s origins, provide considerably more material on wartime operations.  Likewise, a 
wealth of memoires and histories of particular operations flesh out some of the 
details.
1065
  Nevertheless, one key element of our story remains: how SOE‟s intellectual 
patrimony was passed to the United States. 
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CHAPTER VI 
OSS AND ITS DOCTRINE 
 
The Origins of OSS 
“Wild Bill” Donovan 
On 11 July 1941 the euphemistically-titled Office of the Coordinator of 
Information (COI) was created.  Unlike SOE, the COI‟s existence was not secret, though 
the new organization‟s stated purpose was simply to collect and organize information, 
masking its true mission of espionage, propaganda, and subversion.
1066
  In time this new 
organization, under the leadership of Bill Donovan, would become the Office of 
Strategic Services.  At the beginning of its history, “Donovan was the OSS and the OSS 
was Donovan.”1067   
William Joseph Donovan was born in 1883 into an Irish-American family in 
Buffalo, New York.  He studied at Niagara University, a Catholic university, with some 
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thought to entering the priesthood, before transferring to Columbia College in New York 
City, to finish his bachelor‟s degree and then attend law school.  Though of only 
moderate size, he played football for Columbia.
1068
   
While practicing law in Buffalo he organized an Army National Guard cavalry 
troop.  When General John Pershing was sent to pursue the Mexican bandit Pancho Villa 
in 1916, Donovan‟s unit was activated, though it saw little action.  Returning to New 
York, Donovan joined the famed 69
th
 Regiment, a New York National Guard formation 
primarily made up of Irish-Americans.  He was given command of the 1
st
 Battalion and 
served in France during the First World War, earning the Distinguished Service Cross 
(with Oak Leaf Cluster), the Medal of Honor, and France‟s Croix de Guerre for valor.  
He was wounded three times, and it was in battle that he was given the nickname “Wild 
Bill.”1069 
Outside of combat, Donovan was a quiet man, who kept his anger inside.  He had 
a sharp wit, but rarely laughed out loud himself.  He was a man of tremendous energy 
and intellect, who slept little and read voraciously, mostly in military and political 
                                                 
1068
 Dunlop, Donovan, 13- 26; Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS 
and Modern American Espionage (New York, 2011), 10-13.  Donovan‟s grandfather may have had some 
contact with the Fenian Brotherhood, the North American wing of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) 
terrorist organization.  See Brown, Last Hero, 15-16. 
1069
 Dunlop, Donovan, 28, 32-33, 44-113; Waller, Wild Bill Donovan, 15-16, 18-31.  Cf. Stephen L. 
Harris, Duffy‟s War: Fr. Francis Duffy, Wild Bill Donovan, and the Irish Fighting 69th in World War I 
(Washington, 2006).  The Croix de Guerre was initially refused, until a Jewish sergeant, who had 
participated in the same operation, was given his as well.  The poet Joyce Kilmer served under Donovan, 
and was his acting adjutant when he was killed. 
  
248 
history, but also Shakespeare.  He enjoyed singing Broadway tunes and excelled at 
ballroom dance.  Although he enjoyed fine food, he seldom drank and did not smoke.
1070
 
Donovan is often lionized in accounts of OSS, but Anthony Cave Brown 
provides a rather different picture of a Catholic beholden to Francis Cardinal Spellman, 
“a creature who seemed to believe that the only thing to do with Communists was to 
burn them alive, a priest who saw eternal damnation in anything pink.”1071  Moreover, 
Brown writes, “whether Donovan was really the right man for the post of chief of 
America‟s first secret service is very questionable.”  He argues that Donovan lacked 
both bureaucratic skills and good judgment, while his right-wing politics “were useless 
internationally,” leading to policy failures.1072  “Likable, even admirable on occasions, 
he was in fact an Elizabethan man, swaggering about capitals in beautiful cords, 
displaying a fine calf for a riding boot.”1073 
Donovan worked as a lawyer after World War I, but his eyes were always on 
political conflicts across the seas.  In the summer of 1919, while Colin Gubbins was 
serving in Archangel as aide-de-camp to General Ironside, Donovan participated in 
another element of the Allied Intervention.  Traveling via Japan, he undertook a trip to 
Siberia, to collect information and try to make sense of the confusing situation there.  
Richard Dunlop contends that Donovan traveled at the personal request of President 
Woodrow Wilson, but Douglas Waller points out that Donovan was hostile to Wilson.  
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Moreover, Roland Morris, the US ambassador to Japan, claimed that Donovan begged to 
join Morris on his tour of the White Russian forces in Siberia.  Whatever the motive for 
his travels, Donovan concluded that the Japanese had designs on the region and that 
White Russian forces were of poor quality.  Whether President Wilson took Donovan‟s 
assessment seriously is debated by Dunlop, Waller, and other Donovan biographers, but 
on 31 December Wilson ordered American forces out of Siberia and pressured Japan 
into doing likewise.
1074
  In the autumn of 1931 Donovan again returned to the region, 
unofficially investigating the Mukden Incident and informally communicating his 
thoughts on Japanese aggression to the US government.
1075
 
In November 1935 Donovan traveled to Italy, where he met Benito Mussolini; 
convincing the dictator he was sympathetic to the fascist cause, Donovan received 
permission to visit the Italian lines in Abyssinia, which Italy had invaded in the previous 
month.  Donovan spent two weeks touring facilities and interviewing Italian officers.  
Upon his return to the United States, Donovan – who had traveled at his law firm‟s 
expense – briefed an excited War Department, which had been unable to place spies 
among the Italian invaders.
1076
  Continuing to travel as a private citizen, and making use 
of his network of contacts, he visited Germany in 1937 and observed German army 
maneuvers; in 1938 he toured the Czech defenses in the Sudetenland, witnessed the 
fighting in Spain, and again observed maneuvers in Germany.
1077
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Observing the British 
War broke out in Europe in September 1939; following the collapse of France in 
May and June of 1940, Britain stood alone against Nazi Germany.  It was in this context 
that the concept for the new organization that would become OSS emerged, beginning 
with Donovan‟s trip to Britain in the summer of 1940.  Secretary of the Navy Frank 
Knox suggested someone be sent to study the situation in Europe, particularly with 
regard to German fifth column forces; moreover, Knox suggested his friend Bill 
Donovan for the role.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt added to the mission this task of 
assessing the strength of the British.
1078
 
Donovan left for Britain in the middle of July 1940.  Lord Lothian, the British 
ambassador to Washington, cabled ahead to the Foreign Office, explaining that Donovan 
was a key advisor of Secretary Knox, and therefore was likely to have strong influence 
over arms sales to Britain.  This was an exaggeration, but it accomplished Lord 
Lothian‟s purpose, opening doors throughout Whitehall.1079  On arrival Donovan toured 
the island nation‟s defenses and formed strong relationships with the British leadership.  
Naval intelligence, MI5, and SIS all provided Donovan with briefings.
1080
  In addition, 
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Sir Frank Nelson made certain that Donovan received access to SOE facilities 
throughout Britain. Colin Gubbins introduced him to the SOE schools.
1081
  Conyers 
Read, an American historian of Britain who later worked for OSS, argued that this visit 
by Donovan, “marks the beginning of close cooperation with the British which was to 
characterize the whole history of… OSS.  When Donovan later undertook to organize 
his secret intelligence… and his subversive operations… he turned frankly to British 
models.”1082 
On his return to the United States Donovan concluded “that the British would 
hold out; that America must help, at least in the matter of supplies; and that fifth column 
activity had become a fact of major importance in modern warfare.”1083  The Fifth 
Column Lessons for America he co-authored with journalist Edgar Mowrer after his 
return was considered in Chapter IV. 
Although Roosevelt and Donovan, a Republican, disagreed sharply on domestic 
policy, each were powerful men of sharp political skills who understood that they shared 
the belief that America must act on the global stage.
1084
  In November 1940, the 
president again had need of Donovan‟s services, this time sending him to the 
Mediterranean to assess the situation there.  He left the following month, first stopping 
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in Britain, where he returned to SOE‟s network of training schools.1085  Donovan was 
once again impressed by the British, though this did not leave them above criticism.  As 
the War Report of the OSS explains, “the Germans were exploiting the psychological 
and political elements….  Neither America nor Britain was fighting this new and 
important type of war….  Their defenses against political and psychological warfare 
were feeble.”1086  Donovan urged President Roosevelt to take action in this sphere.  After 
stopping in Britain, Donovan then traveled to Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, Greece, Bulgaria, 
Yugoslavia, Turkey, Cyprus, Palestine, Iraq, Spain and Portugal, before returning to the 
States via Britain.
1087
  Of these dozen territories, half were British; Donovan‟s – and 
America‟s – priorities were clear. 
 
The Coordinator of Information (COI) 
 In the summer of 1941, vast amounts of information were flowing into 
Washington.  Faced with this challenge, President Roosevelt asked Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, and Attorney General Robert 
Jackson to consider this problem and that of intelligence in the broadest sense.  When 
consulted by the committee, Donovan advised the creation of an organization with 
responsibility for intelligence, propaganda, and subversion, a vision as expansive as 
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anything Dalton sought.  Bold though this proposal was, the committee endorsed it in its 
report to the president.
1088
 
 Roosevelt asked Donovan for a more specific proposal, and on 10 June he 
submitted his “Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic Information.”  He 
almost certainly received help drafting the document from Sir William Stephenson, the 
chief of British Security Coordination (BSC), and his staff in New York.
1089
  In this 
document, Donovan argued that “our mechanism of collecting information is 
inadequate.”  While acknowledging that “we have intelligence units in the Army and 
Navy,” Donovan contended that “these services cannot, out of the very nature of things, 
obtain… accurate, comprehensive, long-range information.”  To remedy this problem, 
he called for the creation of a new agency:  
a central enemy intelligence organization which would itself collect either 
directly or through existing departments of government, at home and abroad, 
pertinent information concerning potential enemies, the character and strength of 
their armed forces, their internal economic organization, their principal channels 
of supply, the morale of their troops and their people and their relations with their 
neighbors or allies. 
Moreover, Donovan emphasized that “to analyze and interpret such information by 
applying to it… the experience of… specialized trained research officials in the relative 
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scientific fields, (including technological, economic, financial and psychological 
scholars,) is of determining influence in modern warfare.”  Finally, “there is another 
element in modern warfare, and that is the psychological attack against the moral and 
spiritual defenses of a nation. In this attack the most powerful weapon is radio.” 
 To carry out all these functions, Donovan proposed the appointment of a 
Coordinator of Strategic Information, assisted by a panel composed of the Directors of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Naval Intelligence, and the Military 
Intelligence Division.  He was quick to caution, however, that “the proposed centralized 
unit will neither displace nor encroach upon the FBI, Army and Navy Intelligence, or 
any other department of the government.”1090   
Although Donovan had included physical subversion – e.g. sabotage – in his 
initial report to the ad hoc committee, he omitted it from this proposal.  When the 
president created the Office of the Coordinator of Information on 25 June 1941, its 
precise functions were not defined.  The president did, however, invoke the “authority 
vested in me as… Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy,” suggesting that the new 
organization was military in nature.
1091
  Moreover, the document authorized the 
Coordinator to “carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary 
activities as may facilitate the securing of information.”1092  The wide purview of the 
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new organization fit well with Donovan‟s vision of irregular warfare.  As the War 
Report of the OSS explains, his 
basic concept, evolved from his experience extending back to World War I and 
particularly his observation of wars from 1935 through 1940, had envisaged a 
“softening-up” process to pave the way for the regular armed forces, consisting 
broadly of three phases: First, secret intelligence infiltration and preparation; 
second, sabotage and subversive harassing tactics; and third, resistance groups 
and guerrilla or commando operations….  Even before his appointment as 
Coordinator of Information he had urged these ideas often and cogently.
1093
 
From this genesis came an organization which carried out both intelligence and 
sabotage, thus fulfilling the functions of SIS and SOE within a single organization. 
 Over the next year and a half, from the creation of COI to America‟s entry into 
the Second World War following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Donovan worked to 
establish his new intelligence and sabotage organization.  Waller notes that “the 
Coordinator of Information office became a reflection of Donovan‟s creative and 
eclectic mind – constantly exploring, expanding, experimenting.  He launched new 
projects, rearranged priorities, and shuffled personnel.”1094  Inspiration and assistance 
from the British was essential in building the new organization.  During these eighteen 
months, Donovan met with or telephoned Sir William Stephenson at least 36 times, 
about once every two weeks.
1095
  One subsequent member of OSS, Carleton Coon, a 
Harvard anthropologist, argues that Donovan modeled his new organization not on 
Britain‟s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), but on SOE.1096 
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 By October 1941, COI had agents in Vichy North Africa, operating under the 
diplomatic guise of being vice-consuls.  That same month, COI established an office in 
London.
1097
  Perhaps most importantly, on 10 October, a new section of COI was 
established, known simply as “Special Activities – K and L Funds.”  This office handled 
not only secret intelligence, but subversion and guerrilla warfare activities.
1098
  As part 
of the new venture, Donovan sent Lieutenant Colonel Robert Solborg, an Army 
intelligence officer seconded to COI, to Britain for three months to receive “extensive 
training in British [i.e., SOE] schools.”1099  In the following months, Donovan lobbied 
hard for expansion in this area.  In December he sent President Roosevelt an account of 
the British Commandos‟ development and a few days later argued “that there be 
organized now, in the United States, a guerrilla corps, independent and separate from the 
Army and Navy….  This force should, of course, be created along disciplined military 
lines, analogous to the British Commando principles, a statement of which I sent you 
recently.”1100 
 From the beginning, Donovan argued that intelligence and special operations, 
although closely collaborating, should be divided into different branches.  Any doubt 
about this arrangement was removed by America‟s formal entry into the war after the 
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Japanese attack of 7 December 1941.  Although COI had worked with its British 
counterparts prior to that time, such cooperation grew exponentially afterward.  In light 
of the fact that the British SIS and SOE had a strong rivalry and separate cabinet 
ministers, liaison was made much easier for the Americans if they came from two 
distinct branches of COI.  In December 1941 divided “Special Activities – K and L 
Funds” into the Secret Intelligence Branch (otherwise designated SA/B) and the Special 
Operations Branch (SA/G).
1101
 
 
Transformation to OSS 
 As COI grew, its detractors in the military, the State Department, and the FBI 
increased.  In March 1942 there was a major push to have it abolished; Archibald 
MacLeish, director of the War Department‟s Office of Facts and Figures, and Harold 
Smith, Budget Director, proposed creating a new propaganda organization and dividing 
COI‟s other assets among existing organizations.  For a time Roosevelt delayed a 
decision, but on 13 June he divided COI into the Office of War Information (OWI) and 
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the latter under the broad authority of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.
1102
  It was a decision which mirrored the departure of Britain‟s PWE 
from SOE, though unlike its British counterparts, OSS united sabotage and intelligence 
within a single organization.
1103
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 The growth of COI and its transformation into the OSS may have owed 
something to British influence.  The official history indicates that prior to the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor, the British were content to exchange information with a variety 
of American agencies: COI and FBI, as well as military and naval intelligence.  After 
America‟s official entry into the war, however, as exchanges dramatically increased, 
“the British became disturbed about giving such information to several uncoordinated 
agencies which lacked carefully-trained specialists concerned exclusively with counter-
espionage techniques.  Therefore, they suggested that all counter-espionage material be 
channeled through a single agency.”1104  To sweeten the arrangement, the British offered 
to share their extensive counterintelligence files with such an agency. 
 A few days before the official creation of OSS on 13 June 1942, Donovan and 
Major Preston Goodfellow, his director of special operations, traveled to London to 
negotiate an arrangement with Sir Charles Hambro for cooperation with SOE in the 
field.  Although OSS worked out similar arrangements with SIS, the agreement with 
SOE was arguably the more important.  The distinction arises out of the difference 
between intelligence and special operations.  In the case of intelligence, information 
sharing and collaboration between agents in the field often poses a grave danger to the 
safety of agents, a danger which frequently outweighed the benefits of SIS-OSS 
cooperation.  On the other hand, while Gubbins warned of the dangers posed to special 
operations by over-organization, duplication of effort would result in wasted lives and 
operational confusion; in this case, the benefits of close SOE-OSS cooperation 
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outweighed the costs.  These negotiations between SOE and OSS regarding the precise 
terms of their collaboration were ongoing when Roosevelt signed the order dividing COI 
and creating OSS.
1105
 
 
Uniquely American Sources of Doctrine 
 The extensive personal and institutional cooperation of Donovan and COI/OSS 
with their British counterparts suggest Britain as an obvious source for the ideas and 
doctrine of irregular warfare which OSS utilized during World War II.  To adequately 
assess the extent of British influence, however, it is necessary to first consider uniquely 
American sources of possible inspiration available to COI/OSS.
1106
  From the breath of 
potential sources, a handful will be considered: American activities in the Philippines 
and Hawaii in the final decade of the 19
th
 century, the lessons in irregular warfare 
gathered in the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, and experiences of espionage and 
violence along the US-Mexican border. 
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Philippines & Hawaii 
Some historians and soldiers argue that the US has a long history of irregular 
warfare, reaching back to the colonial era.
1107
  As pertains to OSS actions during the 
Second World War, however, the most directly relevant examples begin in the late 19
th
 
century.  In 1898, following the sinking of the USS Maine in Havana harbor, the US 
imposed itself upon a conflict between Cuban rebels and Spanish authorities, and war 
with Spain was declared in April. 
In addition to fighting in Cuba and Puerto Rico, Americas also saw action in the 
Philippines.  On 4 February 1899 fighting broke out between American forces and 
Filipino rebels just outside of Manila; the one-time allies, having defeated the Spanish 
the previous summer, now began a conflict which officially lasted until July 1902, 
though scattered fighting continued for several years thereafter.  For nine months the 
infant Philippine Republic fought a conventional war against the US military, but in 
November 1899, Emilio Aguinaldo, president of the Republic, declared that 
conventional resistance had failed and called for a guerrilla war instead.  The US 
                                                 
1107
 James F. J. Archibald, an American soldier who observed the Boers, makes this argument: “The tactics 
of the American soldier have been the outcome of generations of Indian wars and of fighting in woods and 
mountains.  Our colonial forefathers established the general principles of our present fighting methods 
when they learned the art of warfare from the natives of the wilderness.  When Colonel Washington saved 
General Braddock‟s defeated British regulars from annihilation by the Indians, he employed, in the main, 
the same tactics we now use.  Washington implored the British general to dispose his men like the pioneer 
volunteers, as individual fighters; but the Royal officer disdained to take lessons from a colonial….  The 
American victories of the War of Independence were won by the common-sense tactics natural to men 
who had handled long rifles from their boyhood, and who had learned to hide first and shoot afterwards” 
(Blue Shirt and Khaki, 125-26).  Historian Andrew J. Birtle shares these sentiments, arguing that “there 
was a strong continuity in the manner in which the US Army performed counterinsurgency and overseas 
constabulary missions in the century that preceded the outbreak of World War II” (U.S. Army 
Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941 [Washington, 2009], vii). 
  
261 
military, having recently defeated Spain in a conventional conflict, now had to redirect 
its efforts and undertake a counterinsurgency campaign, a most unconventional effort.   
Through the cooperation of sympathetic local officials, the Filipino guerrillas 
were able to live among the population or establish camps proximate to population 
centers; in both cases, local officials and the people at large supplied them with 
provisions and collected funds for them.
1108
  Thus supported, guerrillas were able to 
launch attacks against American convoys.
1109
  The rebels also mounted a concerted 
campaign to deny information to the American forces; Filipinos found cooperating with 
the occupiers would be punished, sometimes with death.
1110
  The insurgents‟ fears were 
well-founded; even a single individual could provide US forces with information 
sufficient to arrest rebel leaders, capture their weapons, and destroy the rebel grip on a 
given town.  Captured rebels, in turn, could supply information to roll up additional 
guerrilla organizations.
1111
 
The American response to the insurgency was multi-faceted, incorporating 
methods drawn from both American and European traditions.  Under a “policy of 
chastisement” military forces vigorously pursued guerrillas and destroyed them.  This 
often meant concentrating civilian populations into well-guarded villages, cutting them 
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off from the guerrillas they supplied with information, provisions, and concealment.
1112
  
The US utilized light and mobile forces, traveling with limited supplies for rapid pursuit 
of rebels.
1113
  Native forces were also organized into auxiliary forces which could utilize 
their knowledge of the language, culture, and geography, to assist American forces.
1114
   
The Philippines was not the only scene of American irregular operations in this 
era.  In 1893 a group of white planters in the Kingdom of Hawaii organized themselves 
into the “Committee of Public Safety,” with the intention of opposing Queen 
Liliuokalani‟s revisions to the constitution of 1887; the committee contacted the US 
minister, John L. Stevens, who organized a landing party from the USS Boston, then in 
Honolulu harbor, to aid the committee with force.  The queen abdicated, and Hawaii 
became a republic, with the goal of annexation by the US.
1115
  President Grover 
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Cleveland, whose administration was inaugurated shortly after these events, described 
them in the following way: 
The lawful government of Hawaii was overthrown without the drawing of a 
sword or the firing of a shot….  But for the landing of United States forces upon 
false pretexts respecting the danger to life and property, the committee would 
never have exposed themselves to the pains and penalties of treason by 
undertaking the subversion of the Queen‟s Government.1116 
While Cleveland‟s description contains clear moral condemnation, the mechanics of 
subversion parallel the kind of actions SOE and OSS undertook nearly half a century 
later: using subterfuge, not brute force, to encourage local clandestine organizations to 
overthrow regimes considered undesirable.
1117
 
 
Central America and the Small Wars Manual 
 In Central America and the Caribbean region, the US had a long history of 
paramilitary operations.  In the late spring of 1898, Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan, of the 
Army‟s Military Intelligence Division, made contact with the Cuban insurgents then 
fighting against Spain.  Rowan traveled to Cuba by fishing boat from Jamaica, met with 
rebel General Calixto García, who was then badly in need of weapons and ammunition, 
and left Cuba by a small boat to Nassau.  For his efforts, Rowan was awarded the 
Distinguished Service Cross.  But Rowan‟s most powerful legacy came in the form of an 
essay published in 1899 and two subsequent films in 1916 and 1936, all titled “A 
Message to García.”  Although these works took liberties with the historical details of 
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the case, they helped popularize the idea of the lone American spy, working with foreign 
insurgents to advance American interests.
1118
 
 Likewise, in Panama the US gave clandestine support to separatists in order to 
build the Panama Canal.  When Columbia refused to sell the land in question to the US, 
Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a major shareholder in the French company that owned the land, 
collaborated with President Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary of State John Hay, and local 
employees of the company who were willing to lead a Panamanian rebellion.  While 
Bunau-Varilla met with American leaders in Washington in October 1903, the USS 
Nashville was dispatched to Panama.
1119
  Meanwhile, two Army officers, travelling in 
civilian dress, collected detailed military intelligence on Panama and the situation there, 
probably on direct orders from Washington.
1120
  The presence of US forces in Panama 
prevented the Columbian government from quashing the rebellion, and the new republic 
signed a treaty giving the Canal Zone to the US.  Historian Charles D. Ameringer 
contends that the US did not engage in covert actions of this sort again until the Cold 
War, due to the propensity to use the Marine Corps to deal with “troublesome 
situations.”1121  Thus, given their frequent usage in irregular conflicts, it is to the Marines 
and their experience that we must now turn. 
 Throughout its history, the US Marine Corps has fought a large number of small 
wars; that pattern only escalated following the Spanish-American War of 1898.  
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Between 1898 and 1934, the Marine Corps was engaged in active operations every 
single year, and in 1929 more than two thirds of its personnel were on duty outside the 
continental US.
 1122  
In 1935 the various lessons learned from these engagements were 
compiled into a single volume, the Small Wars Operations, revised and republished as 
the Small Wars Manual (SWM) in 1940.
1123
  Like Lawrence, who argued that “irregular 
war is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge,” the Small Wars Manual contends 
that “small wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, 
resourcefulness, and ingenuity.”1124 
The SWM bears a strong resemblance to Callwell‟s work of half a century before, 
from which it likely took its name.
1125
  Like Callwell, the SWM is concerned with 
punitive expeditions and other measure undertaken by a major power to suppress 
lawlessness and insurrection outside the major European population centers.  As with 
Callwell‟s work, the SWM primarily offers insights into counter-guerrilla operations, 
though with a little imagination many of its observations could be utilized by guerrillas 
as well.  The SWM suggests that irregular forces are capable of great effectiveness; it 
cautions, however that the Marine Corps‟s experience “has been gained almost entirely 
in small wars against poorly organized and equipped native irregulars.  With all the 
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practical advantages we enjoyed in those wars, that experience must not lead to an 
underestimate of the modern irregular, supplied with modern arms and equipment.”  It 
goes on to suggest the tactics such a modern irregular might employ: “He will be able to 
concentrate a numerical superiority against isolated detachments at the time and place he 
chooses; as in the past he will have a thorough knowledge of the trails, the country, and 
the inhabitants.”1126 
The SWM contends that “methods of operation must be studied and adapted to 
the psychological reaction they will produce upon the opponents….  Strategy should 
attempt to gain psychological ascendancy.” 1127  This emphasis on psychology was also 
seen in Donovan‟s proposal of 10 June 1941, in which he called for the creation of a 
strategic information service.  In that document he argued that intelligence should be 
analyzed by “specialized trained research officials in the relative scientific fields 
(including… psychological scholars.”  Likewise, he explained that, in addition to the 
traditional tools of military force, “there is another element in modern warfare and that is 
the psychological attack.”1128 
 The SWM identifies a number of the tactics which partisans might employ, 
including threatening lines of communication, blending in with local civilians, and 
collecting intelligence from local sympathizers, who deny such information to the anti-
                                                 
1126
 USMC, Small Wars Manual, 1-6b (p. 8).  Cf. Small Wars Manual, 2-5 (p. 6): “Generally their 
[guerrillas‟] intentions will be to make surprise attacks against the intervening forces in superior numbers 
and against undefended local villages and towns.”   
1127
 USMC, Small Wars Manual, 1-8 (p. 13). 
1128
 Donovan, Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic Information, in Troy, “Donovan‟s 
Original Marching Orders,” 67-68.  
  
267 
partisan forces.
1129
  Considerable space is devoted to the matter of ambushes.  The SWM 
advocates many tactics already discussed: clear lines of retreat, obstacles to block the 
road, and careful observation.
1130
  Although the section on convoys discusses defenses 
against ambushes, few of its details pertain to expected ambush techniques.
1131
  
Moreover, the extent to which OSS was inspired by the ambush tactics in the SWM is 
questionable. Put simply, OSS was not nearly as interested in ambushes as was the US 
Marine Corps.  The version of the two week OSS Basic School offered at the RTU-11 
training camp in Clinton, Maryland, for example, included only four hours of 
paramilitary training, divided evenly between the study of close combat and booby 
traps.
1132
 
 Likewise, the SWM‟s discussion of partisan raiding on supplies requires careful 
attention.  It observes that “frequently irregulars kill and rob peaceful citizens in order to 
obtain supplies which are then secreted in remote strongholds.  Seizure or destruction of 
such sources of supply is an important factor in reducing their means of resistance.”1133  
While the tone clearly betrays the SWM‟s counter-insurgent perspective, it also 
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highlights the utility of captured supplies and the importance of protecting such supplies.  
However, the SWM offers thin comment on the true danger posed by guerrilla attacks on 
supply lines: tying down counter-guerrilla forces, stretching them thin and making them 
ineffective.  The SWM acknowledges that “the greater the number of localities that are 
garrisoned permanently, the less is the mobility of the command; consequently, care 
should be taken to retain sufficient reserves properly located to take up the counter-
offensive at every opportunity.”1134  This suggests an awareness that counterinsurgent 
forces might sometimes be stretched thin, but not an awareness that partisans might 
actively seek to create such a situation.   
Although would-be guerrillas could glean some lessons from the Small Wars 
Manual, its offerings are limited.  This is not only because its tactics are presented from 
the counter-guerrilla perspective, but, more importantly, because the work generally 
assumes static and reactive partisans.  Prescriptions for action by anti-partisan forces 
suggest that they can move about freely and pursue a program of pacification as their 
resources allow; no acknowledgement is made that guerrillas actively seek to disrupt 
such pacification schemes.
1135
  Although the Manual insists that “a careful study must be 
made of the ruses and stratagems practiced by the enemy,” less than a page is devoted to 
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them.
1136
  With so little discussion of guerrilla activities themselves, there was less of 
use to the OSS here than might be expected. 
 
US Customs Service 
 On 14 April 1942, COI activated Detachment 101, a unit designed to conduct 
irregular warfare operations in Asia and commanded by Colonel Carl Eifler.
1137
  When 
arrangements were made for Det. 101‟s creation, there was a small discussion about the 
name: 
“What shall we call the unit?” asked [Garland] Williams [Goodfellow‟s aide].  
“Detachment 1,” replied Eifler.  “It‟s going to be the first outfit into the field.”   
“No,” said Williams.  “We‟ll call it Detachment 101.  We can‟t let the British 
know we only have one unit.”1138 
Eifler was at once an exceptional man and typical of irregular warfare leaders.  He 
managed to join the Army when he was 15 years old, serving for eighteen months at the 
Lighter than Air station in Arcadia, California, and with an aerial photography unit in the 
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Philippines, before being dismissed from the Army for lying about his age.  He then 
attended the Los Angeles Police Academy, graduating in the class of 1926.  He later 
moved to the Newport Beach PD, enlisted in the Army Reserve and eventually spent 
eight years with the US Customs Service.
1139
  Eifler‟s time on the border was arguably 
his most important training for the clandestine war he would later wage with OSS.  
Although he was only one man, Eifler‟s experience is worth considering, both because 
he had lasting influence, as the first commander of one of OSS‟s earliest paramilitary 
formations, and because his experience with US law enforcement provides a case study 
of the kinds of non-military experiences that some OSS members brought to bear on 
their work. 
 Eifler worked out of Calexico, California, more than 100 miles east of San 
Diego.  Shootouts with criminals – armed with rifles, shotguns, and machineguns, more 
firepower than Customs agents carried – were numerous and dangerous.1140  In order to 
catch rum smugglers, Eifler and his colleagues at Customs relied upon informers on the 
Mexican side of the border, a veritable foreign intelligence network.
1141
  In addition, 
Eifler himself operated illegally and under cover on the Mexican side of the border, 
sometimes making use of his command of the German language.
1142
   
On one such operation in 1934, Eifler spotted a number of Japanese in Tijuana.  
His curiosity raised, he tapped his network of informers and discovered that the men 
were Japanese military officers.  Further investigation showed that as many as 400 
                                                 
1139
 Thomas N. Moon and Carl F. Eifler, The Deadliest Colonel (New York: 1975), 2-14.  
1140
 Cf. Carl E. Prince and Mollie Keller, The US Customs Service: A Bicentennial History (Washington, 
1989), 213. 
1141
 Moon and Eifler, Deadliest Colonel, 5, 8. 
1142
 Ibid., 6-7, 12-13. 
  
271 
Japanese personnel were operating in northern Baja California, regularly crossing into 
the US to visit shipyard in California.  In addition, the Japanese personnel occupied an 
abandoned smugglers‟ airfield, not far from the border.  Informants told Eifler that the 
Japanese officers were also engaged in secret negotiations with Mexican officials to 
utilize facilities in Baja in the event of war between the US and Japan.  Eifler took the 
fruit of his investigations to an Army lieutenant colonel in the area, Joseph Stilwell.  
Stilwell, who later served as Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and 
commander of the China-Burma-India Theater, in which capacity he worked with OSS‟s 
Detachment 101, was impressed by Eifler‟s report, but unable to act on it.  The report, in 
one form or another, appears to have made its way to Washington, and the Japanese 
threat in Baja eventually evaporated.
1143
 
This was real-life experience with intelligence, subterfuge, and strategy, 
experience that Eifler gained apart from his service in the Army Reserve, and apart from 
the British, their Empire, or any of the lessons codified by Colin Gubbins.  If OSS made 
little formal use of the knowledge contained in the Marine Corps‟s Small Wars Manual, 
it certainly tapped into the kind of irregular experience that Carl Eifler embodied. 
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British Influence 
Camp X 
OSS eventually grew to have 13,000 personnel with a total budget of $135 
million.
1144
  But in the months prior to the American entry into the war, Donovan faced 
very basic tasks in his effort to build a viable clandestine organization, tasks such as 
training American agents.  A conversation in the summer of 1941 was emblematic of the 
situation.  Meeting with Kenneth Baker, head of the Psychology Division of Donovan‟s 
Research & Analysis Branch, and Dr. J. R. Hayden, former Vice-Governor of the 
Philippines, Donovan told them,  
“I want you to start the schools.” 
“What schools?” 
“The SI [secret intelligence] training schools.” 
“But we don‟t know anything about espionage schools....” 
“Who does?”1145 
The answer to the question was clear enough: the British.  Since the US was not 
officially at war, British training of American personnel would constitute a violation of 
neutrality.
1146
  Such concerns were not enough to derail plans for joint training, but they 
had to be considered.  Thus, it was decided to build a new school in Ontario, Canada, 
outside the United States but close enough for easy access.
1147
  As it turned out, Special 
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Training School 103 would not begin operations until 9 December 1941, two days after 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obviating the need for neutrality.
1148
 
Camp X, as it came to be known, was intended not only to teach the Americans, 
using the SOE training syllabus developed under Gubbins, but also to impress them and 
draw them into the British way of thinking about matters of irregular warfare.
1149
  As 
David Stafford notes, “Gubbins envisaged far more than the training of agents.  He 
wanted to help shape the mental universe of those in the United States who were 
preparing for American entry into the shadow war.”1150  “A really efficient training 
school would impress the Americans,” Colonel Tommy Davies wrote after his visit to 
the US in October 1941.  “It would also provide us with valuable propaganda in 
obtaining their co-operation in the realm of subversive activities.”1151  Another 
assessment from within SOE explained:  
American resentment at England‟s still playing the leading part in this war is 
going to cause difficulties in all spheres.  SOE's best insurance against trouble of 
this sort is the development of close collaboration with OSS.  It will be easy now, 
when we can be of great help to them while they are still floundering in their 
initial difficulties, to get them more or less on the right track.  It might be very 
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difficult indeed, later on, when they have got the bit between their teeth, 
particularly if they are given the impression in these early months, that we have 
gone ahead without bothering about them.
1152
   
Clearly, the American adoption of the British training syllabus was a good thing for the 
British, but it was also a good thing for the Americans, creating a “unity of doctrine and 
effort between OSS and SOE,” something advantageous to both sides.1153  Even in its 
details, Camp X instilled a certain British style; Major Richard M. Brooker, the camp‟s 
first chief instructor and later commander, demanded strict attention to spit and polish.  
Part of this may well have been aimed at overawing the Americans with rarefied British 
custom, but it also instilled a sense of seriousness in the students; Brooker believed an 
attention to detail to be an integral part of intelligence: “if there‟s anything loose in the 
intelligence business, you‟re dead,” he explained.1154   
At the camp American students received three to four weeks of intensive 
training.  Where possible, the course would be tailored to match the future location or 
mission of the students; however, all students received the same basic elements, and 
even variations did not usually represent something heretofore unseen somewhere in the 
SOE training system.
1155
  Students at Camp X were introduced to surveillance, disguises, 
codes, ciphers, invisible inks, propaganda, close-quarters combat, silent killing, 
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recruiting and running agents and adopting a cover, among other exciting topics.
1156
  
Instruction came through a mixture of lectures and hands-on field work. 
By the summer of 1942, Gubbins was beginning to think that Camp X, in its brief 
life, had served its purpose.  In March of that year OSS had established its first training 
facility, Area B, in the Catoctin Mountains of Maryland, near the presidential retreat of 
Shangri-La.
1157
  As the OSS system of schools came on line, Camp X became 
increasingly redundant.  Moreover, British security needs in Latin America – at one time 
a consideration – were diminishing.  However, the view that Camp X had become “an 
expensive and unnecessary luxury,” was not quickly accepted.1158  But in light of the 
scheduled Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 and the subsequent landings on the 
Italian peninsula, guerrilla efforts were stepped up in the Balkans and Gubbins argued 
that, with this new push, the staff at Camp X were needed in Britain more than in 
Canada.  Few SOE recruits were coming out of North America now that the Americans 
had their own schools and Canada had largely been combed for agents.  In May 1943, it 
was decided to close Camp X.  The decision was postponed, due to a late wave of 
Canadian recruits for the Balkans, but in February 1944 the decision was again made to 
shut down the camp and in April its doors were permanently closed.
1159
   
The school had trained more than five hundred students from SOE, SIS, 
COI/OSS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
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many of whom went on to train others in the ungentlemanly arts.
1160
  Among Camp X‟s 
graduates were men like Lieutenant Colonel Garland Williams, who had directed the 
New York Bureau of Narcotics, served in the Army and joined COI in the autumn of 
1941.  Having been trained by SOE at Camp X, he returned to the States to oversee the 
entire training program for SA/G.
1161
 
 
Influence beyond Camp X 
Even after the closure of Camp X, the British continued to influence OSS.  This 
influence was continued most concretely through the work of British instructors who 
served at OSS schools.  Fairbairn was among those who moved to the United States, 
where, one historian explains, he “made a lasting impression on just about everyone he 
met, including OSS, who got him on more or less permanent loan from the British.
1162
   
Major Brooker, who served as Camp X‟s first chief instructor and commanding 
officer from August 1942 until March 1943, was widely credited with being the single 
largest contributor to the school‟s overall success.1163  Though he was “very aggressive 
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and sometimes not too diplomatic,” gaining “many detractors within OSS,” Brooker also 
gained many supporters and was frequently described as a natural salesman and “a 
brilliant and convincing lecturer.”1164  After leaving Camp X, Brooker was seconded to 
OSS as Advisory Director of Training.  One official history explains: 
His contribution to the subsequent reorganizations and the consolidation of 
training programs was very important – if not the determining factor....  He 
visualized a flexible, yet standardized, type of training to accommodate all 
needs....  The plan was solidly founded on the British experience.  OSS had no 
tradition or practical experience in the field at this time.
1165
 
As another history explains, “during 1943, S&T continued to lean heavily on the British 
for assistance by sending potential instructors to British schools and by borrowing 
instructors from the British for varying periods of time.”1166  The OSS Maritime School, 
located in Area D, a wooded section of the Potomac across from Quantico, began its 
work in February 1942 under a British officer on loan from the Royal Navy.
1167
 
In addition to the British instructors who served at OSS schools, the OSS‟s 
official History of the Schools & Training Branch explains that almost all of OSS own 
instructors first “trained in the Canadian SOE school near Toronto [Camp X] in a month-
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long course…  The Canadian school furnished lecture syllabi which S&T adapted for 
use at all the training areas.”1168  The course of instruction for OSS Basic School, 
training common to both intelligence and special operations personnel, covered 19 
topics, of which 17 unambiguously correspond to major topics of the SOE syllabus; 
moreover, only one major section of the SOE syllabus – operations, including passive 
resistance and subversion of troops – is not covered by the corresponding OSS syllabus.  
In other words, the two are virtually identical.
1169
  Likewise, among the archival papers 
of the OSS can be found hand-written notes which clearly follow, sometimes verbatim, 
the SOE lecture outlines.
1170
 
In addition, the British supplied OSS‟s earliest classroom demonstration devices, 
including “incendiary pencils, fog-signals, lead delays, limpets, escape files, concealed 
compasses and models of ships and aircraft.”1171  In addition, when Camp X was closed 
in the autumn of 1944, its entire stock of teaching aids and equipment was passed to 
OSS for use in the growing OSS school system.  
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American Affinity for the British 
 In one of his earliest statements of guerrilla policy, Donovan argued to Roosevelt 
in a memorandum of 22 December 1941 that guerrilla warfare should have two facets: 
“1. Setting up of small groups working as bands under definite leaders.  2. The 
establishment of guerrilla forces military in nature, in order to secure cohesion and 
successfully carry out a plan of campaign.”1172  In the same memorandum Donovan 
expresses his concern that “the preparation and conditioning of those people and those 
territories where the issue is to be fought” has been neglected, suggesting that the 
partisan bands mentioned in his first point would consist primarily of indigenous 
resistance forces.
1173
  As the War Report of the OSS explains, from its inception, “SA/G 
was to operate in support of local area commands.  Consequently, the Washington 
headquarters did not have direct operational control over its missions in the field.”  
Moreover, “the organization and administration of the Branch was along military lines 
and its first personnel were drawn from the armed services, principally the Army.”1174  
In these two points we see the influence of SOE and Colin Gubbins, who argued 
repeatedly for the use of local forces and their militarization (if not strict inclusion 
within the military).
1175
   
 The remainder of the same memo of 22 December offers views which had been 
articulated by a number of thinkers, including, but not limited, to Colin Gubbins.  
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Donovan writes, for example, that “it is unnecessary to stress that modern large-sized 
armies are greatly dependent on roads, railways, and signal communications, and the 
creation of supply and munitions dumps….  These communications constitute a 
desirable target both of the military and sabotage type.”  Likewise, he argues that “the 
whole art of guerrilla warfare lies in striking the enemy where he least expects it and yet 
where he is most vulnerable.”1176  Considering his extensive contact with SOE, the most 
plausible explanation is that Donovan received these views, at least in part, through the 
hands of Colin Gubbins.
1177
 
 This emphasis on both local populations and the need for militarily valuable 
partisans may also be found in the training curriculum for OSS‟s Operational Groups 
(OG‟s), units of foreign language-speaking soldiers created on 23 December 1942.1178  
Their stated mission was  
to create Guerilla Units capable of operating in various occupied countries; these 
units are recruited from the various nationals and first generation Americans….  
They will be militarily organized, disciplined and trained to go into the country 
of their origin to organize, and instruct, local resistance groups into effective 
Guerrilla units.
1179
   
Although the methods of the OG units differed from those of conventional military 
forces, that their work was directly complementary was made clear: these units existed 
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“to harass the occupying forces; by so doing they would render effective assistance to 
the main effort.”1180 
 In addition, the basic shape of OSS training followed the British model.  
American agents attended a Preliminary School for about two weeks, where they learned 
fieldcraft and weapons, and at which their taste for alcohol was carefully observed.  Next 
they moved to two weeks at a Basic School, the American version of SOE‟s Paramilitary 
Schools, where students practiced sabotage and raids.  Then it was off to an Advanced 
School (equivalent to SOE‟s Finishing Schools), where they learned to operate under 
cover, and finally to Parachute School.  Additional OSS schools focused on maritime 
operations, industrial sabotage, and particular overseas locations, filled the role of SOE‟s 
Specialist Schools.
1181
 
 Like their British counterparts, American students of sabotage also studied the 
basics of intelligence.  As one OSS history explains,  
in COI, the tendency for [intelligence and operations] to find considerable value 
in each others‟ training courses had already appeared.  This tendency probably 
can be ascribed to the influence of the British SOE training.  It will be 
remembered that the British SOE combined in one organization both para-
military and intelligence functions…. OSS men trained in British schools, either 
in Canada or England, received a rounded picture of operations in modern war 
and returned to OSS imbued with the idea that OSS students should receive 
training in the many facets of subversive operations.
1182
 
While Britain had a dedicated intelligence organization – the Secret Intelligence Service 
– SOE nevertheless continued to straddle the line between intelligence and military 
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operations, occupying a bureaucratic gray zone that remains difficult to demarcate even 
in the present day.  This ambiguity was in turn inherited by OSS and manifested in its 
training, which frequently united intelligence and special operations. 
 
Relative Influence 
 OSS and its agents were certainly influenced by a variety of experiences and 
ideas pertaining to irregular warfare.  The War Report of the OSS explains: 
The problem of training personnel for… OSS was a complex one….  There was 
no precedent in America for such an undertaking and it was necessary at first to 
piece together various fragments of seemingly relevant knowledge from other 
agencies of the Government, to borrow instruction techniques from the British, 
and to adapt certain technical aspects of orthodox military training to the 
probable conditions under which guerrilla units and resistance organizers might 
operate.
1183
 
As the aforementioned cases demonstrate, the unprecedented nature of OSS‟s work has 
been exaggerated, just as SOE‟s has.  The War Report‟s own admission that orthodox 
military training had some bearing on guerrilla problems acknowledges, to some extent, 
that past models could be utilized. 
The above passage from the War Report also highlights the fact that the influence 
upon OSS was not monocausal: it included the British example as well as American 
sources, both civilian and military.  Thus, the question is not which of these played a role 
in shaping American thinking on irregular warfare – they all did – but which played the 
preeminent role.  While individual Americans were influenced by their experiences of 
places like the US-Mexican border, it is difficult to make the case that, with regard to 
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doctrine and tactics, America‟s clandestine warriors were more influenced by their own 
background than by British tutelage.   
Historian Rhondri Jefferys-Jones observes: “It could be argued that, while the 
Americans did have a tradition, they kept on forgetting about it and having to start from 
scratch, while the British remembered intelligence lessons from the past.”1184  Jefferys-
Jones argues that this line of thinking exaggerates the extent of an ongoing British 
clandestine tradition; instead, he contends, British secret services only managed to get 
themselves organized in the late 1930s, just in time for war.
1185
  Jefferys-Jones‟s 
argument pertains more to intelligence than sabotage or guerrilla warfare, but it is an 
accurate description of GS(R) and Section D.  Nevertheless, it is worth making an 
additional distinction: the US had a tradition of irregular warfare but failed, by and large, 
to draw upon it when the time came.  Although Britain stood in danger of also ignoring 
its own irregular tradition, it was recovered and codified through the efforts of J. C. F. 
Holland and Colin Gubbins. 
 
The JEDBURGH Teams 
 An appropriate coda to the story of joint Anglo-American training in clandestine 
comes in the form of the JEDBURGH teams.  The idea of the teams apparently came from 
Gubbins himself, who referred to them as “my pet project,” and proposed in July 1942 
“the dropping behind of the enemy lines, in cooperation with an Allied invasion of the 
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Continent, of small parties of officers and men to raise and arm the civilian population to 
carry out guerrilla activities.”1186  The concept received further consideration at the 
SPARTAN exercises conducted in March 1943 in southern England, war games designed 
to simulate and study plans for the Allied re-occupation of Western Europe.  Eleven 
SOE teams were dropped behind enemy lines in this exercise, and managed to contact 
and organize the simulated resistance cells with considerable success and limited 
expenditure.  The exercise convinced the British Army that SOE could provide reliable 
support, not only in occupied Europe, but also in the process of liberating it.
1187
 
In their final form, the JEDBURGHs consisted of three members: an SOE or OSS 
officer, a French officer, and an American, British, or French radio operator.  They 
would be parachuted into France immediately following the Operation OVERLORD 
landings at Normandy in June 1944, to support the French resistance and the Allied 
agents already in place.  Thus, members were required not only to be of excellent 
intelligence and skilled with small arms, but also fluent in French.
1188
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 Although all these men were in uniform, unlike many SOE and OSS agents, they 
function in accordance with the well-established doctrine of organizing and aiding local 
forces.  As Gubbins had written in 1939, “The culminating state of guerilla warfare 
should always be to produce in the field large formations of guerillas, well-armed and 
well-trained, which are able to take a direct part in the fighting by attacks on suitable 
hostile formations and objects in direct conjunction with the operations of regular 
troops.”1189  The JEDBURGH teams were designed to help do just that.  As the Secret War 
Report of the OSS explains, they were “to help in the coordination of resistance activities 
with the needs of the invading armies, to train men at new resistance centers following 
the landings and to direct the delivery of additional supplies by air.”1190  Likewise, 
Gubbins observed in 1939 that  
it may… frequently be advantageous to appoint certain serving army officers for 
duty with guerillas… to serve as specially qualified staff officers or assistants to 
guerilla commanders.  In such cases, it will often happen that the serving officer 
works hand and glove with the titular leader, the latter, owing to his local 
connections, etc., ensuring the cohesion of his guerillas, while the former 
supplies to the partnership the technical knowledge necessary for the most 
effective direction and co-ordination of the guerillas‟ operations.1191 
That is precisely what the JEDBURGHs did, organizing and arming recruits, participating 
in operations, liaising with British and American forces, and advising resistance leaders, 
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but leaving command of resistance operations in French hands.
1192
  Indeed, the 
JEDBURGH teams themselves were placed under the operational control of the General 
Staff of the French Forces of the Interior (État-Major des Forces Françaises de 
l'Intérieur or EMFFI).
1193
 
The JEDBURGHs received a pared-down version of the usual training received by 
SOE and OSS agents.  This included parachuting and making contact with friendly 
elements (usually in the form of a “reception committee”), as well as radio operation, 
close combat, weapons training (including foreign weapons), and demolitions.  In 
addition, JEDBURGH training placed special emphasis on “preventing demolition of main 
bridges, etc.” by retreating German forces, a task of particular concern in the period 
immediately following the Allied invasion.
1194
  Omitted were those topics pertaining to 
operating under cover, since the JEDBURGHs would land in uniform a relatively short 
distance in advance of the Allied forces.  Some training was received by American 
elements of the teams before they were sent to Britain, where training was completed at 
Milton Hall, Peterborough.
1195
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 In total, ninety-three JEDBURGH teams were parachuted into Europe.
1196
  Their 
activities there have been well recorded, though the way they were used and the value of 
their operations remain open to debate.
1197
  As one of the end products of Special 
Operations Executive‟s doctrine and training, however, they are undeniably the product 
of the lessons codified by Colin Gubbins. 
                                                 
1196
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(Edinburgh, 2010); John K. Singlaub, Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Century 
(New York, 1991).  The debate about whether or not the JEDBURGHs were dropped into France too late 
was well known in the decades after the Second World War.  Gubbins wrote to Foot in 1964, “I am in 
entire agreement with what most of the Jedburghs said, that they were dropped too late, or could anyway 
have been dropped more quickly early after D Day.  Unfortunately these operations went out of my 
control, as you know, when Koenieg took over Emmfi about 1
st
 July.  In spite of this I sent for A.D.E. 
shortly after and told him that my pet project, the Jedburghs[,] had been absolutely wasted by not being 
pushed in at once.  Although I no longer had control of them.  However, as I say I do not mind your 
criticism in the slightest except that I did my best to get them in long before they actually went” (Gubbins 
to Foot, 31 January 1964, 1-2, Gubbins papers 3/2/57, IWM). 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The value of sabotage and subversion has been hotly debated.  As noted in the 
introduction, some historians, such as John Keegan, have concluded that that SOE was 
expensive and ineffective.
1198
  Assessments of Anglo-American clandestine relations 
have likewise sometimes been scathing.  Anthony Cave Brown – no fan of Bill Donovan 
– argues that at the end of the war “nobody… stepped forward from the grimy London 
headquarters of SIS to speak well of Donovan.”1199 
 When attempting an overall assessment of the value of SOE and its work, it is 
necessary to weigh the costs against the benefits.  The Second World War was a massive 
conflict, with millions of men under arms and nearly unimaginable quantities of war 
materiel expended.  Casualties give some sense of scale: Britain lost 264,000 
servicemen, the British Empire 125,000, and the United States 300,000.  The numbers of 
German, Japanese, and Soviet servicemen and women killed – not to mention civilians – 
runs into the millions for each country.
1200
  In a war of such staggering scale, the 
clandestine services were never very large.  As of 29 May 1944 the number of SOE 
personnel in occupied territories stood at only 1,599 in Europe and 352 in the Far East, 
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less than 2,000 total.
1201
  The entire force of SOE around the globe on that date consisted 
of only 1,847 officers, 6,471 other ranks and 1,558 FANYs, a total of 9,876 men and 
women.
1202
 
The materiel consumed by SOE was quite small; the sum total of its industrial 
sabotage attacks in France utilized about 3,000 lbs. of explosives, the weight of a single 
large bomb dropped by the RAF.  Nearly 100 factories, mines, and other industrial 
installations were damaged or destroyed by these sabotage efforts.
1203
  Likewise, SOE‟s 
use of the resources of other services was slim.  In 1941 a mere 0.13% of RAF Bomber 
Command‟s sorties were for SOE purposes.  That proportion grew as the war 
progressed, and by 1945, when Bomber Command flew more sorties for SOE than in the 
previous four years combined, that proportion had risen to 11.47%.  Still, for the five 
year period from 1941 through 1945, only 4.13% of Bomber Command‟s sorties were 
for SOE.
1204
  Any argument based on what might have been should be treated with 
caution, but it is difficult to make the case that this small use of resources could have 
made a substantial contribution to the war effort in other hands.
1205
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Meanwhile, there is ample evidence that the forces of resistance and the 
clandestine services that supported them made a significant contribution to the ultimate 
Allied victory.  The British Chiefs of Staff estimated that 14 German divisions were tied 
down conducting internal security operations in Yugoslavia due to partisan activities.  
Another three or four divisions in Albania “were contained by partisans only.”1206  The 
Chiefs concluded that “S.O.E. activity forced the Germans to retain considerable forces 
in areas of no immediate military value to us.  These forces could have been used 
elsewhere and were contained by economical expenditure of effort.”1207  The Supreme 
Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) concluded that “without the 
organisation, communications, material, training and leadership which SOE supplied 
(with the assistance of OSS…), „resistance‟ would have been of no military value.  In 
DENMARK and HOLLAND, indeed, there might have been no resistance at all but for the 
work of SOE.”1208  Case studies of clandestine operations in two areas – Normandy and 
Burma – highlight the contribution made by resistance forces and their Allied 
interlocutors, both British and American. 
 
Normandy 
Both SOE and OSS had agents in France prior to the Allied landings at 
Normandy on 6 June 1944.  These men and women, augmented by JEDBURGH teams and 
                                                 
1206
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OSS Operational Groups (OGs) immediately after the landings, helped arm, organize, 
and lead members of the resistance.  OSS alone dropped 20,000 tons of weapons, 
ammunition, and supplies to French partisans.
1209
  On the night of 5/6 June, the BBC 
broadcast the code phrase, “The wine is red.”  It was the signal for the resistance to 
strike.
1210
  These men and women proceeded to conduct sabotage with the primary 
purpose of preventing German reinforcements from reaching the beachhead.  As a result, 
Allied forces were able to break out of their initial positions and push deep into France. 
Nearly a thousand rail lines in France were cut by partisans the night of 5/6 June 
1944.
1211
  More than two thousand additional rail lines were cut over the course of the 
next three weeks.
1212
  SOE estimated that, on average, German forces south of the River 
Loire were delayed two days in their move north to Normandy.  In some cases the delay 
was much longer.  The 2
nd
 SS Panzer Division was delayed two weeks as it fought 
partisans on its journey from Toulouse in the south to St. Lô, in Normandy.  In the 
central French region of Corrèze, 5,000 German troops had to be deployed against 
partisans in June 1944 – 5,000 soldiers who otherwise would have been sent to 
Normandy.  The following month the Germans had to redeploy elements of the 9
th
 
Armored Division and 157
th
 Infantry Division against resistance fighters in the Vercors 
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plateau in eastern France, and the 11
th
 Panzer Division against partisans along the 
Dordogne River in southwest France.
1213
 
Even after the initial Allied breakout from Normandy, the resistance continued to 
show its worth.  One column of 20,000 German troops fleeing from southwest France 
found that it could not travel directly east, as it wanted, since partisans controlled the 
roads beyond Poitiers.  Instead, it was forced to turn north into the Loire valley, where 
18,000 of its number were taken prisoner.
1214
 
One might justly ask to what extent SOE or OSS were responsible for these 
successes.  “How much Resistance was mobilized by the „Jedburghs,‟ which would 
otherwise have been ineffective?” Mackenzie asks.  “There is no means of measuring 
this: but practically every „Jedburgh‟ which was in the field for any length of time found 
much to do on the lines intended for it – reconciling factions, suggesting targets, 
bringing supplies, instilling good guerilla doctrine.  They were certainly a reinforcement 
to Resistance out of proportion to their numbers.”1215  In addition to delaying German 
movements, SHAEF noted that organized resistance also aided regular forces  
by disrupting enemy telecommunications…, by enabling allied formations to 
advance with greater speed through being able to dispense with many normal 
military precautions, e.g. flank protection and mopping up, by furnishing military 
intelligence, [and] by providing organised groups of men in liberated areas able 
to undertake static guard duties at short notice and without further training.
1216
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Moreover, SHAEF recognized the larger role played by the resistance when “setting the 
oppressed peoples at loggerheads with the occupying power.”  This opposition not only 
made it difficult for the Germans to exploit fully their conquered territories, but it also 
fostered the will to resist.  “This morale factor was, of course, greatly enhanced by the 
feeling of support from and contact with the Allies….  As resistance met with success, 
national self-respect and confidence were restored, and the desire and ability to resume 
responsibilities after liberation revived.”1217  This is no small accomplishment 
considering that SOE was never as large as a single infantry division.
1218
 
 Gubbins‟s vision of subversive forces working in close conjunction with regular 
forces was certainly achieved in France.  In the days following Germany‟s defeat, 
General Dwight Eisenhower, overall commander of Allied forces in northwestern 
Europe, wrote a letter of thanks to Colin Gubbins.  In it, Eisenhower observed that “in no 
previous war, and in no other theatre during this war, have resistance forces been so 
closely harnessed to the main military effort.”1219 
 
                                                                                                                                                
France.  General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, who commanded the invasion of southern France, Operation 
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Burma 
The Empire of Japan invaded British Burma in January 1942, overrunning the 
entire country in a few months.  However, members of the native Burma Rifles who 
either did not retreat to India with the main British force, or who returned to Burma after 
having done so, formed the core of organized resistance.  Among such resistance forces, 
the ethnic hill peoples – particularly the Karens and Kachins, though others as well – 
predominated.
1220
  These men formed themselves into guerrilla units that not only 
harassed the Japanese by attacking patrols and supply columns but also rescued downed 
Allied airmen.
1221
 
SOE‟s Burma Section, which worked closely with the Karen forces in 
southeastern Burma, was led by John Ritchie Gardiner, a man who had worked in 
forestry and served on the Municipal Council of Rangoon before the war.  As historian 
Louis Allen explains, the Burma Section‟s goal was “to contact nuclei of local resistance 
against the occupying enemy force, assess their potential, arm them if it was considered 
that an armed rising would assist the returning British, and lead and control the rising 
when it occurred.” 1222  The Karens represented just such a local resistance. 
Several months before the Japanese invasion, Noel Stevenson, an Assistant 
Superintendent of the Burma Frontier Service, began organizing and training guerrillas.  
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Major Hugh Seagrim was recruited by Stevenson and organized a guerrilla force of 
Karens, built around a core of fifty-five policemen.  By April 1942 Seagrim, now living 
and dressing like a Karen, and his guerrilla force in the hills were totally cut off from the 
British Army, a problem only rectified when SOE was able to drop a radio and agent to 
him in October the following year.  So much did the Japanese fear Seagrim and his 
Karen force – and their proximity to the roads and rail lines connecting Rangoon to 
Mandalay – that a punitive expedition (tōbatsu) was launched into the Karen Hills.  To 
end the egregious violence against innocent civilians, Seagrim voluntarily gave himself 
up and was executed by a Japanese court.  However, his Karen guerrillas remained in 
contact with SOE and also with elements of the collaborationist Burma National Army, 
including its Karen battalion, which became resentful of the Japanese and their false 
promises of independence.
1223
 
In 1945 the British XIV Army returned to Burma and, after the capture of 
Mandalay, began pursuing Japanese forces southward.  Historian Charles Cruickshank 
describes the problem the geography imposed, and the solution SOE and the Karen 
resisters offered: 
The Irrawaddy and Sittang Rivers run parallel in the centre of the country, north 
to south….  The Irrawaddy is flanked to the west by the Arakan Yomas Range, 
and the Sittang to the east by the Karen Hills.  It was down these valleys that the 
XIV Army proposed to drive the Japanese forces; but since the mountains 
precluded outflanking movements on any great scale, the enemy would have 
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every opportunity of making an orderly withdrawal, and re-forming troops….  
[SOE] was to make that orderly withdrawal impossible.
1224
   
“I gave the word, „Up the Karens!‟” General William Slim, commander of XIV Army 
recalled in his memoirs.
1225
  And up the Karens rose.  Operation CHARACTER deployed 
teams of British officers and nearly 12,000 irregulars, all in radio communication with 
SOE.
1226
  Over 12,000 weapons were supplied to these Karen levies by air drop.
1227
  
Following the long-standing British practice of empowering traditional Karen 
leadership, these forces were raised through local Karen chiefs.
1228
  Four Special Groups 
– north to south, Walrus, Otter, Hyena, Mongoose – gathered numerous sub-parties, 
making life difficult for the Japanese.  Walrus alone raised more than 2,000 men in its 
first three weeks on the ground.  General Slim recalled: “Japanese, driving hard through 
the night down jungle roads… ran into ambush after ambush; bridges were blown ahead 
of them, their foraging parties massacred, their sentries stalked, their staff cars shot 
up.”1229  The Karen guerrillas were so effective that in the month of June 1945 they 
inflicted more casualties than the vastly larger regular forces of XIV Army.  Total 
casualties inflicted by CHARACTER were 10,964 enemy dead, 644 wounded and 18 
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captured.
1230
  SOE‟s total losses in Burma were a mere 303 officers, NCOs, and native 
levies.
1231
  In addition to its own operations, CHARACTER supplied valuable intelligence 
to the RAF; by the time Allied forces were closing in on Rangoon, CHARACTER was 
supplying virtually all of the targeting data used by the RAF‟s 224th Group, indeed, more 
high-value targets than it had assets to attack.  So effective was this intelligence that 
plans were made such that when Malaya was invaded a single squadron would be set 
aside for the sole purpose of hitting mobile targets reported by SOE.
1232
 
 The Karens were not the only people in Burma to resist the Japanese occupation; 
the Kachins in the north of the country did the same.  Like the Karens, most Kachins 
returned to their villages after the initial British defeat, to conduct guerrilla warfare and 
await the British return.
1233
  Richard Dunlop observes that the Japanese made the 
mistake of believing that they “could terrorize the Kachin mountain warriors into 
making peace by carrying out ferocious attacks on the… villages.  Fire, rape, and the 
mutilation of young boys would intimidate the Kachins into surrender,” or so the 
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Japanese thought.
1234
  Instead, the Japanese earned for themselves the wrath of a 
fearsome people with a long history of violence, who inhabit one of the most 
inhospitable corners of the world.   
 Though the British Army did not return in large numbers until 1945, as early as 
January 1943, British officers were infiltrated into Burma to organize the Kachins into 
units known as Kachin Levies.
1235
  Crucially, these Levies defended Fort Hertz, an 
obscure outpost in the extreme northern corner of Burma, of almost no consequence 
except that it had an airfield.  It was from Fort Hertz that the Allies were able to infiltrate 
men and equipment further into Japanese-occupied Burma.
1236
  Beginning in earnest in 
the spring of 1944, the British organized a number of Kachin units, with a total strength 
of 3,000 men.   However, in the autumn of 1944 SOE withdrew from the area, at the 
instance of General Joseph Stillwell, the regional American commander, who resented 
the British presence.
1237
 
 OSS sent its first paramilitary unit, Carl Eifler‟s Detachment 101, to northern 
Burma, where it operated under Stilwell.  Detachment 101 worked with the local Kachin 
population, organizing guerrilla forces and rescuing downed airmen.
1238
  The American 
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Kachin Rangers, recruited by Detachment 101, eventually numbered 10,200 men.
1239
  
They provided intelligence to Stilwell‟s American and Chinese forces as they worked to 
capture the Japanese garrison at Myitkyina, an operation in which the British Kachin 
Levies also participated.
1240
 
 Like the Karens, the Kachins were praised by their Western colleagues for their 
skill in irregular warfare.  “As guerrilla soldiers they were ideal,” Colonel William R. 
Peers, who eventually commanded Detachment 101, would recall.  “The difficulties of 
following invisible tracks through jungle or crossing towering peaks they looked upon as 
a natural contest.  Weapons they understood as a fact of life; demolitions were not 
beyond their powers.”1241  Kachin resistance forces not only supplied intelligence and 
launched sabotage missions against Japanese targets, but also played a vital role by 
controlling the jungle and securing its trails, allowing Stilwell to move his forces 
unmolested.  The Kachin Rangers alone were responsible for 5,428 known enemy dead 
and possibly as many as 10,000 more.  In the course of the war they destroyed 51 
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bridges and 277 enemy vehicles and rescued 574 Allied personnel from the jungles of 
Burma.
1242
 
 As with the war in Europe, the contribution made by resistance forces in Burma, 
supported by SOE and OSS weapons and coordination, was substantial, even when 
considering the massive scale of modern industrial warfare.  General Slim, commander 
of the XIV Army, believed the resistance played a significant role. 
Our own levies led by their British officers were a most valuable asset and had a 
real influence on operations….  They could not and were not expected to stand 
up to the Japanese in pitched battles but they could and did in places harry them 
unmercifully….  They had an excellent jitter effect on the Japanese, who were 
compelled to lock up troops to guard against attacks on the lines of 
communication.
1243
 
This was precisely the role Colin Gubbins had envisioned in 1939: threatening 
communications and forcing the enemy to spread himself thin, thereby diluting the 
power of his conventional capabilities. 
 
Gubbins after the War 
 In spite of the major successes of SOE in France, Burma, and elsewhere, the 
organization was disbanded in early 1946, with any leftover assets transferred to SIS.
1244
  
Gubbins, an acting major general by the end of the conflict, was unwanted by the British 
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Army, which had more generals than it needed, many of them with far more experience 
commanding in the field than Gubbins, whose work was entirely secret.  Lord Selborne 
fought hard to have Gubbins‟s rank made substantial, so that he could retire with a major 
general‟s pay, but the War Office refused to grant any exceptions: he could keep the 
rank as an honorific, but would retire with the pay of his substantial rank of colonel.
1245
  
The simple fact was that Britain was on the brink of bankruptcy.  On 1 February 1946, 
Gubbins wrote to Selborne, thanking him for his efforts.  The letter reveals Gubbins‟s 
mixed feelings about the situation. 
 I know that the War Office decision is wrong, both ethically and on the 
practical basis of my past career, the appointments I have held, my age etc., 
without taking into account my service in SOE, but I bear no grudge whatever 
against them & am only sorry that they can be so stupid. 
 I am retiring without any feelings of bitterness.  I feel it a real privilege to 
have been in SOE for five years, & know that I was thereby enabled to do far 
more for our country than if I had been a substantive major-general in any other 
appointment whatever, and that there are not many people as lucky as that.
1246
 
Having been knighted in 1944 as a Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. 
George, Gubbins was, however, promoted to Knight Commander in the New Year‟s 
Honours of 1946.
1247
 
 If Gubbins was virtually forgotten by the bureaucrats of the British government, 
the same could not be said of foreign governments.  In addition to the Order of St. 
Stanislaus (3
rd
 class) he received from the White Russian government, Gubbins was 
awarded the Croix de Vaillance by Poland in 1940 and a raft of honors after the end of 
the Second World War: the Légion d‟Honneur (Officer) and Croix de Guerre from 
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France, the Order of Leopold (Grand Officer) and Croix de Guerre from Belgium, the 
Royal Order of St. Olaf from Norway, the Order of Merit from the United States, the 
Order of the White Lion from Czechoslovakia, Order of the Dannebrog (1
st
 class) from 
Denmark, the Order of Orange Nassau (Grand Officer) from the Netherlands, as well as 
Greek and Italian awards.  In his case, the British government waived the usual rule 
limiting British soldiers to four foreign awards.
1248
 
 The transition back to civilian life was not easy for Sir Colin, who had been in 
the army since 1914.  With only a colonel‟s retirement pay, he sought employment.  He 
tried business management, working at a rubber company and then a textile 
manufacturer.  He appears to have been successful, but not outstandingly so, and his 
heart was not in it.  His real interests lay elsewhere.  His great passion of the post-war 
era was the Special Force Club, an organization he founded for former members of SOE; 
its benevolent fund cared for the widows and orphans of those who had served and not 
returned.
1249
  Before agreeing to write a preface or forward to an author‟s book, Gubbins 
would always request that the author or publisher make a small donation to the Club‟s 
benevolent fund.
1250
 
 In 1950 Sir Colin remarried; his new bride was the widow of a Norwegian pilot 
who had died flying for the RAF.  The matter of her citizenship highlights the disregard 
Gubbins was shown after the war; when she applied for British citizenship, she was told 
that her husband, who had been born in Japan while his father was on consular service, 
                                                 
1248
 Philip Rea to Selborne, 30 May 1946, Papers of 3
rd
 Earl Selborne, MS Eng. Hist. c. 1002, fol. 48, 
Bodleian Library; Wilkinson and Astley, Gubbins and SOE, 238. 
1249
 Wilkinson and Astley, Gubbins and SOE, 238-39, 241. 
1250
 Gubbins papers 3/2, IWM. 
  
303 
qualified as a British subject, but not a British citizen, a status that was only created 
under the British Nationality Act of 1948.  (The Home Office unhelpfully suggested that, 
since Sir Colin‟s father had been born in British India, he might be able to claim Indian 
citizenship.)  Sir Colin had to apply for British citizenship before his new bride could 
claim the same.
1251
 
 In spite of such difficulties, he settled into and profoundly enjoyed his new 
married life.  He took up gardening and, feeling the deprivation of never having attended 
university, took to intellectual and aesthetic pursuits, reading widely, visiting art 
galleries, and attending the ballet.  He eventually returned to his Scottish roots and 
retired to the Isle of Harris; he served as colonel in command of the local Home Guard 
from 1952 to 1956.  On 23 January, 1976, he was commission the Deputy Lieutenant of 
the Isles Area, Western Isles, an honor he deeply valued.  Two weeks later, on 6 
February, suffered a heart attack, and died on 11 February.
1252
 
  
 Far from disappearing, insurgency and guerrilla warfare have become common in 
the decades following the Second World War.  So long as they remain, the study of SOE 
and OSS likewise maintain their relevance.  For historians and policymakers interested 
in understanding these organizations and the ideas they utilized, Colin Gubbins is 
indispensable.  As Lord Selborne observed, “It is not too much to say that the 
Organisation over which he presided was mainly his creation.”1253  In that creative 
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capacity he built a clandestine service which embodied the lessons of his own life and of 
the British military experience around the globe. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE ART OF GUERILLA WARFARE 
 
General Principles. 
Object. 
1. The object of guerilla warfare is to harass the enemy in every way possible 
within all the territory he holds to such an extent that he is eventually incapable either of 
embarking on a war or of continuing one that may already have commenced.  The sphere 
of action should include his home country, and also, in certain circumstances, such 
neutral countries as he uses as a source of supply.  This object is achieved by compelling 
the enemy to disperse his forces in order to guard his flank, his communications, his 
detachments, supply depots, etc., against the attacks of guerrillas, and thus so to weaken 
his main armies that the conduct of a campaign becomes impossible. 
2. There are three types of guerrilla warfare: -- 
(a) The activities of individuals, or of small groups working by stealth on acts of 
sabotage. 
(b) The action of larger groups working as a band under a nominated leader, and 
employment of military tactics, weapons etc., to assist in the achievement of their 
object, which is usually of a destructive nature. 
(c) The operations of large guerilla forces, whose strength necessitates a certain 
degree of military organization in order to secure their cohesion and to make and 
carry out effectively a plan of campaign. 
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3. The type of guerilla warfare that can be carried out in any particular territory is 
dependent on the local conditions at the time, as explained later.  The greater, however, 
should always include the less – i.e., where circumstances are favourable to the 
employment of large guerilla forces, they will also permit the action of partisan bands 
and of saboteurs.  Where conditions are unsuitable to large scale operations, the action of 
partisan bands should be supported by that of saboteurs. 
4. The culminating state of guerilla warfare should always be to produce in the field 
large formations of guerillas, well-armed and well-trained, which are able to take a direct 
part in the fighting by attacks on suitable hostile formations and objects in direct 
conjunction with the operations of regular troops.  It may well be, however, that in the 
early days of the war, guerilla activities must, owing to the enemy‟s strength and lack of 
support of the local population, be limited to acts of sabotage. [2]
1254
 As the war 
progresses, and as the enemy‟s hold begins to weaken owing to successful sabotage, to 
war wariness of the enemy‟s troops, and as the inhabitants cease to be overawed, 
conditions will become ripe for the formation of partisan bands. 
 These bands will, at the commencement, act singly or in small local 
concentrations.  By their audacity and apparent immunity from hostile counter-measures, 
they must then fan the flame of revolt until circumstances become favourable for the 
organization of large groups of bands, working under central leadership on a semi-
military basis, necessitating a considerable degree of co-ordination as regards 
arrangements for supplies, munitions, collection of military intelligence, etc. 
                                                 
1254
 Numbers in brackets refer to original page breaks.  Insofar as possible, the original formatting has been 
preserved. 
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5. There are two main points in this connection to bear in mind: -- 
(a) To obtain the maximum effect from guerilla warfare it is necessary to make use 
of all three types.  Therefore, a careful study must be made as early as possible of 
the territories concerned, so as to determine for what methods of warfare each 
territory is suited, and to make the necessary preparations in advance.  It is an 
extravagant waste of effort and opportunity if, for example, in an area suited for 
large scale guerilla operations, activities are, for want of preparation and 
forethought, limited to the uncoordinated actions of partisan bands and saboteurs. 
Further, it must be remembered that the enemy will institute counter-measures as 
soon as guerilla activities against him commence.  If these activities are on a small scale, 
it may be relatively easy for him not only to suppress them temporarily, but also, by that 
action, to prevent their resuscitation on either that or a larger scale.  It has been shown 
countless times in history that where firm enemy action has been taken in time against 
small beginnings, such action has always met with success.  To counter this, therefore, it 
is again important that the commencement of guerilla operations should be on the 
highest and widest scale that the area concerned will permit. 
The two arguments above overwhelming support this policy. 
(b) The second point to be noted is that the organization of guerillas must not be of a 
higher degree than circumstances will, with reasonable safety, and a view to 
efficiency, permit. 
 The factor of “safety” concerns possible enemy counteraction; the closer and 
higher the organization, the more easily can it be broken up and become ineffective.  It is 
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valueless and dangerous prematurely to organize partisan bands, acting independently as 
they normally should, into platoons, companies, [3] squadrons, etc. and then into 
regiments or brigades, with nominated commanders, skeleton orders of battle, 
intelligence services, etc.; such organization necessitates documents, written orders, 
files, etc. all or any of which, falling into the enemy‟s hands, may enable him to destroy 
the guerilla movement at a blow. 
 In any case, such organization is unnecessary in the early stages.  In these 
conditions, except for a central directing brain and a few trusted emissaries, partisan 
bands should be self-contained, acting under their own leader‟s initiative towards the  
ends directed by the controlling authority, obtaining their own information by the most 
direct and simplest means (usually by word of mouth) and maintaining the loosest 
organization compatible with effective action. 
(6) The factor of efficiency concerns the inherent advantages that guerillas enjoy 
through their superior mobility and their lack of communications.  A premature 
tightening of organization is directly inimical to these two advantages, so that an 
increase in the degree of organization over the bare minimum necessary must inevitably 
lead to decreased efficiency.  It is obvious, however, that, in the culminating stages of 
guerilla warfare, with large masses of guerillas taking an open part, some degree of 
organization is necessary in order to establish a chain of command, to render 
administrative arrangements possible, and to collect intelligence as a basis for plans, etc. 
7. At any time, therefore, the correct degree of organization to be established must 
be a matter for the most serious consideration of the controlling authority; as conditions 
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change, so will the degree.  To meet changing circumstances, therefore, the controlling 
authority must plan in advance, so that closer organization can be instituted when the 
moment demands, or can be relaxed if enemy action temporarily necessitates. 
 
Objectives of guerilla warfare. 
8. The whole art of guerilla warfare lies in striking the enemy where he least 
expects it, and yet where he is most vulnerable: this will produce the greatest effect in 
inducing, and even compelling, him to use up large numbers of troops in guarding 
against such blows. 
 Modern large-sized armies, entirely dependent as they are on the regular delivery 
of supplies, munitions, petrol, etc., for their operations, present a particularly favourable 
opportunity for guerilla warfare, directed against their communications by road, rail or 
water, and against their system of internal postal and telegraph communications. 
 Further, the maintenance of these large armies necessitates the establishment of 
dumps and stocks of supplies, munitions, etc. [4] at focal points, which offer most 
suitable targets for guerilla action. 
 The guarding of these communications and dumps against attack will, even 
before the threat is evident, necessitate the institution by the enemy of detachments and 
posts, more particularly at vital points on the communications and where dumps of 
importance are located.  These detachments themselves are a suitable object of attack. 
 Thus the operations of guerillas will usually be directed against the flanks of 
armies, against their communications and against posts and detachments established by 
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the enemy for the express purpose of protecting his important localities against such 
sporadic attempts. 
 
Methods and Principles. 
9. The methods and principles of guerilla warfare must be based on a proper 
estimation of the relative advantages and disadvantages enjoyed by the enemy on one 
hand, and the guerillas on the other, in armaments, mobility, numbers, information, 
morale, training, etc. 
10. The enemy will almost invariably possess armament superior both in quantity 
and quality – i.e., he will have artillery, mortars, gas, armoured vehicles, etc., in addition 
to the automatics and rifles with which the guerillas will also be armed.  In total strength 
the enemy will normally have the superiority as well, but the distribution of his forces 
will necessitate the use of detachments against which superior guerilla forces can be 
brought. 
11. It is in mobility, in information, and in morale that the guerillas can secure the 
advantage, and those factors are the means by which the enemy‟s superior armament and 
numbers can best be combated.  The superior mobility, however, is not absolute, but 
relative – i.e. to the type of country in which the activities are staged, to the detailed 
knowledge of that country by the guerillas, etc.  In absolute mobility, the enemy must 
always have the advantage – i.e., the use of railway systems, the possession of large 
numbers of motors, lorries, armoured cars, tanks, etc., of large forces of cavalry, etc.  By 
the judicious selection of ground, however, and by moves in darkness to secure surprise, 
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the guerillas can enjoy relatively superior mobility for the period necessary for each 
operation. 
12. The enemy will usually be in a country where the population is largely hostile, so 
that the people will actively co-operate in providing information for the guerillas and 
withholding it from the enemy.  The proper encouragement of this natural situation and 
the development of the system of obtaining information will ensure that the guerillas are 
kept au fait with the enemy‟s movements and intentions, whereas their own are hidden 
from him. [5]  
13. Morale, training, etc., are factors of importance in which first one side and then 
the other may have the advantage.  Where the enemy is constrained by demands on his 
forces to use reserve and second-line units for guarding communications, etc., neither the 
morale nor training will be of a high standard.  The morale of the guerilla should always 
be high; fighting in his own country, among his own people, against a foreign foe who 
has invaded his land, the justice of his cause will inflame his embitterment.  At the same 
time, the narrow limits of the training he requires, his natural dash and courage, and the 
careful, detailed rehearsal of projected coups should enable him, with the advantage of 
the initiative, to match even the best trained troops.  
14. Guerillas must obtain and make every effort to retain the initiative.  To have the 
initiative confers the invaluable advantage of selecting the place of operations that most 
favour success as regards locality, ground, time, relative strengths, etc.  The initiative 
can always be secured by remaining completely quiescent until the moment for the 
commencement of guerilla activities arrives, and then suddenly launching out against an 
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unsuspecting enemy.  To retain the initiative conferring these advantages demands a 
ceaseless activity, so that the enemy is prevented from getting his blow by the constantly 
recurring necessity of parrying those aimed at him. 
15. Until the final and culminating stages of partisan warfare where large bodies of 
guerilla are co-operating with the regular forces, it must be the object of partisans to 
avoid prolonged engagements with their opponents, unless in such overwhelming 
strength that success can be assured before the arrival of reinforcements.  The object 
must be to strike hard and disappear before the enemy can recover and strike back.  
Therefore the action of all partisan bands must be governed by the neccessity [sic] of a 
secure line of retirement for use when the moment for calling off the action arrives.  It 
must be borne in mind, too, that the immunity of partisans from enemy action is a most 
valuable moral factor; to inflict damage and death on the enemy and to escape scot-free 
has an irritant and depressing effect on the enemy‟s spirit, and a correspondingly 
encouraging effect on the morale, not only of the guerillas but of the local inhabitants, a 
matter of considerable moment; in this sphere of action nothing succeeds like success. 
16. From the above review of the circumstances of guerilla warfare, the aim of the 
guerilla must be to develop their inherent advantages so as to nullify those of the enemy.  
The principles of this type of warfare are therefore:- 
(a)  Surprise first and foremost, by finding out the enemy‟s plans and concealing 
your own intentions and movements. [6] 
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(b)  Never undertake an operation unless certain of success owing to careful planning 
and good information.  Break off the action when it becomes too risky to 
continue. 
(c)  Ensure that a secure line of retreat is always available. 
(d)  Choose areas and localities for action where your mobility will be superior to 
that of the enemy, owing to better knowledge of the country, lighter equipment, 
etc. 
(e)  Confine all movements as much as possible to the hours of darkness. 
(f)  Never engage in a pitched battle unless in overwhelming strength and thus sure 
of success. 
(g)  Avoid being pinned down in a battle by the enemy‟s superior forces or 
armament; break off the action before such a situation can develop. 
(h)  Retain the initiative at all costs by redoubling activities when the enemy 
commences counter-measures. 
(i)  When the time for action comes, act with the greatest boldness and audacity.  the 
partisan‟s motto is “Valiant yet vigilant.” 
These are the nine points of the guerilla’s creed. 
 
Organization. 
17. In guerilla warfare it is the personality of the leader that counts: he it is who has 
to make decisions on his own responsibility and lead his men in each enterprise.  He 
must therefore be decisive and resourceful, bold in action and cool in council, of great 
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mental and physical endurance, and of strong personality.  These qualities alone will 
enable him to control his followers and win their unquestioning obedience without the 
close constraints of military organization and discipline which are the antithesis of 
guerilla action and a drag on its efficiency. 
 A background of military training is invaluable for a guerilla leader, tempering 
his judgements and strengthening his decisions.  The almost universal adoption of 
compulsory military training throughout Europe and the levees en masse of the Great 
War will usually ensure that every leader will have had a military experience of some 
sort or other.  To this should be added, by study and instruction, a realisation of the 
influence of a mechanized age on the operations of large armies, both as a factor limiting 
and handicapping initiative and as a factor opening up new possibilities of mobility, of 
air action, of fire power, etc.   
 The selection of suitable leaders is therefore of paramount importance.  The 
central authority must, and perforce will be, some man of prestige and weight who has 
been a leading personality in the territory in time of peace, as the leader either of some 
[7] powerful association or league or minority.  Leaders of local partisan bands will be 
selected from those of standing or mark in the locality who possess the necessary 
attributes of personality. 
18. It may, however, frequently be advantageous to appoint certain serving army 
officers for duty with guerillas, either to serve directly as commanders, more particularly 
in the higher spheres, or as specially qualified staff officers or assistants to guerilla 
commanders.  In such cases, it will often happen that the serving officer works hand and 
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glove with the titular leader, the latter, owing to his local connections, etc., ensuring the 
cohesion of his guerillas, while the former supplies to the partnership the technical 
knowledge necessary for the most effective direction and co-ordination of the guerillas‟ 
operations. 
19. The wider the guerilla movement spreads, and the closer that its organisation 
must ultimately in that case become, the greater will be the need for a leaven of regular 
officers to carry out the basic work of simple staff duties, and to effect liaison with the 
regular forces.  These officer must, however, clear their minds of all preconceived ideas 
regarding military procedure and apply their minds entirely and objectively to the 
success of the matter in hand.  The very fact of their being regular officers may prejudice 
their position in the eyes of the partisans, and such prejudice can only be overcome by 
the proof they can give of their value to the guerilla cause. 
20. In cases where the guerillas are a nation in arms, or part thereof, fighting for their 
freedom in alliance with or assisted and instigated by a third power which is willing and 
anxious to render all assistance to them, it will usually be advisable for that third power 
to be represented by a mission at the headquarters of the guerilla movement.  The duties 
of such a mission would be to provide expert advice, to ensure liaison, to arrange the 
supply of arms, ammunition, money, etc., and to provide leaders and assistants to 
leaders, if such were found to be necessary. 
21. It is of great importance that the personnel of such missions should be au courant 
with the countries and territories where they are to work; the more detailed knowledge, 
personal liaison and reconnaissance that they can have or can effect before operations 
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are even envisaged, the greater is the chance of their success.  They must study the 
languages, dialects, topography, etc.; they must know the ethnological, political and 
religious groupings of the people, the history and aspirations of the country, its heroes of 
the present and martyrs of the past.  They must in fact be prepared, at the risk of future 
regrets and disillusion, to identify themselves in every way with the peoples they are to 
serve. 
22. As described in paragraph 5 (b), it is important that the degree of internal 
organization of the guerillas should be suitable [8] to the conditions in which they are 
operating; over-organization is more dangerous and detrimental to guerilla operations 
than too loose an organization.  The latter can be tightened as circumstances prescribe, 
whereas the relaxing of control that has once been established, even though necessitated 
by changed conditions, must at first lead to some embarrassment, confusion, and the loss 
of direction. 
23 The organization of partisans must usually commence with the formation of local 
bands, number not more than about 30 men each.  It is not only simpler and more 
convenient to form them on a local basis, but also quicker.  The men live in the 
neighborhood, they know the country, they know each other, and their leaders, and can 
assemble rapidly when required, either for operations in their own area, if targets for 
attack exist, or for transfer to some area where conditions are more favourable.  At the 
same time, there will be many areas where it will not be possible to form bands.  
Suitable and willing men in such areas must be given a rallying place, to which they will 
move under their own arrangements and there to join existing bands. 
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24. Modern developments, particularly in aircraft, mechanized forces and wireless, 
have profound influences on guerilla warfare, enabling the enemy rapidly to concentrate 
in opposition to any moves of guerillas that have been discovered.  Concealment from 
aircraft, therefore, becomes one of the most important factors and inevitably curtails the 
possibilities of large forces of guerillas moving at will throughout the country.  In effect, 
such large forces, if they are to remain undiscovered, can only move by night and must 
conceal themselves by day or else move by routes – i.e. through thick forests etc. – 
which afford concealment from reconnoitring [sic] aircraft; such routes however 
themselves offer some difficulty to movement. 
25. In addition, areas which offer good opportunities for concealment are usually just 
those areas where the maintenance and supply of large guerilla forces becomes difficult.  
They are usually wild, with little cultivation or pasture land for carrying stock or feeding 
the guerillas‟ animals, and supplies would have to be brought in specially.  At once the 
guerillas would begin to be dependent on communications, a situation cramping their 
mobility and exactly opposed to the characteristic which constitutes their chief military 
value. 
26. It must be clearly realized therefore that in most European countries, except for 
large areas in the east and south-east, conditions will rarely at the commencement of a 
campaign be suitable for the employment of guerillas in large masses.  Even in Asiatic 
and North African countries, the presence of hostile aircraft will make this difficult. [9] 
27. It is therefore probable that in the early stages of a war, the scale of guerilla 
warfare will not exceed that activities of partisan bands; even if it should never exceed 
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this, however, a guerilla campaign of this type directed with skill and executed with 
audacity and ceaseless activity will be a most potent factor in absorbing hostile forces 
and thus rendering a proper campaign by the enemy impossible.  For this type of guerilla 
war a loose organization is essential, and co-ordination and direction of effort must 
emanate in considerable detail from the central controlling authority known as “The 
Chief”. 
 
“The Chief”, or Military Mission or Guerilla Bureau. 
28. “The Chief” may be either an individual of the country concerned located with 
his small staff in the area of guerilla activities, or a section of the General Staff 
(Intelligence Branch) of the Army concerned, and located at its General Headquarters, or 
even a military mission from a third party, located either at the General Headquarters of 
one of the armies in the field, or some other more suitable place.  “The Chief” may thus 
be established in either friendly territory, or in territory occupied nominally by the 
enemy.  The relative advantages of either course are as follows: - 
29. If located in enemy territory – i.e. in the area where guerilla bands are to operate 
– contact and direction are easier, co-ordination of plans simplified, and “The Chief‟s” 
presence must have a stimulating effect on the partisans.  In addition, intelligence and 
planning, which depend so much on local conditions at the moment, can be more 
thorough.  On the other hand, the nearness of the enemy and his activities will 
necessitate constant changes of location, and the possibility of enemy raids will 
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necessitate the reduction of documents, files, etc. to a minimum which may be 
incompatible with effective action. 
30. Conversely, the installation of “The Chief” at the General Headquarters of an 
army, or even in friendly territory, brings in its train closer relations with the regular 
forces, wider sources of information, the possibility of complete documentation, greater 
security, and facilitates the provision of such supplies as the guerillas may receive, i.e. 
arms, ammunition etc.  What is lost, however, is the close touch with the active agents of 
the guerilla campaign, and the inspiration which only the presence of “The Chief” in 
their midst can really arouse.  This can, however, be counteracted by the appointment of 
a “Deputy Chief” specially chosen for his personality and characteristics, and granted 
plenipotentiary powers for use in emergency. 
31. “The Chief” will direct his bands by emissaries or personal visits and will 
appoint regional assistant-chiefs to assist him.  When a large operation is planned, he 
will frequently direct and [10] lead it in person.  As, however, the organization is 
purposely loose, it is important that “The Chief” should not be exposed to unnecessary 
danger.  Much of his plans and intentions for future action, his knowledge of the country 
and of his assistant-chiefs will not have been committed to paper nor can be, but are 
stored in his brain; his loss might be irreparable. 
32. Assistant-chiefs may again appoint sub-chiefs under them, according to the size 
of the regions for which they are responsible and the number of bands they contain. 
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Arms and Equipment. 
33. The provision and replenishment of arms and equipment for guerillas is a 
problem that requires constant consideration.  It is obvious that, if adequate supplies can 
be obtained before hostilities commence and can be suitably distributed, the problem is 
immensely simplified; further, guerilla operations can then be commenced without 
delay.  The possibility of providing such peace stocks is governed almost entirely by 
political considerations, so that each country or district must be considered as a separate 
case; the attitude of the General Staff concerned is also of importance, more particularly 
in view of the pressure they can exert on their governments, a pressure which grows in 
weight on the approach of crises. 
34. The arms most suitable for guerillas are those which do not hamper their 
mobility, but which are effective at close quarters.  Guerilla actions will usually take 
place at point blank range as the result of an ambush or raid, with the object of inflicting 
the maximum amount of damage in a short time and then getting away.  What is 
important therefore is a heavy volume of fire developed immediately, with the object of 
causing as many casualties and consequent confusion as possible at the outset of the 
action.  Undoubtedly, therefore, the most effective weapon for the guerilla is the sub-
machine gun which can be fired either from a rest or from the shoulder – i.e. a tommy-
gun or gangster gun; in addition, this gun has the qualities of being short and 
comparatively light.  Special efforts must therefore be made to equip each band with a 
percentage of these guns.  Carbines are suitable, being shorter and lighter than rifles, and 
the long range of the rifle is not necessary.  After carbines come revolvers and pistols for 
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night work and for very close-quarters, and then rifles.  The more silencers that can be 
obtained for these weapons the better; a „silenced‟ rifle or revolver not only impedes 
detection, but has a considerable moral effect on the sniping of sentries, etc.  Telescopic 
sights are invaluable for snipers. 
 Bayonets are quite unsuitable for guerillas: these are only for use in shock action 
which should be eschewed; a dagger is much more effective, and more easily concealed.  
[11] Bombs and devices of various kinds are of great use; when possible they 
should be specially made for the peculiar requirements of guerilla warfare, but standard 
army equipment must frequently be made to serve. 
35. Replenishment of stocks during a campaign, particularly of ammunition, must be 
a constant concern to all partisans.  When operating behind the enemy‟s lines, the 
maintenance of supplies from outside will be a matter of the very greatest difficulty, 
frequently impossible; it is most important therefore that every opportunity to seize arms 
and ammunition from the enemy should be grasped.  This is the only sure way of 
obtaining requirements.  It will sometimes be necessary to organize raids whose primary 
object is the seizure of arms; every partisan must always have this matter uppermost in 
his mind, and be prepared to grasp any opportunity that offers. 
 
Information and Intelligence Service. 
36. In their normally superior facilities for obtaining information guerillas have a 
factor in their favour of which the fullest advantage must be taken in order to counteract 
the enemy‟s superior armament and equipment.  Operating as they usually will be 
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among a friendly population, a system of obtaining information must be so built up that, 
from the offensive aspect, the fullest information required can be obtained prior to any 
contemplated operation; and, from the defensive aspect, no action which the enemy 
intends against the guerillas will escape prior detection.  Further, information must 
always be sought giving details of the enemy‟s movements, detachments, convoys, etc., 
which may lead to the initiation of a successful operation. 
37. An enemy in occupation of territory is compelled to mix in varying degrees with 
the inhabitants.  Troops must be billeted in houses; cafés and beerhouses will be used for 
their recreation; working parties will be employed for unloading trains, repairing roads, 
etc.  These circumstances are extremely favourable for the collection of information by 
the local populace acting as agents.  In fact, every reliable man, woman and child of 
common sense and reliability should be encouraged and trained to keep his ears open for 
items of information, and, where conditions are suitable, to seek for it by questions, by 
purloining letters, etc.  Among the most suitably placed to act as agents are barbers, 
waitresses, domestic servants, priests, doctors, telephone and telegraph operators, 
postmen and camp followers generally. 
38. The collection and collation of this information requires some consideration.  As 
pointed out earlier, the seizure of documents by the enemy from guerillas as the result of 
raids, interception of letters, etc., is of the greatest value to him in his efforts to crush the 
guerilla warfare.  Messages passed by agents [12] therefore should be verbal as far as 
possible, and the degree of documentation by local partisan leaders must not exceed that 
which allows reasonable security.  As and when the guerilla organization grows tighter 
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and closer, collation and recording of intelligence will increase until the stage is reached 
that at the headquarters of the guerilla forces in the field there is a proper intelligence 
staff with files, maps, enemy order of battle, etc.  To err on the side of over-organization, 
however, is to court disaster; hence the over-riding importance of the personality of the 
leaders.  The leader alone it is who by his activity, his drive, his flair for guerilla warfare, 
his intelligence and wit, directs his men to successful action without the close 
organiation [sic] necessary for regular forces. 
39. When guerilla operations commence, on whatever scale, the enemy will institute 
counter-measures, of which one important aspect will be intelligence.  But he will be 
working usually amidst a hostile populace; without their co-operation his task will be 
more difficult and will require a larger number of his own men to carry it out. 
40. The guerillas must therefore impress on the people the vital necessity of 
witholding from the enemy all information about them however harmless it may seem; 
the people must be convinced that their refusal to co-operate with the enemy in this 
respect is of the greatest importance for the redemption of their country from the 
enemy‟s grasp, and for the safety of their friends and relatives.  They must be warned 
never to discuss the activities of the guerillas in any circumstances whatever. 
 In every community will be found certain individuals so debased that for greed of 
gain they will sell even their own countrymen.  Against this contingency close watch 
must be set, and wherever proof is obtained of such perfidy, the traitor must be killed 
without hesitation or delay.  By such justifiably ruthless action others who might be 
tempted to follow suit will be finally deterred. 
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41. It will be necessary, in addition, to harass the enemy‟s intelligence service in 
every possible way.  Agents that he may have imported must be tracked down and shot, 
his intelligence officers and staff sought out and neutralized, and captured documents 
and plans destroyed after perusal. 
42. Guerillas themselves must be trained to give away no information if captured.  
The enemy intelligence officers will be adepts in leading prisoners into indiscretions, in 
installing listening sets and „pigeons‟ in prisons, concentration camps, reading prisoners‟ 
ingoing and outgoing mails, etc. 
43. The advantage of superior information is the guerillas‟ greatest asset; it must be 
used to the fullest extent possible. [13]  
 
Intercommunication. 
44. All means of communication that are open to interception by the enemy must be 
used with the greatest discretion – i.e. civil postal service, telephone and telegraphs, etc., 
as any code and ciphers used by guerillas must of necessity be simple or only 
infrequently changed, and their solution by the enemy will not be a difficult task.  Such 
devices therefore only give a very relative security. 
45. The passing of information verbally and direct is clearly the safest and in many 
ways the most reliable means.  At the same time, however, opportunities for this will not 
always occur, and frequently messages must be written and conveyed by several hands 
before reading their destination.  For this purpose it is often better to use women and 
children who are less suspect and probably could enjoy greater immunity from search. 
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46. It will be incumbent on leaders within their own areas to arrange adequate means 
for the collection of information, and their own ingenuity will produce many devices, 
such as messages left in clefts of trees, in stone walls, in culverts, etc.  Pigeons are 
occasionally useful, but their limitations are obvious – i.e. ease of detection, uncertainty, 
etc., and the greatest care must be observed in their use. 
47. For messages of operational importance between partisan bands and the scouts, 
and within groups of partisan bands, etc., wireless offers great possibilities.  It can be 
used by scouts to inform their band that an enemy convoy is leaving by a certain route, 
offering a chance of ambush; it can be used within groups to co-ordinate attacks, to pass 
on information, etc.  The smaller the transmitting set and the wider its range the more 
useful it becomes; ease of concealment is a very important factor. 
 Wireless should not be used except for matters of importance; sets are not easily 
replaced if discovered and should be guarded preciously.  It may be advisable to fix 
certain hours only during which wireless may be used.   
 ALL MESSAGES IN WIRELESS MUST BE IN CODE OR CIPHER. 
 
Training. 
48. Training in the full military sense is not applicable to guerillas, but on the other 
hand any guerilla who has a background of military training is ipso facto a better 
partisan.  The object of military training is to make any recruit of whatever calibre into a 
reasonably good soldier, so that it is based on the lowest common denominator.  
Guerillas on the contrary will usually be recruited from men who have a natural aptitude 
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or a fondness for fighting, who are accustomed to the use of weapons, to hard sleep, to 
movement in the dark, etc. [14]  
 Their training, therefore, should first be directed to the use of their basic 
weapons, i.e., automatic rifles, carbines, pistols, etc., and to the use of the various 
destructive devices such as bombs, road and rail mines, etc., which are such a special 
and useful feature of guerilla warfare. 
49. For these devices knowledge of electrical equipment is of great value; leaders 
must therefore endeavour to include in their bands a few men with this experience; if 
they do not exist, suitable men must be trained.  The actual placing of these devices, and 
even their firing, can often be carried out in emergency by untrained personnel, but the 
risks of inefficacy and failure are great and should not be run for want of a little time 
spent in training. 
50. Localities for training must be carefully selected so that surprise is impossible; it 
is essential to post sentries far out where enemy movement can be seen in time. 
51. Weapon training of guerillas must be efficient, not only so that the men may have 
confidence in their weapons and shoot to kill, but also in order to save ammunition 
which is frequently an important factor in guerilla warfare.  A few rounds spent on 
perfecting shooting, and testing of rifles, will be amply repaid. 
52. Training in defensive action against modern weapons is of importance, more 
particularly in the following aspects: - 
(a)  Aircraft: 
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Partisan leaders must impress on all their men that the surest way of attaining 
success in their operations is by remaining undetected, and that detection will 
always be followed by enemy action against them.  Concealment from aircraft is 
of the greatest importance, and men must be trained to take cover quickly, to lie 
face downwards, and to remain absolutely still until the aeroplane has passed. 
(b)  Tanks, Armoured Cars, etc. 
 These are very blind when forced by fire to close down their screens; both are 
very susceptible to ground. 
(c)  Machine Guns, etc. 
 Smoke screens formed by smoke bombs are the best antidote.   
For further details, see the Partisan Leader‟s Handbook. 
 
Enemy Counter Action. 
53. The first effect on the enemy of the institution of guerilla warfare will be to 
compel him to strengthen all posts, guards, detachments etc., and to carry out all 
movements in convoy, even if only of a routine nature.  By this the guerillas will have 
achieved a part of their object, i.e. more enemy troops will be absorbed [15] in purely 
protective duties, and his forces for offensive action correspondingly reduced. 
 This reaction of the enemy is however purely defensive.  As the scale of guerilla 
warfare increases, and as successful attack are carried out against those strengthened 
posts, convoys, etc., the enemy will undertake active offensive measures against the 
partisans with the object of finally crushing them. 
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54. Until the first stage has been reached, and this will not be long, i.e., moving into 
convoy, etc., members of partisan bands may well be able to remain living but 
undetected in their own homes, and collecting [sic] by summons for particular 
operations.  This however will soon be rendered impossible by the searches, raids, etc., 
and issue of curfew, passport and other regulations that the enemy will introduce.  When 
that moment comes it will be necessary for the partisans to “go on the run,” i.e. to live as 
a band in some suitable area where the nature of the country enables them to be 
relatively secure. 
55. The commencement of offensive action by the enemy will be marked by the 
institution of “flying columns” – detachments of from fifty to two or three hundred 
strong, mobile by means of horses, lorries, etc., and equipped with several days of 
supplies – which will be sent out to search the country, moving by circuitous and 
haphazard routes, employing scouts and advance guards, and probably assisted by 
aircraft.  The final stage, when this action is insufficient, will be the organization of 
“drives”, in which large forces of troops consisting of all arms will be used to sweep 
through successive selected areas, and the accompanying intelligence officers, their 
staffs, informers, agents, etc., will interrogate every man falling into the net and arrest 
any to whom suspicion attaches.  Aeroplanes are certain to co-operate. 
56. Against flying columns, the guerillas‟ superior sources of information, 
knowledge of the country and individual mobility should be adequate protection; the 
object of the guerillas in these circumstances is to avoid discover, and not take military 
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action against the flying columns unless overwhelming strength against any particular 
column can be combined with favourable circumstances in which to destroy it. 
57. Against large-scale drives the guerillas must give way, and move off to some 
locality where the enemy is relatively inactive.  It must be remembered that in countries 
of any large extent the number of troops required to carry out comprehensive drives 
simultaneously through every area subject to guerilla warfare will usually be prohibitive.  
Should the enemy attempt such a policy, the object of this warfare will be even nearer to 
achievement, i.e. rendering the enemy incapable of carrying on an effective 
campaign.[16]  
58. The counters to such a policy are clear.  If the enemy drives throughout the 
whole area affected give no chance of eventual escape, the partisans must harry the 
advance as it proceeds, seek the weak spots in it, and break through back into their own 
country, either by infiltration, or by massing against a weak spot and bursting through by 
sheer strength and force of arms.  To men who know the country and can move freely in 
the dark there is little risk of failure. 
59. Against the various weapons that the enemy may employ, endowed as he will be 
with superior equipment of war, i.e. aeroplanes, tanks, armoured cars, etc., instructions 
are contained in the Partisan Leader‟s Handbook. 
 Of all these means, the most dangerous to the partisans is the aeroplane: they 
must be taught always to move and take up their positions by night, to take immediate 
cover from aircraft of all descriptions, and never to open fire on them unless the 
aeroplanes themselves attack. 
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60. Against action by the enemy, other than of a military nature, every step must be 
taken to render it inoperative.  Such action will include the institution of curfew hours, of 
a system of  visas and cartes d’identité, of traffic regulations, of restriction on the must 
of motor transport, etc.  In this field, it is the civilian population which can most assist 
the guerilla; a policy of absolute non-co-operation leavened with enlightened stupidity 
will do much to render the enemy‟s control ineffective. 
 
Planning and Action. 
61. Just as in time of peace the study of the employment of its regular forces in the 
event of possible wars is one of the main problems of a country‟s General Staff, so must 
the employment of guerilla forces and tactics in aid of the regular army be the object of 
equally close examination.  Probable theatres of war and possible allies in various 
contingencies will lead this examination over a very wide field.  Cases requiring 
particular study will be those in which either the home country or an ally must envisage 
in view of the enemy‟s greater strength, more complete preparation, or more rapid 
mobilization, a successful invasion of its territory in the early stages of the campaign, 
even if only to a limited depth. 
62. The object of such study is to determine the possibilities of guerilla warfare on 
the flanks of, but more particularly behind, the advancing hostile armies, and to make the 
necessary arrangements IN PEACE before the emergency arises.  To delay study and 
preparation until a war has broken out will make the institution of a proper guerilla 
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campaign infinitely more difficult, and in face of a strong and ruthless enemy, in all 
probability impossible. [17]  
 The arrangements to be made must include: - 
(a) The nomination of local partisan leaders. 
(b) The provision of arms, ammunition, destructive devices, wireless sets, etc., and 
their concealment. 
(c) Selection of “The Chief” and of the personnel of his staff. 
(d) Provision of ensuring liaison between General Headquarters in the field and “The 
Chief” with his guerillas. 
 N.B.  If “The Chief” is at General Headquarters, liaison is required between him 
and the deputy chief. 
(e) The formulation of a plan of campaign. 
(f) The selection of vital points for destruction after hostile occupation and their 
preparation to that end. 
 ETC. ETC. 
 
63. It may well be that among a group of two or more allied powers, one power by 
its wealth, its strategic position, its military experience or its initiative is in a position to 
encourage and assist the others in these preparations.  Such assistance may take the 
following forms:- 
(a)  The provision of special weapons and destructive devices for use by guerillas. 
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(b)  The provision of technical experts in destructive devices specially trained to 
assist the leaders of partisan bands. 
(c)  The establishment of a mission or bureau either at the allied General 
Headquarters, or in the field with the  guerillas, to direct operations in co-
ordination with that General Headquarters, and to arrange for the further supply 
and distribution of money, arms, etc. 
(d)  The provision of military experts in the field to assist and co-ordinate the 
activities of assistant leaders. 
 
Preparatory Planning. 
64. A complete survey of likely territories must be made with a view to determining 
for what types of guerilla activities they will initially be suitable. 
 Politically, the field of action for guerilla warfare may be broadly divided into 
three distinct spheres: - 
(a) Where the population, except for numerically insignificant minorities, support 
the hostile power.  This territory usually comprises the enemy‟s home country 
and that of his allied and associated powers. 
(b) Where the population is, in varying degrees, hostile to the power in occupation. 
(c)  Neutral countries [18]  
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Friendly Population 
65. Unless a war has been begun in opposition to the general weight of public 
opinion, the enemy‟s home country will at the onset have been brought to a high pitch of 
patriotism and jingoism.  Such conditions offer no scope for the organization of armed 
intervention by guerillas and this type of warfare must therefore be limited to 
subterranean attacks by disaffected individuals or small groups against targets that will 
interrupt communications, interfere with or damage supplies of food, munitions, etc., 
assist in diverting the enemy‟s armed forces and generally lower the morale of the 
people. 
66. At the same time the people‟s will to war must be sapped and undermined in 
every other way, so as to induce a craving for peace and for a change in the regime of 
the country which will lead to it.  The object must be to prepare a situation in which an 
increasing and vocal part of the population will be opposed to the government and its 
policy, and any alternative will seem to offer fairer prospects.  At the right moment it 
will be desirable to focus public opinion on to an alternative leader or party. 
67. Such a campaign is best carried on by “whispering” by skilful propaganda 
through the press and wireless, by magnification of hardships such as food restrictions, 
by the sabotaging of food supplies, communications, by publishing exaggerated casualty 
lists, etc. and many other means.  Even in the final stages of such a campaign, however, 
there is no field for the employment of partisan bands; there representatives either of a 
foreign power or a disaffected minority would only serve to exacerbate the patriotism of 
the general population.  What is required is to divide the population of the enemy against 
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itself; the means are endless - knowledge of the country and a fertile imagination will 
devise the methods. 
 
Hostile Population. 
68. A population hostile to the enemy‟s occupation offers immediately a sphere for 
the fullest development of guerilla warfare in all its aspects, culminating in a general 
rising of the people against the enemy.  The types of warfare to be employed at the onset 
must depend on the nature of the country; it is clear that in highly cultivated districts 
with few physical features the concentration of partisan bands into large formation is out 
of the question until such time as the enemy‟s hold begins through weakness to relax.  
Then is the moment for a general levée en masse of the population with such arms as 
they have concealed or seized; the enemy‟s defeat will not long be delayed. 
69. In cases of this nature the provision of arms and ammunition and arrangements 
for replenishing stocks are of primary [19] importance.  Where the possibility of 
aggression by a hostile power and the occupation by it of foreign territory can be 
foreseen, such provision should invariably be made before the commencement of 
hostilities.  Not only can adequate stocks be more easily obtained and planted, but also 
more thorough precautions can be made for secrecy in delivery and in distribution and 
storage. 
 Where such provisions cannot be made beforehand, an organization must be 
immediately created for the running of weapons and explosives from neutral or friendly 
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countries, and plans must be worked out and put in hand for the seizure of hostile stocks 
by local guerillas. 
70. In general, the action to be undertaken in areas where the people are hostile to the 
occupying power is to stimulate the morale of the inhabitants, to create a policy of 
complete non-co-operation, both active among those best fitted for it and passive by the 
whole of the remainder.  It is necessary to convince the people that the hostile power is 
not de facto in control, that its writ does not run and that it will eventually be compelled 
to evacuate the territory, when those who have tacitly accepted its control will be 
punished, and those who have opposed it will be rewarded. 
 
Neutral Countries. 
71. The institution of guerilla activities in neutral territories from which the enemy 
draws supplies must depend to some extent on the political and other relations between 
the powers concerned.  In certain cases it may be politic to ignore the assistance given to 
the enemy by a particular neutral country in view of the even greater aid that is being 
received.  When, however, the supplies which the enemy is obtaining are vital to his 
conduct of the war it may be necessary actively to hinder this provision in spite of 
otherwise friendly relations with the country concerned, and to risk the rupture of such 
relations. 
72. This risk, however, must be reduced to a minimum and postponed as long as 
possible.  Its elimination depends primarily on the skill with which the campaign is 
carried out.  The methods to be employed to hinder supply range from the purchase of 
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supplies, over the head of the enemy, the organization of labour strikes at the vital points 
– i.e., factories, mines, docks, etc., to the sabotaging of ships, trains and machinery.  The 
engagement of local firms of solicitors, not too scrupulous and at the same time 
experienced in neutrality and labour legislation, and in the procrastination of judicial 
procedure will be of the greatest assistance. 
73. As in the case of guerilla warfare proper, this [is] a subject which requires close 
study and preparation before hostilities commence, and the selection of suitable 
personnel, experienced [20] in shipping and commerce generally, and maritime and 
neutrality laws of the countries concerned. 
 
Geographical. 
74. The geographical study of a territory is concerned with two factors: - 
(a) Its suitability as an area for guerilla warfare.  The more broken and forested it is, 
the more suitable will it be. 
(b) The potential targets for guerilla action which it offers.  These will usually be in 
the shape of road, rail and river communications which the enemy would have to 
employ for the maintenance of his armies in the field.  Vulnerable points within 
the enemy‟s own territory must also be marked.  The reconnaissance of territories 
should, whenever possible, be carried out in time of peace by selected officers 
who have been grounded in the principles of guerilla warfare.  Their reports will 
be of great assistance  in formulating a plan. 
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Organization of Bands. 
75. One of the principle reasons for insisting on the advantages of peace time 
preparation is that, failing such arrangements, the situation of guerilla warfare BEHIND 
THE ENEMY‟S LINES will be a matter of the utmost difficulty.  The ideal at which to 
aim is that when the enemy invasion takes place the men who are to become the 
partisans should remain in their homes with their arms conveniently concealed, and 
allow themselves to be over-run.  They will then hold themselves in readiness to 
commence action under their leader the moment the order is given.  Where the fronts 
coved by the main opposing armies are wide and broken, there will be opportunity for 
partisan bands to penetrate the hostile lines for operations in the enemy‟s rear, but when 
the fronts are continuous, as may frequently happen, there will be no such opportunity; 
without previous provision, therefore, guerilla warfare on the enemy‟s lines of 
communication, his most vulnerable and tender spot, could only be sporadic and half-
hearted. 
76. Most of the great powers include in their forces formations of a para-military 
character such as Frontier Guards, Customs Guards, Frontier Gendarmerie, and Forest 
Guards, etc.  These organizations, dealing as they do with the prevention of smuggling, 
illicit crossing of frontiers, poaching, etc., contain men with an intimate knowledge of 
frontier districts, trained to act by night, and to be self-dependent.  As frontiers 
frequently rest on natural boundaries such as mountains, large river, etc., which form 
good area [sic] for guerilla activities, such men will be of immense value as the nuclei of 
partisan bands. [21]  
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77. From a consideration of the above factors it is apparent that the institution of 
guerilla warfare to assist the regular armies in the defeat of the enemy is a subject which 
must in all its aspects be considered and prepared in peace to the fullest extent possible.  
Such planning and action should include the following: - 
(a) A careful study of the territories concerned from the point of view of geography, 
communications, ethnology, racial and religious habits, historical associations, 
etc., and a decision as to possibilities. 
(b) The supply and distribution of arms, ammunition, devices,  pamphlets, etc., and 
the instruction of potential partisans in their use. 
(c) The selection and training of regular army officers in the art of guerilla warfare; 
these would be sent to organize and take charge of guerilla operations in their 
respective areas, or to act as advisers to the local leaders.  Such training should 
include a period of residence in the territory concerned. 
  
Conclusion. 
78. The more the subject is considered the more apparent it becomes that in guerilla 
warfare it is the personality of the leader which counts above everything.  It is he who by 
his personality and steadfastness must hold the loosely organized partisans together, and 
by his courage, audacity and high intelligence successfully direct and lead their 
operations. 
79. These operations range over an unlimited field according to local circumstances.  
Large forces of guerillas can harry the flanks of an advancing or returning army, can raid 
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his communications in force, destroying railways, burning supply dumps and capturing 
convoys, and then withdraw again to the security of their own lines.  Small bands of 
partisans can live behind the enemy‟s lines, or filter through gaps in his front, and carry 
on similar activities on a smaller scale.  Individual guerillas can be permanently located 
in the enemy‟s rear, where by the sniping of guards, the destruction of military vehicles, 
buildings, etc., they can be a running sore in his flesh, draining his vitality and 
hampering his action. 
80. Guerillas obtain their advantage over the enemy by their greater knowledge of 
the country, their relatively greater mobility, and their vastly superior sources of 
information.  Those are the factors which, when properly exploited, enable them to 
engage with success an enemy who is better equipped, more closely disciplined, and 
usually in greater strength. [22] 
81. The main objects of guerilla warfare are to inflict direct damage and loss on the 
enemy, to hamper his operations and movements by attacks on his communications, and 
to compel him to withdraw the maximum number of troops from the main front of battle 
so as to weaken his offensive power.  Direct action of the types envisaged will bring the 
desired result about.  It must always be remembered that guerilla warfare is what regular 
armies have most to fear.  When directed with skill and carried out with courage and 
whole-hearted endeavour, an effective campaign by the enemy becomes impossible. 
82. Guerilla warfare is much facilitated by the co-operation of the local inhabitants, 
but in the face of an uncompromising hostile occupation this will only become active as 
the result of successful action by the guerillas.  It is this alone that will awaken in the 
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people the spirit of revolt, of audacity and of endurance, and make them foresee and 
assist towards the victory that will be theirs. 
83. In the modern world the time has now come when aggressor nations, to gain their 
ends, use every device and ingenuity that their perverted wits can devise to break down 
the resistance of their intended victims both before and after the occupation of their 
territory.  Given the leadership, the courage, the arms and the preparation, however, 
there is one thing remaining that they cannot break, and that is the spirit of the people 
whose territory has been over-run, a spirit expressing itself in uncompromising and 
steadfast resistance to defeat and in a ruthless and uncompromising warfare of partisans 
until the enemy is forced to cry “Halt!” and depart.  In the long history of the world such 
deeds have been done, such causes won; and they can be won again, given opportunity. 
 
F I N I S 
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APPENDIX B 
THE PARTISAN LEADER‟S HANDBOOK 
 
Principles of Guerilla Warfare and Sabotage. 
1. Remember that your object is to embarrass the enemy in every possible way so 
as to make it more difficult for his armies to light on the many fronts.  You can do this 
by damaging his rail and road communications, his telegraph and postal system, by 
destroying small parties of the enemy, and in many other ways which will be explained 
later.  Remember that everything you can do in this way is helping to win freedom again 
for your people. 
2. You must learn the principles of this type of warfare, which are as follows: - 
(a)  Surprise is the most important thing in everything you undertake.  You must take 
every precaution that the enemy does not know your plans. 
(b)  Never engage in any operation unless you think success is certain.  Break off the 
action  as soon as it becomes too risky to continue. 
(c)  Every operation must be planned with the greatest care.  A safe line of retreat is 
essential. 
(d)  Movement and action should, whenever possible, be confined to the hours of 
darkness. 
(e)  Mobility is of great importance; act therefore where your knowledge of the 
country and your means of movement – i.e., bicycles, horses etc. – give you an 
advantage over the enemy. [2] 
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(f)  Never get involved in a pitched battle unless you are in overwhelming strength. 
(g) Never carry incriminating documents on your person nor leave them where they 
can be found. 
 The whole object of this type of warfare is to strike the enemy, and disappear 
completely leaving no trace; and then to strike somewhere else and vanish again.  By 
these means the enemy will never know where the next blow is coming, and will be 
forced to disperse his forces to try and guard all his vulnerable points.  This will provide 
you with further opportunities for destroying these small detachments. 
3. Types of Operations – Operations can be divided into two main types: - 
(a)  Those of a military nature which entail the co-ordinated action of a certain 
number of men under a nominated leader. 
(b)  Individual acts of sabotage, of sniping sentries, etc., for which men can be 
specially selected to work individually in certain areas. 
 For action of a military nature the choice of suitable leaders is of great 
importance.  A leader must have courage and resource, he must be intelligent and a good 
administrator and be a man of quick decision.  He must know intimately the country in 
which he is 
operating, and should be able to use a compass and map.  The sort of man required is the 
type whom other men will willingly accept to lead them in dangerous actions, and whose 
personality will hold them together.   
 The size and composition of guerilla parties [3] must depend on the nature of the 
enemy and the hold which the enemy has over it.  It must be remembered that the speed 
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of modern communications, i.e., motor, wireless, etc., and the presence of aeroplanes 
make it very difficult for a large party to remain concealed for any length of time.  
Parties should therefore number between 8 and 25, depending upon the work to be done; 
such parties can move quickly and yet hide themselves fairly easily.  Under especially 
favourable conditions, it may be possible to collect several parties together, up to 100 
men or more, for some important undertaking  In such cases, however, the arrangements 
for dispersal after the operation must be made with special care. 
4. Modern large-sized armies are completely dependent on roads, railways, signal 
communications, etc., to keep themselves supplied with food, munitions and petrol, 
without which they cannot operate.  These communications therefore form a most 
suitable target for guerilla warfare of all kinds, and any attack on them will at once force 
the enemy to disperse his forces in order to guard them.  Communications are open to 
attacks both of the military and sabotage type.  Attacks can also be directed against small 
detachments of the enemy, stocks of food, munitions, etc., and many other objects. 
5. Military action is employed when it appears that damage can only be inflicted if 
force has to be used first. 
The following are types of military action:- 
(a)  Destruction of vital points on roads, bridges, [4] railways, canals, etc., when 
action by an individual employing secret means would not be effective.  If a 
hostile guard has first to be overpowered, or work preliminary to destruction 
requires a considerable number of men, the project must be undertaken as a 
military operation. 
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(b)  The raiding and destruction of hostile mails, either in lorries or trains. 
(c)  The destruction of enemy detachments and guards. 
(d)  The organization of ambuscades of hostile troops and convoys traveling by road 
or train. 
(e)  The destruction of stocks and dumps of food, petrol, munitions, lorries, etc., by 
first overpowering the guards on them. 
(f)  The seizure of cash from hostile pay-offices  etc. ETC. ETC. 
6. Military action is greatly facilitated by the support of the local population.  By 
this means, warning can be obtained of all hostile moves, and it will not be possible for 
the enemy to carry out surprise action.  It is therefore important to endeavoour not to 
offend the people of each district, but to encourage their patriotism and hatred of the 
enemy.  Successful action against the enemy will breed audacity and force the people to 
take note and respond.  Their response in the first instance should be directed to the 
supply of information about the enemy, his strength, movements, etc., and to assistance 
in the concealment of compatriots who are taking part in guerilla warfare.  In effect, the 
people must be taught to boycott the hostile [5] troops completely, except as may be 
necessary to obtain information.  This can be done by convincing them that the enemy‟s 
occupation is only temporary, that he will soon be ejected, that those of the people who 
have helped will then be rewarded, but that those who have fraternized with the enemy 
will be ruthlessly punished.  The question of „informers‟ and traitors who are in league 
with the enemy is dealt with later. 
  
366 
7. The areas most suitable for military action are those where cover, such as rocks, 
trees, undergrowth, etc. give a concealed approach to the object or detachment to be 
attacked.  Such cover not only provides an opportunity for attack without discovery, but 
also for getting away safely when the attack is completed.  In all such attacks, it is 
important that sentries should be posted on all approaches to give warning of any 
possible surprise by the enemy; it is not necessary that all these sentries should be armed 
men, in fact it will frequently be of advantage to use some women and children, who are 
less likely to be suspected.  A simple code of signals must be arranged. 
 Every operation of this nature must be most carefully planned.  When some 
particular operation has been decided upon, the locality must be thoroughly 
reconnoitered, and the enemy‟s movements in the vicinity should be systematically 
studied and noted over a period of days, with special reference to such points as the 
following, where applicable:- 
(a)  Hours when sentries are relieved, and how relief is carried out. 
(b)  Total strength of guard or detachment.  [6]   
(c)  How and when do supplies for the guard arrive?  Are civilians allowed to enter 
the post? 
(d)  Where do men not on sentry-go keep their rifles?  Are these rifles chained up or 
in plain racks? 
(e)  Are men allowed to leave the position for short periods? 
(f)  How often are guards inspected, by whom and at what times? 
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(g)  What means of communication for the post exist, i.e., telegraph, motor-cycle, or 
cycle messengers, carrier pigeons, etc.[?]  Can these be destroyed? 
(h)  Do mails or small detachments of men follow regular routes at fixed times, 
giving opportunities for ambushing? 
(i)  Do these detachments have sentries, advance parties, etc., or do they proceed in 
one group? 
(j)  Are motor vehicles fitted with bullet proof or puncture-proof tyres, armoured 
sides, etc.? 
(k)  What special tools and explosives, if any, are required for the operation, and 
what amount? 
Examples of such operations are given at the end of the book. 
8. Sabotage deals with the acts of individuals or small groups of people, which are 
carried out by stealth and not in conjunction with armed force.  These undertakings, 
however, frequently produce very valuable results and, like military action, force the 
enemy to disperse his strength in order to guard against them.  The following are 
examples of this type of work: -  [7] 
(a)  Jamming of railway points. 
(b)  Destructive work on roads, railways, canals, telegraphs, etc., where this can be 
done by stealth. 
(c)  Firing of stocks of petrol; burning garages, aeroplane hangers, etc. 
(d)  Contamination of food, of forage, etc., by acid, by bacilli, poison, etc. 
(e)  Contamination of petrol by water, sugar, etc. 
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(f)  Destruction of mails by burning, acids, etc. 
(g)  Shooting of sentries. 
(h)  Stampeding of horses. 
(i)  Use of time bombs in cars, trains, etc. 
 ETC. ETC. 
9. Sabotage to be effective requires the same degree of careful preparation as does 
military action.  The first point is to choose an objective which has some value, even if it 
is only the sniping of a sentry or the firing of a stack of forage.  Such shooting men that 
the enemy must double his sentries or risk their loss; such destruction means more 
guards.  So more troops have to be used, and this is one of your objects. 
 The next step must be to study the place and conditions, so that the most 
favourable moment for success can be selected.  A sure line of retreat, or an alibi, must 
be arranged beforehand.  Often it will be necessary to wait a fortnight or longer before 
the right opportunity presents itself.  At the same time, however, it may be necessary at 
times to carry out sabotage on the spur of the moment without previous preparation, for 
example when a convoy of lorries arrives [8] unexpectedly in a village, and there is a 
chance of setting one on fire.  Such opportunities should not be missed.  It is certain that 
the enemy will force a proportion of the inhabitants to work for him in mending roads, 
loading and unloading trains, and other works of a military nature.  Such working parties 
provide good opportunities for sabotage by time bombs, by acids and other devices. 
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10. Organization:- 
 (This particular pamphlet is intended simply for the use and instruction of 
guerilla „parties‟.  The higher organization of guerilla warfare throughout a whole 
country or region is dealt with in the manual “The Art of Guerilla Warfare”). 
 In the early stages of guerilla activities, before hostile counter-measures have 
become intense, it will be possible for the members of a party to live independently in 
their own villages and homes and carry on their normal occupations, only collecting 
when some operation is to be undertaken.  The longer they can go on living in this way 
the better.  When the enemy begin to take active measures to prevent guerilla warfare by 
raids on suspected houses, by arresting suspects, etc., it will eventually be necessary for 
the guerillas to „go on the run‟ – i.e., to leave their houses and live out in the country, 
hiding themselves by day, and moving at night.  The number of men „on the run‟ in any 
one party must depend on the nature of the country.  If it is wild, hilly, and forested, it 
may be possible for parties of up to 100 strong to avoid detection for long periods.  If the 
country is flat and featureless and cultivated, it may be difficult for even [9] one man to 
remain undetected for long.  The organization must therefore depend on the country; the 
wilder it is the closer can the organization be – i.e. the leader has his men closely under 
control all the time, and the party moves from place to place, as necessary, to carry out 
operations or avoid capture.  In less favourable country, the organization must be looser, 
and men must be collected for action by secret means.  If and when the enemy‟s 
activities make it too dangerous, for the time being, to continue, the men should leave 
their area, and join parties operating in more favourable conditions.  These latter parties 
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must always serve as a rallying point for men who have been forced by danger of arrest 
to „go on the run‟, for deserters from the enemy, and escaped prisoners. 
 The “leader” is responsible for the organization; the importance of selecting only 
men who are reliable and resourceful is thus paramount. 
11. Information: -  If you can keep yourself fully informed of the enemy‟s 
movements and intentions in your area, you are then best prepared against surprise, and 
at the same time have the best chance for your plans to succeed.  The enemy is 
handicapped in that his men must wear uniform and are living in a hostile country, 
whereas your agents wear ordinary clothes and belong to the people and can move freely 
among them.  Therefore, make every use of your advantage in order to obtain 
information.  Suitable people must be selected from among the inhabitants to collect 
information and pass it on; these should be people who are unfit for more active work, 
but whose occupations or intelligence make them specially suitable for the [10] task.  
The following are types who can usefully be employed:- 
(a)  Priests. 
(b)  Innkeepers. 
(c)  Waitresses, barmaids, and all café attendants. 
(d)  Domestic servants in houses were officers or men are billeted.  These are a very 
useful source. 
(e)  Doctors, dentists, hospital staffs. 
(f)  Shopkeepers, hawkers. 
(g)  Camp followers. 
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These people must be trained to know what sort of information is required; this is most 
easily done by questioning them on further points whenever they report anything, as they 
will then learn to look for the details required (see example at the end of the book). 
They must also be trained to be on the look-out for enemy agents disguised as 
compatriots. 
 It is important that as little as possible of this information should be in writing, 
or, if it is in writing, that it should not be kept any longer than necessary.  All papers, 
documents, etc., dealing with intelligence or your organization in any way, must be 
destroyed immediately [after] you have finished with them, or kept in a safe place until 
destroyed. 
 It has been proved over and over again in guerilla warfare that it is the capture of 
guerilla documents that has helped the enemy the most in his counter-measures.  These 
have been captured either on the persons of guerillas, or seized in houses that have been 
aided.  The utmost care is therefore necessary.  [11]   
12. Informers:-  The most stringent and ruthless measures must at all times be used 
against informers; immediately on proof of guilt they must be killed, and, if possible, a 
note pinned on the body stating that the man was an informer.  This is the best 
preventive of such crimes against the homeland.  If it is widely known that all informers 
will be destroyed, even the worst traitors will hesitate to sink to this depth of perfidy, 
whatever the reward offered. 
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 If a person is suspected of being an informer, he can be tested by giving him false 
information, and then seeing if the enemy acts on it.  If the enemy so acts, such evidence 
is sufficient proof of guilt, and the traitor must be liquidated at the first opportunity. 
13. Enemy Counter-Measures and their frustration:-  The best means of 
defeating the enemy‟s counter-measures is by superior information which will give 
warning of his intentions – i.e., of raids against suspected houses, of traps he may lay, of 
regulations he proposes to enforce in the territory he occupies, etc.  Attempts to bribe the 
people must be met by the measures shown in paragraph 12 above. 
 Certain counter-measures, however, can only be met by special action; for 
instance, the use of identity cards, which the enemy is certain to introduce when guerilla 
warfare becomes active, in order to assist him in tracing the guerillas.  It will then be 
necessary to obtain or copy the official seals and stamps so as to provide identity cards 
for the guerillas. 
 When the enemy finds that passive means are insufficient to defeat guerilla 
operations, he will resort to active measures.  These will probably take the form [12] of 
mobile columns of considerable strength, horsed or in motors, including armoured cars 
and tanks, with which he will make sudden sweeps, often by night, through the various 
parts of the country.  The bigger the column, the easier it is to obtain information about 
its projected movements, and it may even prove possible to combine several parties 
together and destroy it.  If, however, the enemy‟s measures are so comprehensive as to 
lead to unnecessary risk, it will often be better for the guerillas to lie quiet for a month or 
so, or move to another district. 
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14. Conclusion:-  All guerilla warfare and sabotage must be directed towards 
lighting strokes against the enemy simultaneously in widely distant areas, so as to 
compel him to weaken his main forces by detaching additional troops to guard against 
them.  These strokes will frequently be most effective when directed against his 
communications, thus holding up supplies and eventually preventing him from 
undertaking large scale operations.  At the same time, however, action should be taken 
against detachments, patrols, sentries, military lorries, etc., in such a way that the whole 
country is made unsafe except for large columns and convoys.  This will hamper the 
enemy‟s plans effectively. 
 The civilian population must be made to help by refusing to co-operate with the 
enemy, by providing information about the enemy, and by furnishing supplies and 
money to the guerillas.  If they suffer inconvenience from your activities, either directly 
or as a result of enemy counter-measures, it must be explained to them that they are 
helping to defeat the enemy as [13] much as their army at the front.  The bolder the 
activities of the guerillas, and the greater the impunity with which they can act, owing to 
their careful planning and superior information, the more will the population despise the 
enemy, be convinced of his ultimate defeat, and help the guerillas. 
 Remember that you are fighting for your homeland, your mother, wife and 
children.  Everything you can do to hamper and embarrass the enemy makes easier the 
task of your brothers-in-arms at the front who are fighting for you.  As your activities 
develop, the enemy will become more and more ruthless in his attempts to stop you; the 
only effective reply to this is greater ruthlessness, greater courage, and an even wider 
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development of your operations.  Your slogan must be “Shoot, burn and destroy”.  
Remember that guerilla warfare is what a regular army has always most to dread.  
When this warfare is conducted by leaders of determination and courage, an 
effective campaign by your enemies becomes almost impossible. 
 
ROAD AMBUSH.       Appendix I 
1. Planning. 
(a)  Find out by what roads small detachments and patrols of the enemy are 
accustomed to move.  Select on one of these roads a locality which offers a good 
opportunity for ambushing. 
2. Locality. 
 The following points should be looked for in selecting the locality for the 
ambush:- 
(a)  A line of retreat must be available which will give all the men a safe and sure 
way of escape.  [14] A thick wood, broken and rocky country, etc., give the best 
cover 
(b)  Firing positions are required which enable fire to be opened at point-blank range.  
When there is no chance of prior discovery by the enemy, it may sometimes be 
of advantage to improve the position by building a stone or sandbag parapet.  
This should not be done, however, unless it can be concealed from aircraft. 
(c)  The locality should provide at least two fire positions and it is often better if 
these are on opposite sides of the road. 
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(d)  It is best if the fire position enables the approaching enemy to be in view for 
three or four hundred yards.  By this means it can be discovered in time if the 
enemy is in greater strength than expected; in such a case the enemy should be 
allowed to pass without being attacked. 
3. Information. 
 Then get the following information:- 
(a)  Do the detachments move on foot, mounted, or in motor vehicles? 
(b)  What is the average strength of these detachments?  How are they armed?  How 
many vehicles 
(c)  Do they use armoured cars and light tanks to patrol the roads? 
(d)  At what times do they pass the place you have chosen? 
(e)  Do they move in one block, or do they put men [15] out in front and behind to 
guard against surprise?  How do these men move, and how far from the main body? 
(f)  How will they try to summon assistance if attacked?  Where is the nearest place 
such assistance can come from? 
(g)  If the detachment is carrying supplies, are those supplies of a type which can be 
easily destroyed by you, or be of use to you? 
(h)  What sort of troops are they, active or reserve, elderly, young or what?  Is there 
an officer with them?  Can he be picked out and shot by the first volley?  Can the 
N.C.Os be picked out as well? 
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4. Action. 
(a)  The men must get into position without any chances of discovery.  If there is any 
doubt, the position should be occupied by night. 
(b)  Sentries must be posted to give warning of the enemy‟s approach.  They must be 
in sight of the firing position.  It is not necessary to use guerillas for all sentry 
posts; a woman or child can sometimes be employed with advantage as they need 
not be in hiding. 
(c)  A simple system of signaling by sentries must be arranged.  This can be the 
removal of a hat, doing up a shoelace or any natural action of that nature. 
(d)  If the enemy detachment is preceded by scouts, or a scouting vehicle, these 
should be allowed to pass on and not be fired at.  Sometimes, however, it may be 
advantageous to place one [16] or two guerillas further on from the firing 
position to shoot these scouts.  They must never be fired on, however, before 
the main attack begins; the guerilla leader must make certain this is known 
and understood. 
(e)  The leader must give the signal to open fire.  This can either be pre-arranged or 
given at the moment.  Fire must be rapid fire, so as to have an immediate 
overwhelming effect. 
(f)  Two or three of the best shots must be detailed to shoot any officers or N.C.Os.  
If these cannot be recognized by their uniforms, they can be discovered by noting 
who is shouting orders, etc. 
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(g)  If the enemy appears to be destroyed, and it  is intended to destroy or looting any 
cars or lorries, men for this task must be detailed beforehand.  The rest must 
remain ready to open fire in case enemy are concealed in the lorries, or 
reinforcements arrive. 
(h)  The leader must give the signal to retire, and this signal must be unmistakeable. 
 To judge the correct moment to break off the action is the leader’s most 
difficult task.  If the opening volleys of fires have not disorganized the enemy, it 
will probably be better to retire immediately, and be content with the damage 
done.  If, however, the enemy detachment is completely destroyed, the 
opportunity should always be taken to seize all rifles, ammunitions, etc., and 
destroy or loot all other material.  All papers and documents found should be 
taken away for examination.  The dead must be searched for any-[17]thing that 
may be useful. 
(i)  Remember that soldiers will always face the  direction from which they are being 
fired at.  It is usually best therefore to divide the party into two groups, on 
different sides of the road, of which only one group should fire first.  The enemy 
will then face towards this group and start to attack and fire.  The other group 
must then shoot the enemy in the back. 
(j)  Sentries must remain in position until the leader gives the signal to retire. 
(k)  Retirement when begun should be as rapid and dispersed as possible, i.e., the 
party must break up, and collect again as the leader may have ordered.  Make full 
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use of the time until the enemy hears of the attack to get right away from the 
scene. 
(l)  All wounded guerillas must be carried away if possible.  It may be useful to have 
a few horses hidden at a short distance to carry wounded. 
5. Road Blocks. 
 The use of road blocks by means of trenches, fallen trees, rocks, etc., in 
conjunction with an ambush must be carefully considered.   
 At the commencement of guerilla warfare, before the enemy has had experience, 
it may be useful to have a block at the place of ambush, so as to force lorries to halt.  
When, however, the enemy is experienced, he will use scouts and patrols on all roads, 
and these will be warned by the blocks and so warn their [18] detachments.  A stout wire 
rope fastened across the road after scouts have passed, at a suitable height to catch the 
motor driver, is a useful device. 
 If it can be arranged to have mines or bombs buried in the road which scouts will 
not see, these are of great assistance in demoralising the enemy.  Fire should not be 
opened until the mine has been exploded under the enemy.  Here are details of road 
mines:- 
 (1)  Crater or Land Mine:-  60lbs. of high explosive buried 5 feed deep and 
fired electrically will produce a crater 25 feet across which will wreck a tank, armoured 
car, etc., completely.  All traces of the digging must be obliterated carefully to avoid the 
enemy locating the ambush by scouts on motor-cycles.  The digging for this reason 
should be done outside the tarred area of the road but close to it.  If done overnight and 
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watered as soon as filled in, the traces of excavation can best be obliterated.  The debris 
from the explosion will be thrown as far as 200 yards.  Men in ambush 100 yards away, 
behind cover, are sufficiently protected, however.  A crater so formed, if in a defile, is an 
impassible obstacle to tanks.  The method of laying the charge is as follows:- 
 A hole 5 feet deep is dug and 60 lbs. of explosive in its paper wrapping is placed 
in the bottom.  The paper wrapping of one packet is broken and an electric detonator is 
inserted, dug well into the explosive itself.  Two wires, 100 yards in length, are joined, to 
the two ends of wire projecting from the electric detonator.  If the ground is wet, these 
joints must be protected with insulating tape or some other covering.  Care must be taken 
that the two joints do not touch. [19] The long wires are then led away to a distance and 
hidden where necessary in a shallow trench.  When the two outer ends of the wire are 
connected to the terminals of an ordinary car battery the charge will be exploded. 
 (2)  Small Land Mine:-  A charge of 10 lbs. of high explosive with not more 
than 6 inches of earth covering will blow the track off a tank or the wheel off a lorry 
passing over it.  The road should therefore be partially blocked by a broken-down farm 
cart or other means so that all traffice is forced to proceed through a very limited gap.  
The charge should be placed as in the preceding paragraph, but may be fired from a 
distance of 25 yards.  Care must be taken to judge the exact moment the wheel of the 
vehicle passes over the charge. 
 (3)  Hand Bombs:-  These are of two sorts, those with a 7 second time fuze and 
those which go off on impact.  The impact bomb is essentially for throwing.  The 
thrower should locate himself behind a wall or other cover, preferably within 10 yards of 
  
380 
where the enemy will pass.  The bomb will smash through any metal it is in contact with 
on impact, but will have little effect on a vehicle elsewhere.  It should therefore be 
thrown to hit the side or tracks of a tank or the wheel of a vehicle.  The time bomb is 
most effectively used for the destruction of any machinery or vehicles in which it is 
placed or thrown. 
6. Remember:- 
(a)  Let scouts pass. 
(b)  Use your best shots to kill any officers or [20] N.C.Os and drivers of vehicles 
immediately. 
(c)  Armed sentries must remain at their posts until ordered to retire. 
(d)  Any looking or destruction must be protected by men ready to fire. 
 
RAIL AMBUSH.       Appendix II. 
 In general the rules for road ambushes apply to rail ambushes, so read them and 
make certain you understand them. 
 The difference between a rail ambush and a road ambush is that in a rail ambush 
you must combine some plan to wreck the train, either by derailing it, by blowing a mine 
under the engine, or other means.  It is not sufficient merely to shoot at the train; this 
would do more harm than good and must be avoided. 
(1)  The principle is first to derail the train and then shoot down the survivors. 
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(2)  Choose some place which is suitable for wrecking, for example a high 
embankment where the falling engine will drag the coaches down with it; or a 
bridge, where the drain will, with luck fall into the river. 
(3)  Do not choose a place where trains run slowly; the faster the train is going, the 
better results you will get. 
(4)  The coaches at the rear of the train will probably suffer least damage; your first 
volleys should be directed against. 
(5)  It is best to dispose your party into two groups, [21] as in a road ambush, on 
opposite sides of the train. 
(6)  The signal to shoot will be when the wrecking starts or the mine is exploded.  
Everyone must start firing immediately. 
(7)  The train must not be looted until you are certain that all resistance by the enemy 
is at an end.  After looking, it should be set on fire. 
(8)  If the train is armoured, and the wrecking has not been severe, it may be better to 
retire immediately.  An armoured train will usually have many machine-guns 
with it.   
Read again the rules for a Road Ambush and apply them to this case. 
 Here are some methods of derailing a train:- 
To derail a train with certainty, both rains must be cut.  This can be done very easily in 
the following ways:- 
(1)  One pound of high explosive pressed hard against the side of each rail. 
(2)  Three pounds of high explosive placed against the under sides of each rail. 
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(3)  Ten pounds of high explosive buried under the ballast not more than 4 inches 
from each rail. 
(4)  A single charge of fifty pounds of high explosive buried three or four feet deep 
between the rails.  This will lift the locomotive ten feet into the air and is the best way 
where no bridge or steep slope can be found. 
 If the derailing is done by methods (3) or (4), [22] or where the ballast has been 
allowed to come close up under the rails by method (2) as well, it will be possible to lay 
the charge so that it will be undetected by day.  Care must be taken not to show any 
signs of digging.  A tin of water should be carried to wash down the stone ballast and 
clean it of earth adhering to it when using methods (3) or (4). 
 In all cases, it is best to fire the charge under or just in front of the front wheels 
of the locomotive.  This can be done in two ways:- 
(a)  By means of an electric detonator with long wires leading to a battery where a 
man is concealed to operate it at the right moment. 
(b)  By means of a striker machine which is buried under a sleeper next to a rail joint.  
The weight of the locomotive passing over releases a striker which fires the 
charge by means of an instantaneous fuze. 
In both cases, the detonator must be buried firmly in the explosive.  When a battery is 
used, great care must be taken that the battery does not come near the end of the wire till 
the last moment, to avoid accidents. 
 A length of wire up to 100 yards may be used leading away from the explosive to 
a hidden spot where it is fired.  Insulated wire such as is used for electric light in houses 
  
383 
must be used.  The accumulator batter out of a car is best but a good hand torch dry 
battery will do. [23] 
 
Diagrams
1255
 of methods (1) and (2) of cutting rails:- 
Method (1). 
 
 
[24] 
 
                                                 
1255
 Diagrams used with the permission of the Imperial War Museum for dissertation purposes only.  Not 
to be reproduced without the permission of the copyright holder. 
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Method (2). 
 
 
Detonator and wires to battery should be arranged as in Method (1). 
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[ 25] Method of connecting electric detonators. 
 
 
 
 The electric detonator is in two parts:- 
(1)  The detonator, which is a small copper tube  closed at one end and open at the 
other. 
(2)  The T head, which has two wires sticking out of one end and a very thin bridge 
of wire like the filament of a lame the other.  The filament end of the T head is 
pressed into the open end of the detonator.  When an electric current passes 
through the filament it gets red hot and burns away completely but in doing so 
ignites the detonator. 
When wires are joined together or to the T head or battery, the covering must be 
cut away and the metal cleaned bright by scraping with a knife.  The wires may 
then be twisted together.  The bare wire at a joint must never touch anything, 
especially another joint.  It is best to bind insulating tape or a piece of cloth round 
the joint.  The joining of the wires for two charges fired by one battery is shown 
on page 26.  [26] 
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[27] Destruction of Railway Engines:- 
(1)  If you have no explosives, run off most of the water into the boiler and bank up 
the fire.  The fire box, no longer cooled by the water, will get red hot and the steam 
pressure will bend it in. 
(2)  If you have explosives, make it up into one pound packets each with a hand 
bomb time striker mechanism.  This mechanism will explode the charge six seconds 
after the pin is pulled out.  The best places to put these charges are on any of the large 
machined portions of the engine which the hand bombs will cover and are not more than 
1” thick.  If the engine is cold, open the smoke box in front and put a charge just inside 
one of the tube openings. 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF AN ENEMY     Appendix III. 
POST, DETACHMENT OR GUARD. 
1. The object of this can be either to inflict casualties on the enemy, or to carry out 
the destruction of some place which the detachment is guarding. 
2. The detachment will usually be housed in a small house, hut, or tents, and will 
have taken steps to try and make these safe against attack.  Remember, however, that if 
you use cunning, patience, and determination, no small post can be made impregnable 
and at the same time do its job of protection properly. [28] 
3. Information:-  You must get detailed information of the posts in your area, and 
then decide which offers the best chances of success.  It may not be possible to get full 
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details of all, but you will get enough information about some of them to enable you to 
select one and carry out a successful attack. 
4. The points on which you should get information are:- 
(a)  Strength of the detachment, number of officers, N.C.Os etc. 
(b)  Who commands the detachment? 
(c)  Are the troops active or reserve?  Are they old or young men?  To what regiment 
or district do they belong? 
(d)  What arms and equipment do they carry?  Have they machine-guns? 
(e)  Is there a reserve of arms in the post?  Where are they kept? 
(f)  What are the orders for safe custody of arms?  Are they locked up? 
(g)  What means of communication has the post  got – i.e. 
(i)   Telegraph or telephone wireless. 
(ii)   Signal flags. 
(iii)  Rockets. 
(iv)  Pigeons. 
(v)   Sirens, hooters. 
(vi)  Messengers. 
    ETC. 
 Can any of these be destroyed when necessary? 
(h)  What sentries does the post provide – [29] 
(i)  On the railway, bridge, or store it is guarding? 
(ii) On the post itself? 
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(i)  At what hours are sentries relieved –  
(i)  By day? 
(ii) By night? 
(k)  How is relief carried out? 
(l)  Is there a group of men in the post always ready for immediate action?  How 
strong is it? 
(m)  How long is each sentry‟s beat?  What are its limits? 
(n)  What places can these sentries not see except by going to them? 
(o)  Are any civilians allowed to approach or enter the post, selling food, papers, 
etc.?  Can you use any of these civilians to get information? 
(p)  Are there any searchlights in position? 
(q)  Is the post protected with barbed wire?  Is this wire electrified?  How do soldiers 
get in and out? 
(r)  Where does the post get its water supply from? 
 Can the source of water be destroyed? 
(s)  How often is the post and its guard inspected by someone from outside? 
(t)  How far away is the nearest re-inforcement and how long would it take to come?  
Can it be ambushed on the way by another part? 
(u)  Can your destructive work be undertaken while the post is being fired at, or must 
the post first be destroyed completely? [30] 
(v)  Can the post be blinded by smoke bombs for long enough to allow the 
destruction to be done? 
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(x)  Are there watch-dogs, alarm traps, etc.? 
 ETC. ETC. 
5. Plan:-  This must depend on the information collected regarding the daily life 
and habits of the post, the state of alertness of the guard, its strength, armament, etc. 
 If the post is very small – say six to eight men – it may be possible to capture it 
by getting one or two men inside to seize the arms and hold up the guard at the moment 
the sentries are shot; on the other hand, it may be possible to rush the post from outside 
after shooting the sentries, to surround it and cut all communication, and shoot down all 
the men inside.  It will also frequently be practicable to carry out destruction by one 
group while the other group of the party prevents the enemy of the post interfering.  This 
depends to some extent on how long the destruction will take. 
 If the post is large, it will probably not be possible to destroy it.  In such cases, if 
you wish to carry out some really important destructive work, it should be attempted by 
masking the post with heavy fire, smoke, etc.  Such an attack has usually most chance of 
success when carried out by night. 
In every case of an attack on a post, your first care must be to arrange for the 
destruction of means of communication – i.e., telegraph, wireless, etc. – unless you 
have a plan to ambush reinforcements. [31] 
 Do not alarm any post that you mean eventually to attack – i.e., do not allow men 
to snipe it, to cut off its water supply, etc.  Leave it absolutely quite until the moment for 
attack comes.  This will put the enemy off his guard. 
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CONCELAMENT AND CARE OF    Appendix IV. 
ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES 
Try and get your arms before the enemy invades your country, so that you can 
conceal them more easily and at leisure. 
1. One of the first acts of the enemy will be to demand the surrender of all arms 
held by the civil population. 
2. All arms, bombs, etc., which are concealed must be protected against damp, rust, 
etc.; remember that your life and that of your friends may depend on a weapon in good 
order.  The best way of preserving rifles, revolvers, etc., is to cover them with mineral 
jelly or Vaseline, and wrap them in greasy paper or cloth.  They may then be safely 
buried. 
3. Places where arms can be concealed are:- 
(a)  In the ground by burying.  Choose a place where the earth has already been 
turned, or else go far away into a wood, etc. 
(b)  In the thatch or roof of a house. 
(c)  In a well-shaft, by making a chamber in the wall six feet or more down the shaft. 
(d)  In the banks of streams, in hollow trees, behind a water-fall, etc. [32] 
(e)  In haystacks, potato or turnip heaps, ditches, culverts, etc. 
(f)  Do not use places like cellars, wooden floors, cattle sheds, etc., which the enemy 
is bound to search. 
(g)  As a last resort, give them to your women if caught unexpectedly. 
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4. You must make every effort to obtain arms and ammunition from the enemy 
during ambushes, raids, sniping, etc., as it will be difficult in time of war to replenish 
your stock by other means.  Boxes of rifles and ammunition are frequently transported 
by rail and in lorries, inadequately guarded: find out when these are being carried and try 
and get them. 
Be very cautious of buying arms from a supposed enemy traitor.  This is a common 
way of inducing you to walk into a trap. 
 
THE ENEMY’S INFORMATION     Appendix V. 
SYSTEM AND HOW TO COUNTER IT. 
 As soon as guerilla warfare or sabotage commences, the enemy will set up an 
information organization in order to try and find out your organization, leaders and 
intentions. 
The methods he will employ are as follows:- 
(1)  Local agents, selected from amongst the inhabitants, and either bribed or 
compelled to act for him. 
(2)  Agents recruited from his own or other coun tries and imported into your area. 
 These two types of agents can only be discov-[33]ered by very careful work on 
your part, by getting information regarding arrivals of unknown people, by laying 
traps for suspected agents, etc. 
(3)  Special information branches that he will form. 
(4)  Captured prisoners and their interrogation. 
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(5)  Captured documents which may reveal details of your organization, plans, 
names of partisans, etc.  It is most important that no documents should be kept 
unless absolutely essential, and these should never be carried on the person for 
longer than necessary.  This is usually the enemy‟s best source of information. 
(6)  Censorship of civilian letters. 
(7)  By placing agents among captured partisans.  This is a difficult thing to counter 
and can only be met by strict discipline among the partisans in the prisons and 
concentration camps.  They should be trained never to talk about their military 
matters, to mention names, or to give away any information at all.  Steps must be 
taken within prisons by the partisans to test and try out every prisoner who comes 
in, to make absolutely certain that he is not an agent in disguise. 
(8)  Listening sets:-  These will also be placed in prisons and camps, so all 
conversation must be restricted to general matters and nothing said which might 
lead to the capture or death of your compatriots. [34] 
(9)  Men who are captured must at once organize themselves in the prison to censor 
all their own letters that they are writing to friends outside, and to censor all 
incoming letters to individual prisoners. 
(10)  The best method of dealing with informers is their ruthless extermination when 
discovered, as described in the main part of this book.   
(11)  Prisoners who are being interrogated may be tempted by the fact that there is 
only one enemy in the room to give away information if pressed, as they may 
feel that only one person will know it.  All men must know that this is not 
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correct; not only will the enemy install listening sets in the room in which the 
prisoners are interrogated in order that two or three people may hear any 
confession, but also all the information a prisoner gives, and his name and 
district, will be taken down in writing and distributed everywhere.  His comrades 
would then eventually discover his treachery and he would be dealt with suitably 
when the enemy has been defeated. 
 You must try and break up or hinder the enemy‟s information organization by all 
means.  The most effective is the destruction of the personnel engaged on that work.  
Intelligence officers, N.C.Os, etc., will frequently work individually and move about the 
countryside.  Opportunities must be sought to kill them and destroy or carry off any 
papers they are carrying. [35]  
 
HOW TO COUNTER ENEMY ACTION.   Appendix VI. 
 The enemy will make use of his superior armaments to try and break up guerilla 
activities.  Here are some of the methods he will employ, and ways for you to counter 
them. 
(1)  Aeroplanes:- These will be used to search the country for guerilla parties, and 
possibly also to attack them.  The best counter is concealment, therefore move as 
much as you can by night.  By day, on the approach of an aeroplane, men must 
be taught to get under whatever cover is available, and to lie still with faces to 
the ground.  Movement and human faces show up to aeroplanes at once. 
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 Do not fire at an aeroplane unless actually attacked by it.  Remember that an 
aeroplane, if it sees you, will at once report your position to the nearest military 
detachment who will come out after you.  Therefore, if you think your party has been 
seen, move off at once to some other place, and keep a good lookout. 
(2)  Tanks, armoured cars, armour-plated lorries etc.:-  Do not shoot at these 
haphazardly; it will have no effect unless you have anti-tank rifles and bombs, 
etc.  You must lay a proper trap if you are trying to destroy them – i.e. a road 
mine or block, or the vehicle must be halted.  Remember that these vehicles shut 
down their windows when attacked, and are then very blind; it will then be 
possible for [36] hold men to crawl close enough to bomb them or set them on 
fire with petrol. 
(3)  Gas:-  The enemy will only use gas if he gets you in a corner and other methods 
fail.  Therefore your first precaution must be to avoid being caught where you 
cannot get away.  Your information of the enemy‟s plans and proper posting of 
sentries and look-outs when the party is collected will prevent you being caught.  
If you hear that the enemy intends using gas against guerillas, all men should 
provide themselves with gas-masks. 
(4)  Shells, bombs, grenades:-  Against these weapons the best protection is to be 
down flat behind any cover available, such as a bank, ditch, etc. 
(5)  Machine-guns, etc. :-  Smoke bombs can be used to create a smoke screen 
between yourself and the machine-gun so as to enable you to get away. 
 
  
396 
GUERILLA INFORMAION SERVICE.    Appendix VII. 
1. Early information of the enemy‟s moves, strength, intention, etc., is vitally 
important.  You must therefore impress on all your compatriots the necessity of passing 
on to some members of the party any information they hear.  The following, owing to 
their occupations, are in a good position to get news:- [37] 
(a)  Innkeepers, hawkers. 
(b)  Waitresses, barmaids, etc. 
(c)  Postmen, telephone and telegraph operators. 
(d)  Station-masters, railway porters and staffs. 
(e)  Doctors, priests, dentists, hospital staff. 
(f)  Domestic servants, barbers. 
(g)  Shopkeepers, newsagents. 
(h)  Contractors, camp followers, camp sanitary  men. 
(i)  All people who have access to military camps, establishments, etc. 
(j)  Discontented enemy soldiers. 
2. Domestic servants and café attendants are particularly valuable agents; they must 
be encouraged to gain the confidence of the enemy soldiers, and be on easy and intimate 
terms with them.  Suitable agents of this type should be introduced into houses where 
enemy officers are billeted, etc.  It is a natural weakness of soldiers in a hostile country 
to react favourably to acts of courtesy and kindness from women; such men will 
frequently drop unsuspecting hints that they are shortly going on patrol, etc.  The agent 
must then find out as much detail as possible and pass it on at once. 
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3. Discontented soldiers must be discovered, i.e., those who have recently been 
punished, have had their pay stopped, etc.  These, if encouraged, may give useful 
information. 
4. Information should be passed by word of mouth unless that is impossible.  If 
impossible, it must be written and sent by messenger (children frequently make good 
messengers) or placed in a pre-arranged [38] place, and then destroyed by the recipient. 
 
SABOTAGE METHODS.      Appendix VIII. 
 Sabotage means any act done by individuals that interferes with the enemy and 
so helps your people to defeat him.  It covers anything from the shooting of a sentry to 
the blowing-up of an ammunition dump.  The following are various acts, and the best 
way of 
carrying out the difficult ones:- 
(1)  Lorries, cars, tanks, etc.:-  Burn them by knocking a hole in the bottom of the 
petrol tank, and setting fire to the escaping petrol.  If you can‟t burn them, put 
water or sugar in the petrol tank, or remove the magneto, etc.  This will 
temporarily disable the vehicle. 
(2)  Munition Dumps:-  The best method is to lay a charge of explosive among the 
shells and then explode it, but it will be rare that you will get an opportunity to 
do this unless you are disguised as an enemy soldier.  There are other ways.  If 
the dump is in a building, a good way is to set fire to the building.  Use oil-
soaked rags, shavings, thermite bomb.  If the dump is in an open field or by the 
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road, throw a special bomb into it (this must be a bomb with at least one 
kilogramme of explosive in it, and you must hit a shell or it will not be effective). 
(3)  Cement:-  Open the sacks, and pour water on them, or leave them for rain and 
moisture to get in. [39] 
(4)  Hay, Forage:-  Burn or throw acid or disinfectant. 
(5)  Petrol stocks:-  Use a special bomb or thermite bomb. 
(6)  Refrigerator sheds, and refrigerator railway vans:-  Destroy the refrigerating 
apparatus. 
(7)  Sniping and killing sentries, stragglers, etc.  Get a rifle or revolver with a 
silencer, but use a knife or noose when you can.  This has a great frightening 
effect.  Don‟t act unless you are certain you can get away safely.  Nighttime is 
best and has the best effect on enemy nerves.  Get used to moving about in the 
dark yourself.  Wear rubber shoes and darken your face. 
(8)  Telegraph lines on roads and railways:-  Cut these whenever possible.  When 
you cannot reach them, throw over a rope with a weight on the end and try and 
drag them down.  Cut down a tree so that it will fall across them. 
(9)  Railways:-  Jam the points by hammering a  wooden wedge into them.  Cut 
signal wires.  Set fire to any coaches and wagons you can get at.  If you can use 
explosive, try and destroy the points.  Remember that railways can carry very 
little traffice if the signaling apparatus is interfered with, and this traffice must go 
every slowly. 
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(10)  Water supplies:-  Contaminate water which [40] is used by the enemy.  Use 
paraffin, strong disinfectants, salt, etc. 
(11)  Destruction of leading marks, buoys, lightships, etc., in navigable waters. 
(12)  Burning of soldiers’ cinemas, theatres:-  Cinema films are highly 
inflammable.  The cinema should be fired during a performance by firming the 
films in the operator‟s box.  This should easily be arranged. 
(13)  Time bombs, cigar-shaped, are very suitable for placing in trains, lorries, etc.  
They are made of lead tubing, dividing into two halves by a copper disc.  
Suitable acids are put in each half, and when they have eaten the copper away, 
the acids combine and form an intensely hot flame, which set fire to anything 
with which it comes into contact.  The thickness of the copper disc determines 
when the bomb will go off.  Get some of these bombs. 
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